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This thesis investigates sacrifice in experimental narratives of the early twentieth 
century by May Sinclair, Mary Butts, and H. D. (Hilda Doolittle). I argue that 
sacrifice is used as a narrative strategy for negotiating the relationship between self 
and other, not only on a thematic level, but also in terms of narrative strategy. These 
shifts are not only indicative of the tendency to experiment with unexpected 
narrative strategies in early twentieth century fiction, but also reveal a concern with 
the individual self in relation to a community of other selves that intersects several 
wider issues in the historical/cultural context of the works studied: the First World 
War, first-wave feminism, psychoanalysis, and anthropological research. As first-, 
second-, and third-person modes of narration are interspersed, the boundaries 
between narrative selves are continually dissolved and reinstated. The continuous 
negotiation of the boundaries of the narrative voice means that these narratives 
promote both the death and the resurrection of the subjective self through the use of 
sacrifice as a narrative strategy.  
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This thesis investigates sacrifice in experimental narratives of the early twentieth 
century written by the three authors May Sinclair, Mary Butts, and H. D. (Hilda 
Doolittle). I argue that sacrifice is used as a narrative strategy for negotiating the 
relationship between self and community on both a thematic level and a stylistic 
level in the works studied. Sacrifice is understood in this thesis as meaning acts of 
renunciation, normally made in times of uncertainty or upheaval, which have the 
potential to confer a quality of transcendence to the performer of the sacrifice and 
the thing or person sacrificed, as well as effect a negotiation of chaos and order in a 
given community. I discuss this definition of sacrifice and related concepts at length 
below. The thematic use of sacrifice concerns both transcendent and concrete aspects 
of the concept, for instance spiritual awakening on the one hand and actual death on 
the other, because the two are inseparable; in order for a death to be a sacrifice it has 
to involve a transcendental facet. 
The stylistic use of sacrifice concerns the formation and abnegation of the 
narrative self through pronoun shifts: otherwise unmarked changes to the personal 
pronoun that indicate a change in the narrative stance. The continuous negotiation of 
the boundaries of the narrative voice is a grammatical representation of the 
sacrificial theme on the pages of the novels studied, because it expresses not only 
moments of uncertainty and identity crises, but also a return to certainty with every 
shift back to a familiar referent. The pronoun shifts thereby simulate sacrifice in that 
they dissolve and reinstate boundaries between narrative selves, thus negotiating 
between chaos and order. 
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 What I bring to the discussion of the fiction of May Sinclair, Mary Butts, and 
H. D. is an exploration of the connection between sacrifice and the self, and how this 
links in with experiments with narration in the form of shifts between the first, 
second, and third personal pronoun in the narrative voice. The pronoun shifts not 
only show a suspicion towards a hegemonic narrator and a linear narrative, but also 
imply a continual dissolution and reconstitution of the self. I will consider what, if 
any, relation the concept of sacrifice has to narrative innovation in general. 
The self is understood here as a combination of qualia and the 
autobiographical self, and community is understood as the experience of 
intersubjectivity. Qualia is understood here as defined by David Chalmers as a 
‘quality of experience’ of consciousness, or ‘those properties of mental states that 
type those states by what it is like to have them.’1 I will argue that the convergence 
of sacrifice and experimental narration, formally expressed through pronoun shifts in 
the narrative voice, is contingent on the problem of a simultaneous realisation of a 
defined self and an intersubjective consciousness. The operational definition of 
intersubjectivity as used in this thesis is that of a shared experience between more 
than one subject. Sacrifice is represented linguistically and thematically in the 
studied fictional narratives to temporarily make sense of and create order in a context 
that lacks an institutionalised belief. Understanding the relationship between self and 
community is crucial for the concept of sacrifice, as it prompts the question of 
whether it is right for the community to take precedence over the self. Whereas the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4; 359, n. 2. This, for Chalmers, 
is ‘[t]he really hard problem of consciousness’ in philosophy as opposed to the nuts 
and bolts of neurophysiology: ‘[w]hy should physical processing give rise to a rich 
inner life at all?’ David Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 5. 
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act of sacrifice implies that the answer is yes, I interpret the works studied here as 
representing an ambiguous stance. The central object of this thesis is to find out why 
sacrifice takes a central position in the studied works, and how it can be read both as 
regenerative or creative and destructive.  
Sacrifice is often perceived as destructive – its connotations are to terrorism, 
scapegoating, violence, and death. Yet to make sense of the texts that this thesis 
seeks to investigate, where sacrifice plays an integral part in events that both 
promote and negate self-development, a less one-sided understanding of sacrifice is 
needed. The thesis will therefore attempt to look at sacrifice without ascribing to it 
an inherently negative value, in order to understand its role in developmental as well 
as destructive processes. 
 The choice of authors was made after careful consideration of several writers 
of the early twentieth century, some of whom will be looked at briefly in chapter 1. 
The decision to focus on May Sinclair, Mary Butts, and H. D. developed out of this 
initial investigation, where it was found that these three authors represent three 
different and significant ways of writing sacrifice into fiction in the interwar period. 
In chapter 1, I give the details of my reasoning behind this choice. 
 The first section of chapter 1 deals with the contextualisation of sacrifice in 
early twentieth century fiction. I then outline my conceptualisation of sacrifice in its 
philosophical and anthropological context. Here, I use various theories of self-
consciousness – primarily those of G. W. F. Hegel, Daniel Dennett, and David 
Chalmers – to connect sacrifice with intersubjectivity, that is, the self in relation to 
other selves. I argue that rather than being a problematic concept, sacrifice is actually 
crucial to the formation of self for protagonists in the novels studied. For this reason 
I am using sacrifice as a wide concept that encompasses aspects of the term from 
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ritual blood sacrifice to more everyday forms of self-immolation. The chapter finally 
explains the connections between sacrifice and the pronoun shifts that mark various 
plateaux of the narrator-protagonist’s renunciation and realisation of the self, which 
will be exemplified in the case studies. 
Chapter 2 concerns May Sinclair, primarily her two novels Mary Olivier: A 
Life (1919) and Life and Death of Harriett Frean (1922). I propose that the two 
novels adopt two opposing methods to describe experiences of the self. In the former 
narrative, sacrifice serves as a key to reaching an illuminated state of self, or self-
realisation, whereas the latter novel presents a dark-sided counterpart: sacrifice that 
leads to self-annihilation. The narrative techniques used in each novel represent not 
only a side of sacrifice and its relation to self-realisation, but a side of the problem of 
consciousness as well.  
The work of Mary Butts, dealt with in chapter 3, exemplifies ritual sacrifice 
in the novel through the use of scapegoating and mythologising mechanisms to 
address some of the problems that modernism sought to illustrate. The three novels 
Ashe of Rings (1925), Armed with Madness (1928), and Death of Felicity Taverner 
(1932) incorporate a plethora of images of sacrifice, crucifixion, self-immolation, 
and literal blood sacrifice. The texts are also deeply concerned with the space 
between communal responsibility and individual freedom; they probe whether or not 
humans need structure, and whether it is possible to institute a community that is not 
oppressive to any one individual. Interestingly, all of the sacrifices in Butts’ novels 
appear to be made with the aim of bringing about structure. The suggestion of the 
chapter is that they are not singularly successful in doing so. 
The early prose works of H. D. are the focus of chapter 4, in which the 
conception of identity and selfhood is found to be tied to notions of sacrifice in a 
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variety of contexts: war, motherhood, martyrdom, and classicism. The negotiation 
between self-sacrifice and self-assertion in H. D.’s Madrigal cycle – which consists 
of HERmione (written 1926, published 1981), Asphodel (written 1921-2, published 
1992), Bid Me to Live (A Madrigal) (written 1939, published 1960), and Paint It 
Today (written 1921, published 1992) – creates a need for experimental pronoun 
shifts in the narratives.2 These shifts in turn create a space of intersubjective 
consciousness that continuously negotiates the boundaries of the self. 
The works chosen from each author share a narrative strategy that is related 
to sacrifice – shifts in the personal pronoun used by the narrative voice. The 
significance of reading sacrifice as a theme side by side with these experiments on 
the grammatical level brings a new perspective on pronoun shifts as a narrative 
strategy. The pronoun shifts represent a continuous giving up and regaining of the 
self on the level of the sentence and are therefore conceptually linked to a concern 
with sacrifice through the negotiation between individual and community, a highly 
relevant issue in the historical context of the fictional works.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See further discussion about the complications involved in dating these works in 
chapter 4, n.2. 
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Chapter 1 
Sacrifice and Experimental Narration 
 
 
In order to look at the experimental narratives in this study through the prism of 
sacrifice, it is essential to situate the concept of sacrifice in relation to early 
twentieth-century fiction. It is also necessary to formulate a definition of sacrifice 
that is relevant both to the case studies and to their wider context. In this chapter, I 
will look at the relationship between sacrifice and experimental narration by placing 
sacrifice it in the context of modernist fiction, discussing definitions of the concept, 
and relating sacrifice to theories of consciousness and the self. I will also explain my 
choice of materials and what type of narrative pronoun shifts I look at in the selected 
novels in order to clarify how the narrative strategy is linked to sacrifice as a theme. 
 
Sacrifice in Modernist Fiction 
Sacrifice has been identified as a central theme in much modernist fiction in previous 
scholarly work, but normally these works have used definitions of sacrifice that are 
narrower than the one applied in this thesis. Sacrifice in these studies tends to be 
understood as ritual sacrifice, which implies an orientalisation or othering of the 
concept, rather than looking at its wider significance. One such study is Culture and 
Sacrifice: Ritual Death in Literature and Opera (2007), in which Derek Hughes 
examines the role that ritualised human sacrifice has played in Western culture and 
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states that ‘[h]uman sacrifice is everywhere in Modernist texts.’1 Hughes’ study 
concerns human sacrifice only, and it distinguishes between human and other kinds 
of sacrifice by claiming that human sacrifice is equivalent to ‘moral chaos’ and thus 
representative of ‘primal barbarity’; human victims signify a ‘corruption of 
sacrifice.’2 Hughes further argues that James George Frazer is the only 
anthropologist to have any major literary influence: ‘Only at one point has there been 
any substantial interaction between literature and anthropology: in the influence of 
Frazer’s The Golden Bough.’3 Hughes boldly claims that Henri Hubert and Marcel 
Mauss’ Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice (Sacrifice: Its Nature and 
Function, 1898) ‘made no impact on literature,’ but does not back up this statement 
beyond pointing out that ‘[i]ts account of the logic of sacrifice was theoretically and 
psychologically remote…’4 This appears to be a very misleading claim given the 
influence of Hubert and Mauss on for instance Jane Harrison’s work, which in turn 
had a profound effect on modernist authors as shown for instance in Martha C. 
Carpentier’s  Ritual, Myth and the Modernist Text: The Influence of Jane Ellen 
Harrison on Joyce, Eliot and Woolf (1998). There will be further discussion below 
of the intertextual relevance of Jane Harrison and the importance of her work for the 
authors studied. Hughes’ statement about Hubert and Mauss and his neglect of 
Harrison skews the image he gives of sacrifice in modernist literature.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Derek Hughes, Culture and Sacrifice: Ritual Death in Literature and Opera 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 2. 
2 Hughes, Culture and Sacrifice, 6; 11. 
3 Hughes, Culture and Sacrifice, 6. Several scholars have dealt with the impact of the 
work of James George Frazer on writers of fiction, notably in John B. Vickery’s The 
Literary Impact of The Golden Bough (1973), and Sir James Frazer and the Literary 
Imagination: Essays in Affinity and Influence (1990), a collection of essays edited by 
Robert Fraser. 
4 Hughes, Culture and Sacrifice, 211. 
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An earlier, pioneering work in the area of sacrifice in fictional narrative is Kenneth 
Burke’s Language as Symbolic Action (1966), which explores the notion of the 
protagonist as a scapegoat. Burke, a literary theorist and assistant editor of as well as 
contributor of fictional works to the modernist magazine The Dial in the 1920s, had 
ideas similar to those of anthropologist Mary Douglas and philosopher René Girard 
as regards sacrifice and the structuring principle of society and his work is 
fundamental to later scholarship that has been done on sacrifice in modernist fiction. 
Burke considered sacrifice to be a precursor to governance, law, and social order. In 
The Rhetoric of Religion (1961), wherein he reads the Bible as a narrative, he writes 
that ‘the emergence of the turn from mere sacrifice to the idea of outright 
redemption by victimage’ is gradual, and that ‘ultimately the idea of cleanliness 
attains its full modicum of personality, in the idea of a fitting personal sacrifice.’5 
Sacrifice, according to Burke, becomes gradually less concerned with the gift-
sacrifice anthropologist Marcel Mauss writes about in Essai sur le don (The Gift, 
1925) – that is, strictly transactional offerings in return, for example, for a good 
harvest – and more preoccupied with personal victims or scapegoats, Christ being 
the foremost example in a post-Christian paradigm: ‘a theological view of the 
narrative can lead to a more “promissory” kind of classification, whereby all 
sacrifices and sufferings preceding the Crucifixion can be classed as “types of 
Christ.”’6 Burke finds that all dramatic narrative needs a scapegoat or victim, 
because ‘if drama, then conflict. And if conflict, then victimage. Dramatism is 
always on the edge of this vexing problem that comes to a culmination in tragedy, 
5 Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), 216. 
Emphasis in original. 
6 Burke, Rhetoric of Religion, 218. 
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the song of the scapegoat.’7 Narrative and sacrifice are intimately bound together in 
this view. If indeed all narrative has an element of sacrifice – if there is sacrifice in 
all narrative – the three authors studied utilise this element in a particular way by 
experimenting with the narrative form in order to negotiate a continuous 
development of the fictional self.  
Several later scholars on the topic build on Burke’s theories, among others 
Thomas Cousineau, who argues in Ritual Unbound that the reason for the 
ambivalence with which modernist writers treat sacrifice is the double-edged 
realisation that scapegoating as a social phenomenon brings about in a twentieth-
century context: ‘On the one hand, we recognize the injustice of persecuting victims 
in whose guilt we can no longer plausibly believe; on the other hand, we cannot 
imagine how to create a human community that does not have its scapegoats.’8 
Cousineau maintains that the novels he looks at are aesthetic answers to the 
modernist issue with sacrifice in that they constitute ‘an imaginary solution to the 
intractable problem of creating, in the real world, a non-sacrificial economy.’9 These 
works either wholly reject the sacrificial ritual as having no value for modern man, 
Cousineau concludes, or defend the individual character that has been or is to be 
sacrificed while retaining the notion that sacrifice is a necessary outlet of communal 
violence.10 The first type is exemplified by Ulysses, a text that Cousineau perceives 
as ridiculing and thus wholly rejecting both ritual and religion. To exemplify the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Kenneth Burke, On Symbols and Society, ed. Joseph R. Gusfield (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989), 125. 
8 Thomas J. Cousineau, Ritual Unbound: Reading Sacrifice in Modernist Fiction 
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2004), 18. 
9 Cousineau, Ritual Unbound, 18. 
10 Cousineau, Ritual Unbound, 17. 
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second type, Cousineau uses Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1899), which 
appears to describe the inescapability of sacrificial violence when social boundaries 
are transgressed. Modernist works are thereby undoubtedly negative towards 
sacrifice according to Cousineau, and display this antipathy either by rejecting 
sacrificial ritual altogether as having no value for the modernist individual, or by 
way of defending an individual character that has been or is to be sacrificed but 
retaining the notion that scapegoating is a necessary evil in society.11 
The main difference between Cousineau’s reading of modernist sacrifice and 
my own concerns the value of sacrifice. The novels I work with do not categorically 
present sacrifice as necessary or unnecessary, or the value of sacrifice as being 
inherently good or bad. Rather than either rejecting or defending the sacrificial ritual, 
they display an interest in the nature of sacrifice and its relationship with the 
construction and destruction of the self. They do not linger on the potential horrors 
of sacrifice, nor do they bypass them as unproblematic. 
While my argument includes the tenet that sacrifice in modernist fiction is 
much concerned with the self and its construction through consciousness, it is also 
just as attentive to the issue of selves in relation to one another – in fact, the two rely 
on each other, as I will show below. This contradicts William A. Johnsen, who finds 
that the modernist preoccupation with sacrifice is primarily an expression of 
solipsistic individualism. In Violence and Modernism (2003), he reads selected 
writings of James Joyce, Henrik Ibsen, and Virginia Woolf alongside anthropologists 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 John B. Vickery’s The Literary Impact of The Golden Bough (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1973) further outlines the intertextual relationship 
between Frazer’s work and William Butler Yeats, T. S. Eliot, D. H. Lawrence and 
James Joyce. Cousineau is currently undertaking work on a related project, which 
builds on Kenneth Burke’s assertion that all protagonists are essentially sacrificial 
victims. Thomas Cousineau, ‘The Daedalus Complex,’ accessed on 25 August 2015, 
https://sites.google.com/site/thedaedaluscomplex/home. 
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of the same era, who regarded sacrifice as an archaic or exotic phenomenon, and 
suggests that the three modernists acknowledged sacrifice as a pertinent element of 
modern culture in the form of scapegoating. This hypothesis is naturally reliant on 
René Girard, whose theories Johnsen uses to underpin his readings.12 
Johnsen further proposes in a 2011 article that modernist authors not only 
saw the continued relevance of sacrifice in the twentieth century; they were 
‘fascinated by its persistence’.13 He argues that René Girard’s theory of deviated 
transcendency may be employed to explain why characters tend to become self-
sacrificial. The notion of deviated transcendency builds on the principle of mimetic 
rivalry, which, at its culminating point is denoted by Johnsen as ‘modern order 
break[ing] down.’14 The modernist literary character displays a ‘need to be self-
sacrificial’ due to the fact that he ‘desires some sense of transcendent self-offering of 
himself to others but not for others, a sacrifice not as an offering or gift but of self-
gratification, even self-divinization.’15 This could be framed as self-serving sacrifice, 
a seemingly contradictory idea, as sacrifice is thought of as displacing the self for the 
benefit of the other. Outside of the individualist opposition between self and other, it 
appears to be less of a contradiction; however, Johnsen’s reading is grounded in the 
notion that sacrifice as self-serving cannot possibly have a positive impact beyond 
the individual who makes the sacrifice. As an outlet of the modernist feeling of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 William A. Johnsen, Violence and Modernism: Ibsen, Joyce and Woolf 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003), 140-1. Simon De Keukelaere has 
done similar work on Woolf in ‘What is deviated transcendency? Woolf’s The 
Waves as a textbook case,’ Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture 
12-13 (2006): 195-218. 
13 William A. Johnsen, ‘Modern Sacrifice,’ Religion and Literature 43, no. 3 (2011): 
194. Emphasis in original. 
14 Johnsen, ‘Modern Sacrifice,’ 195. 
15 Johnsen, ‘Modern Sacrifice,’ 195. 
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discontinuity with history, then, literary characters are not only preoccupied with 
sacrifice, but long to perform it, a wish that Johnsen reads as purely egocentric and 
devoid of any interest in the benefit of the community. 
I argue, contrary to Johnsen, that sacrifice as a self-serving endeavour and 
sacrifice for the advantage of others could well be considered as two sides of the 
same coin, bearing in mind that sacrifice entails both sacralisation and destruction, as 
will be shown in the following section where I discuss the definition of sacrifice. The 
question here is more one of intentionality rather than of the outcome of the sacrifice. 
A self-sacrificial act that gratifies the person performing it can of course have a 
secondary purpose of being of value to the community. However, one may pose the 
question of whether a sacrifice originally intended to benefit the community can also 
benefit the individual who is being sacrificed. The answer may depend on the issue 
of whether or not the sacrifice is to some degree voluntary; if the sacrificed person 
believes in the higher purpose and that the sacrifice is necessary for the community, 
then it will also be self-gratifying. One example of this is sacrifice in wartime, which 
is motivated by such calls to arms as ‘your country needs you.’ 
War is and has always been intimately connected to sacrifice for obvious 
reasons: the importance of violence to many theories of sacrifice, and the inherent 
narrative of war as a sacrifice for a higher purpose.16 For that reason, it is hardly 
surprising that interwar fiction should deal with sacrifice to some extent. After 1918, 
people struggled to make sense of the apparently senseless waste of human life 
provoked by increasingly advanced technological warfare. Unsurprisingly, modernist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Allen J. Frantzen provides a useful overview of the relation between war and 
sacrifice by looking at this conceptual juncture in two historical contexts, the Middle 
Ages and the Great War, in Bloody Good: Chivalry, Sacrifice, and the Great War 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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fiction brims with narratives that deal with death in war. Many of the questions 
provoked by the deaths of many thousands of soldiers can be boiled down to one: 
was it worth it? The immensity of that human sacrifice must be clearly motivated by 
a higher principle if the idea of the nation-state and the honour of warfare is to 
continue to have any value. In a time of upset and social upheaval such as the period 
during and after the First World War, stability can be expected to be an increasing 
concern. Marcel Proust identifies the core of the problem in the final instalment of In 
Search of Lost Time, where he writes about the relationship between the individual 
and the state in wartime, and the role of narrative as a mediator of this relationship. 
The quote is from the first part of the seventh instalment, which takes place during 
the war. Marcel is walking around Paris at night and meets Baron de Charlus, who is 
siding with Germany, and hopes if not for victory for the Germans, then at least for 
them to avoid being annihilated, which is what causes Marcel to think about 
individuals belonging to nations: 
 
[W]ithin a nation the individual, if he is truly part of the nation, is simply a 
cell of the nation-individual. It is ridiculous to talk about the power of 
propaganda. … The real propaganda is what – if we are genuinely a living 
member of a nation – we tell ourselves because we have hope, hope being a 
symbol of a nation’s instinct of self-preservation.17 
 
Proust implies that the reason why it would be ‘ridiculous’ to speak of the potency of 
propaganda is because it would be powerless without the grand narrative of the 
nation-state and the individual subjects’ internalisation of that narrative. Propaganda 
only works on those who are already inclined to believe in the nation and to see 
themselves as part of it, whether consciously or not, so it is not actually necessary at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time vol 6: Time Regained, trans. Andreas 
Mayor and Terence Kilmartin (London: Vintage, 1996), 103. 
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all. Being told to make a sacrifice for a country when one does not truly feel like a 
full member of that country is not going to have the same impact as on ‘a living 
member of a nation’. For that reason, it is all the more important for society to keep 
its structures intact and preserve its national images; without that sense of security 
and stability regarding communal concerns, the whole nation could fall to pieces 
when attacked by an enemy. 
While this thesis does not give its undivided attention to the First World War, 
armed combat necessarily forms a contextual background for the studied works. A 
number of studies on the topic of sacrifice and war in English modernist fiction have 
attempted to point out a discursive shift concerning sacrifice that coincides with the 
war.18 Evelyn Cobley’s article ‘Violence and Sacrifice in Modern War Narratives’ 
(1994) argues that narratives of the First World War describe soldiers as sacrificial 
victims, which fundamentally alters the image of war from that of a heroic battle to a 
more gritty and dehumanising process.19 Derek Hughes reiterates and modifies this 
point when stating that the use of the term sacrifice changed during the First World 
War to become invested with an ‘almost desirable’ quality compared to the way in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See for instance Conflict, Nationhood and Corporeality in Modern Literature: 
Bodies-at-War, edited by Petra Rau, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Jay 
Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural 
History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Fighting Forces, Writing 
Women: Identity and Ideology in the First World War, edited by Sharon 
Ouditt, (London: Routledge, 1994); Mark D. Larabee, Front Lines of Modernism: 
Remapping the Great War in British Fiction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); 
and Trudi Tate, Modernism, History and the First World War, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998). 
19 Evelyn Cobley, ‘Violence and Sacrifice in Modern War Narratives,’ SubStance 23, 
no. 3, issue 74 (1994): 77.  
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which it had been used in English media during the Crimean War.20 In The Great 
War and the Language of Modernism (2003), Vincent Sherry maintains that the 
discourse used by the government with regard to the war generated literary 
experimentation due to negative reactions to the legitimisation of armed combat 
through political rhetoric: ‘In the political discourses of the Great War, where the 
language of public reason goes so massively and disastrously wrong, the first words 
of a truly novel consciousness may begin to spell themselves out in the reverse 
lettering of this discredited myth, in a modernity against itself, in modernism.’21  
It is not only clear from previous research that modernist fiction is deeply 
affected by the war and its various narratives – and thereby the understanding of 
sacrifice as an act of some value – it is also evident that the value of sacrifice 
undergoes a significant change at this time. My research will show how the works 
studied negotiate and try to make sense of that change through a particular narrative 
strategy that combines a thematic concern with sacrifice with formal experiments in 
narrative voice. The thesis thus focuses on three authors whose work applies this 
particular combination: May Sinclair, Mary Butts, and H. D. 
The reason for the exclusion of certain other authors in this thesis is the 
particular narrative strategy used in combination with an ambiguous concern with 
sacrifice: pronoun shifts. This strategy does exist in Woolf and Richardson to 
mention two examples, but does either not take shape in relation to sacrifice or does 
not relate to the negotiation of self in relation to others. Below, I examine pronoun 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Derek Hughes, ‘Human Sacrifice and the Literary Imagination,’ Sacrifice and 
Modern Thought, ed. Julia Meszaros and Johannes Zachhuber (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 231. 
21 Vincent Sherry, The Great War and the Language of Modernism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 16. 
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shifts further – which ones I will look at and what function they have. This 
discussion will further illuminate my choice of materials. 
A question that lies at the centre of this thesis is whether or not the narrative 
strategy employed by Sinclair, Butts, and H. D. is specific to modernist fiction. 
Research done by Cousineau and Johnsen suggests that the preoccupation with 
sacrifice in literary fiction is particular to the modernist period. While Johnsen’s 
work connects modernism’s anxiety about itself to the desire for self-sacrifice, and 
Cousineau primarily argues that the scapegoating treatment of protagonists is 
specifically apparent in modernist fiction, I would like to draw attention to another 
way that modernist literature represents sacrifice: through formal innovation. 
Modernist fiction is of course known for its experiments with narrative form, and my 
contention is that sacrifice is specifically connected to those experiments. In the 
following section I outline in further detail the parallels between formal 
experimentation and depictions of sacrifice that will be dealt with thoroughly in each 
separate chapter. 
 
The Concept of Sacrifice 
I will now outline the arguments for a wide, inclusive definition of sacrifice that 
relates to self-consciousness and self-perception. Building on theories of sacrifice 
from the field of the anthropology of religion, I maintain that sacrifice is relevant 
across time and place, not as a static concept of specific ritual practices, but as an 
understanding of how individuals relate to each other in that it creates an 
intersubjective space. By intersubjectivity I mean a shared cognition of any 
particular event, that is, a mutual understanding within the group that performs or 
takes part in the sacrifice. The group can be termed a community through its creation 
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of a sense of belonging, which is achieved through partaking in the sacrifice. I argue 
that sacrifice has a non-dichotomial yet ordering function in the narratives studied. It 
is crucial to establish the ordering function of sacrifice for the argument that follows 
because it founds the claim for sacrifice as constructive. Sacrifice does not entail 
violence and chaos only – it simultaneously creates an order out of chaos, without 
which it would not have the potential to reinforce the self. I will now look at 
sacrifice in the framework of anthropology and religious studies in order to establish 
these aspects more fully. 
I rely on the assumption that sacrifice is inherently religious, as it is derived 
from a way of thinking that is categorised as religious, even when talking about 
‘everyday’ sacrifice. The etymological meaning of the word sacrifice, to do or to 
make holy, from the Latin words sacer (holy) and facere (to do or make), has at least 
two possible interpretations: turning something previously regarded as mundane into 
something holy, or to perform a holy or sacred act. I do not propose that all acts of 
everyday sacrifice are consciously meant to be ‘religious,’ as in made with a 
supernatural being in mind, but that all acts of sacrifice are imbued with ideas 
derived from religious thinking. Anthropology in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries asserted that the widespread inclusion of sacrifice in religion 
pointed to the universality of the notion of sacrifice as a concept.22 Naturally, there is 
great plurality when it comes to sacrificial acts, and in order to define the concept in 
a wide sense, all such variations have to be considered. In the foundational work 
Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function, anthropologists Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See for instance Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, Sacrifice: Its Nature and 
Function, trans. W. D. Halls (London: Cohen and West, 1964), 13-4, for a brief 
discussion on the generic unity of sacrifice. See also further details of their definition 
of sacrifice below. 
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looked at the smallest common denominators and formulated a definition that has 
been in use since the early twentieth century and still is today. It should be noted that 
the work of Hubert and Mauss has been criticised for eurocentrism and 
methodological shortcomings. Despite these concerns, the definition is still 
considered relevant in the field of religious studies.23 I return to the definition itself 
in further detail below. 
French philosopher René Girard’s theories are also useful for this study in 
that they combine philosophy, anthropology, and literary criticism. They do, 
however, put forward Christian sacrifice as something other and apart from sacrifice 
in other religions. Girard’s motive here is to find evidence for the supremacy of 
Christianity as religious belief, which is decidedly not a scientific endeavour. I will 
return to a discussion of the details of Girard’s argument below. A number of 
scholars who build on Girard argue that sacrifice is integral to human society and 
even fundamental to our cognisance of existence, as noted in the introduction to 
Violence, Desire, and the Sacred (2014), a collection of work that is based on and 
develops Girard’s theories on sacrifice: ‘Sacrifice … represents the human project in 
a fundamental way, that is, to survive and thrive in relationship with each other and 
in terms of the almost uncontrollable and undefined desires that we have for more, in 
fact, for “being” itself.’24 The volume posits that sacrifice is essential to human 
society, as it can be found in societies across the globe and throughout history. In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For further details on the work of Hubert and Mauss as understood and used today, 
see Nick Allen, ‘Using Hubert and Mauss to think about Sacrifice,’ in Sacrifice and 
Modern Thought, ed. Julia Meszaros and Johannes Zachhuber (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 147-162. 
24 Scott Cowdell, Chris Fleming, and Joel Hodge, ‘Introduction,’ in Violence, Desire 
and the Sacred, Volume 2: René Girard and Sacrifice in Life, Love and Literature 
(New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2014), xvii. Emphasis in original. 
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same vein of understanding sacrifice as a universally applicable concept, Gavin 
Flood writes that ‘sacrifice has … become a way of ordering the world, of 
expressing hope, and of giving life meaning. This ordering of the world through 
sacrifice has often … occurred at times of crisis,’ which is an expression of 
specificity within the general.25 Flood is pointing to the general usage of sacrifice as 
way to bring structure and order to chaos specifically in moments of upheaval. I 
maintain that this is a crucial point for reading sacrifice in fiction produced in early 
twentieth-century England, a time and place of extensive social change. 
Although I write of sacrifice as a structural concept, I do not propose a 
structuralist approach in the sense of the term as used in anthropology, but I am 
firmly relying on such poststructuralists as Judith Butler to assert that sacrifice as 
structural can be used to criticise the same structures it creates.26 It is possible to 
think of this concept as poststructural sacrifice. I purposefully do not wish to use this 
term as I think the conception of sacrifice that I use moves beyond poststructuralism 
into an acknowledgement that structures are needed in society, while retaining the 
realisation that these structures, if rigidly maintained, are harmful for those who do 
not fit into the structure but remain on its borders or in its ‘between’ spaces. 
As I wish to consider sacrifice as a wide concept, I take my departure from 
the Hubert and Mauss definition, and go on to look at the related concepts of 
scapegoating and victimhood, but do not look at the details of what sets various 
aspects of sacrifice apart from others, only what brings them together under the 
umbrella term of sacrifice. The definition of sacrifice that is given by Hubert and 
Mauss in the introduction to Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function is ‘a religious act 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Flood, ‘Sacrifice as Refusal,’ 116.  
26 See for instance Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge Classics, 
2006), 4. 
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which, through the consecration of a victim, modifies the condition of a moral 
person who accomplishes it or that of certain objects with which he is concerned.’27 
This definition underlines three important elements of the concept as used here. 
Firstly, sacrifice is primarily a religious act, or, in cases where one is tempted to use 
the phrase secular sacrifice, an act that is derived from a religious frame of thought, 
that is, that there exists a purpose higher than oneself or one’s own material 
wellbeing, and that the sacrifice serves this purpose.28 Hubert and Mauss are clear in 
that they regard sacrifice as purely religious: ‘Sacrifice is a religious act that can 
only be carried out in a religious atmosphere and by means of essentially religious 
agents.’29 This definition indicates that there is a transcendental element in sacrifice. 
Giving something up for a higher purpose is a sacred performance, one that involves 
the sanctification of all those involved. 
The second point in Hubert and Mauss’ definition of sacrifice states that the 
victim of the sacrifice is consecrated, which means that it is not only beneficial for 
the individual to perform a sacrifice – that is, to sacrifice something other than 
oneself – for a higher purpose, but that it is also beneficial, within the framework 
that validates the sacrifice, to be sacrificed. In the words of Hubert and Mauss, the 
victim, once destroyed, is ‘separated definitively from the profane world; it [is] 
consecrated, it [is] sacrified…’30 Thirdly, the sacrificial act has the power to alter the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Hubert and Mauss, Sacrifice, 13. Emphasis in original. 
28 Secular sacrifice can be used to term the everyday use of the word sacrifice, for 
example as in ‘to sacrifice one’s career to have a family.’ Secular sacrifice is 
normally regarded as equivalent to ‘giving something up,’ which is of course a 
meaning that goes far beyond the scope of ritual or religious sacrifice and can extend 
to any kind of renunciation, including one that does not confer a sense of 
consecration. I will discuss and exemplify this further in chapter 2. 
29 Hubert and Mauss, Sacrifice, 19. 
30 Hubert and Mauss, Sacrifice, 35. Emphasis in original. 
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state of the person who performs it, as well as the state of his or her objects. This is 
effected through representation in the victim of the sacrifier by way of a proximity 
between the two: ‘Through this proximity the victim, who already represents the 
gods, comes to represent the sacrifier also.’31 The act of sacrifice is an act of 
representation, and the patron of the sacrifice may thereby be considered as 
sacrificed himself, if only symbolically. 
Using this interpretation, it is tempting to think that sacrifice can be 
understood as being part of a particular kind of exchange-based economy, in which 
participants give up one thing in return for another. Hubert and Mauss indeed 
thought of the ‘gift-sacrifice’ as the first and original form of sacrifice out of which 
other kinds later developed.32 Mauss touches upon this idea in the seminal work The 
Gift, in which he compares gifts between humans with sacrifice as a gift to the 
supernatural or a gift between humans ‘in the sight of the gods and nature.’33 
Importantly, as Mauss points out in the introduction to this study, the gift-sacrifice is 
not made without the expectation of a return – it is not a charitable gift, but a silent 
economic agreement: ‘exchanges and contracts take place in the form of presents; in 
theory these are voluntary, in reality they are given and reciprocated obligatorily.’34 
Sacrifice can therefore not be understood solely as renunciation, because it implies a 
reciprocal link. It is however important not to simplify the term and consider it as 
having a purely economic or transactional function, as sacrifice more often than not 
entails giving up something that has a value outside the symbolic economy of 
sacrifice, that is, something that is of worth or use both as a worldly object and as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Hubert and Mauss, Sacrifice, 32. 
32 Hubert and Mauss, Sacrifice, 2. 
33 Marcel Mauss, The Gift, trans. W. D. Halls (London: Routledge, 2002), 18. 
34 Mauss, The Gift, 3. 
 27 
sacrifice. Additionally, I would argue that there is rarely a guarantee of returns on 
the deal in a strictly economic sense. For this reason, it is not possible to equate 
sacrifice and for instance money, which of course has no value or use outside of a 
particular economic system. 
The outcome of a sacrifice could of course have great value even if it is not 
comparable to a gift or money. Georges Bataille holds in La Part Maudite (The 
Accursed Share, 1967) – a ‘book of political economy’ according to its author – that 
there is such a thing as giving without receiving. He bases his theory on the sun, 
‘which dispenses energy – wealth – without any return. The sun gives without ever 
receiving.’35 For Bataille, this partly explains the practice of making a sacrifice even 
when there is no discernible return: ‘In former times value was given to 
unproductive glory, whereas in our day it is measured in terms of production … 
dominated though it is by practical judgment and Christian morality, the archaic 
sensibility is still alive’.36 The notion of sacrifice, particularly when perceived as 
unproductive or uneconomic, is perceived as something that should be outdated, yet 
it remains relevant. 
The Hubert and Mauss definition further makes clear that sacrifice is an 
action that will generate change; it effects a sacralisation, and it ‘modifies the 
condition of a moral person who accomplishes it or that of certain objects’.37 This 
aspect is also highlighted in Julia Meszaros and Johannes Zachhuber’s introduction 
to Sacrifice and Modern Thought: ‘[T]he thing that is sacrificed, whether an external 
object or the self, is thereby [through the sacrificial rite] changed from a profane into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share. Vol I: Consumption, trans. Robert Hurley 
(New York: Zone Books, 1988), 9; 28. 
36 Bataille, The Accursed Share, 29. 
37 Hubert and Mauss, Sacrifice, 13 
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a sacred item, and this transformation signifies symbolically the need and the 
potential of the world as a whole to be remade in likeness of the divine.’38 The 
potential for change is particularly important for the understanding of sacrifice as an 
anthropological concept. 
It may seem contradictory to argue that sacrifice is both an agent of change 
and one of order, but I wish to argue that the change-making properties of sacrifice 
are in fact crucial to its ability to reinforce any kind of structure. The structure may 
be of a revolutionary nature or be more conservative; the anthropologists of the late 
nineteenth century claimed that ritual sacrifice was purely conservative, but more 
recent scholarship provides a firm basis on which to consider ritual sacrifice as 
making things new. Consider for instance any of the examples from Hinduism 
brought up by Gavin Flood in his chapter ‘Sacrifice as Refusal’ in Sacrifice and 
Modern Thought, for instance that of the Vedic sacrifice, which ‘is performed within 
the “sacred canopy” of a cosmology with a fixed order’ – a re-enactment of the 
world’s structure as it is seen in this particular culture. The sacrificial death itself 
does not only signify destruction, but also re-birth and, importantly, ‘the affirmation 
of the order of the world.’39 Flood argues that, generally, ‘sacrifice is concerned with 
the future, with piling up merit in heaven… and structuring the universe in an 
ordered way that relates the future to the present and a higher world to the lower 
world.’40 Sacrifice, then, is both a way in which to create change and in which to 
reinstate an order. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Meszaros and Zachhuber, ‘Introduction,’ 5. 
39 Flood, ‘Sacrifice as Refusal,’ 126. 
40 Flood, ‘Sacrifice as Refusal,’ 124. 
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Jane Ellen Harrison was an early twentieth-century classical scholar and suffragist 
whose work was read by and resonated with all three authors studied in this thesis. 
Her work is included here as it deals with the change-making and ordering 
properties of sacrifice in ancient Greece, and her ideas on this influenced the 
thinking of Sinclair, Butts, and H. D. Harrison belonged to the Cambridge 
Ritualists, a group of Cambridge classical scholars who shared the conviction that 
myth originates in ritual. In Ancient Art and Ritual (1913), following Hubert and 
Mauss’ introductory definition of sacrifice, the sacrificial ritual is understood by 
Harrison as a vehicle through which something is made holy and, once the sacrifice 
has been completed, as transferring the quality of sacredness to the whole 
community that is involved in the ritual. The thing that is hoped to be achieved 
through the sacrifice – which in most of Harrison’s examples is the fertility of soil 
and people – is invested in the image of the object to be sacrificed. In one example, 
the offering takes the form of a bull and the desire for fertility becomes transmuted 
into a desire for the animal. This is an example of the change-making properties of 
sacrifice. 
The perceived sanctifying properties of sacrifice are evident at this stage in 
Harrison’s description of the ritual. After the killing, the bull is dismembered and 
shared by all, thereby affording the members of the community that performs the 
sacrifice a piece of its sacredness in death. Through the consumption of this meal, 
Harrison argues, the bull lives on by way of both feeding and sanctifying the people: 
‘[I]t was not to give him up to the gods that they killed him, not to “sacrifice” him in 
our sense, but to have him, keep him, eat him, live by him and through him, by his 
grace.’41 Harrison’s wording here clarifies that there is a parallel between ritual 
41 Jane Harrison, Ancient Art and Ritual (Bradford: Moonraker Press, 1978), 46. 
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sacrifice and the Eucharist. The sacrificial ritual has invested the victim, the bull, 
with holy properties. The ingestion of its meat transfers the holiness of the bull onto 
the people who consume him. For Harrison, this is a description of a primeval 
sacrifice.  
Harrison argues further on that this ritual forms the basis for understanding 
the meaning of sacrifice, a ritual which has now come to signify something less 
corporeal and more symbolic: ‘[I]n place of sacraments, holy bulls killed and eaten 
in common, we get sacrifices in the modern sense, holy bulls offered to yet holier 
gods. … Religion moves away from drama towards theology...’42 Harrison posits 
that ritual becomes art when culture reaches a point where the ritual is no longer 
significant for the religious cult. This hypothesis is particularly relevant for the 
modernist authors I study, who all express the originally religious concept of 
sacrifice through the art of narrative. In this view of the development of religion, 
sacrifice developed from being a literal murder of a person or animal to become a 
symbolic gesture: ‘art … risen out of ritual,’ or the symbolic ritual of the Eucharist.43 
The sacrifice, originating in ritual, still retains one of its basic functions as a 
mediator between chaos and order. 
René Girard’s theory of scapegoating links sacrifice with a structuring 
principle by seeing it as an outlet for chaos, which has a subsequent outcome of 
restored order in a society. Girard was deeply influenced by anthropologist Claude 
Lévi-Strauss in his thinking, but also by the aforementioned literary theorist Kenneth 
Burke. Girard’s theory proposes that scapegoats are needed to control the constant 
build-up of violence in society due to so-called mimetic desire or rivalry: the 
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inclination to want what someone else has got. A scapegoat is not necessarily the 
same thing as a sacrificial victim, however; for Girard, the death or exclusion of the 
scapegoat is not voluntary, whereas an element of choice or at least compliance is 
not uncommon in rituals of human sacrifice. For instance Jessica Frazier, building on 
work done by Laura Rival, argues ‘that shamanistic notions of inter-subjectivity 
meant that even [the Aztecs’] human sacrifices were partly sacrifices of the shared 
self, rather than a scapegoated Other.’ Frazier further suggests that ‘[t]he fact that 
numerous violent temple-sacrifice traditions viewed death as the gateway to a post-
mortem life lived in the divine realm, supports the idea that the significance of many 
animal and human sacrifices lay in their potential for life, not for death.’44 In this 
study, both voluntary and involuntary sacrifice are regarded as equally worthy of 
attention. 
Seen in a broader perspective, sacrifice is not solely related to actual, 
physical violence that leads to ritual death; the violence of Girard’s theory can also 
be regarded as a form of negotiation of chaos and order in a given group. 
Scapegoating, as well as other forms of sacrifice, have the function of averting or 
channelling disorder. Rather than just denoting a particular kind of ritual or violent 
event, I wish to derive from Girard the notion of sacrifice as related to chaos and 
order, but in opposition to Girard, I understand sacrifice as both productive and 
destructive. Girard builds on Hegel in considering desire to be a fundamental drive 
that feeds into the dialectic of power relations: one individual wants what the other 
one has and vice versa, thereby creating tension and ultimately conflict. In Hegel’s 
thought – to which I will return in more detail – desire controls self-consciousness, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Jessica Frazier, ‘From Slaughtered Lambs to Dedicated Lives: Sacrifice as Value-
Bestowal,’ in Sacrifice and Modern Thought, ed. Julia Meszaros and Johannes 
Zachhuber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 112; 113. 
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as it is that which instigates the master-slave dialectic as well as prompts the 
individual to want to be recognised by, and thereby ‘mirror’ themselves in, the other. 
This is part of the mimetic rivalry process: the progression from wanting the same 
thing to fighting over it, which then evolves to a state of violent interaction in 
general, now removed from the initial coveted object. ‘Mimetism is a source of 
continual conflict. By making one man’s desire into a replica of another man’s desire, 
it invariably leads to rivalry; and rivalry in turn transforms desire into violence.’45 It 
is this violence, Girard holds, that needs to find an outlet in the form of sacrifice. 
Malcolm Bull similarly argues, on the basis of the theories of Hegel and Girard, that 
the threat of chaos in human communities is usually heralded by the ceasing of 
sacrificial practices. If Girard’s argument is that chaos in society is staved off by the 
practice of sacrifice, Bull means to say that when sacrifice is not present as a tool 
with which to re-establish order, chaos takes over and society, or societal order, is 
destroyed.46 
According to Girard, the scapegoat mechanism comes into play when a 
society, due to internal strife, has reached a point of chaos and is at risk of being 
violently destroyed or dissolved. The situation is then defused by the victim onto 
which all the internal violence is projected: ‘[S]ociety is seeking to deflect upon a 
relatively indifferent victim, a “sacrificeable” victim, the violence that would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 169. For a longer discussion of 
mimetic desire and rivalry, see René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of 
the World, trans. Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer (London: Continuum, 2003), 7-
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46 Malcolm Bull, Seeing Things Hidden: Apocalypse, Vision and Totality (London: 
Verso, 1999). 
 33 
otherwise be vented on its own members, the people it most desires to protect.’47 The 
victim thus symbolises not only the struggle between members in the society, but 
also the members themselves, as they were the original targets of the violent acts. As 
the victim shoulders the burden of the violence that brought chaos to its social group, 
it is either ejected from society or destroyed, but paradoxically also sacralised. 
Through its annihilation or expulsion, peace is restored to the community that 
performed the sacrifice. This suggests that sacrifice exists to keep societies in order 
and to stifle the chaos that, according to Girard, will inevitably arise among humans 
as a consequence of violence born out of mimetic desire, and that ‘sacrifice serves to 
protect the entire community from its own violence’ by offering an outlet for that 
accumulated violence.48 It is thereby possible to read the Girardian sacrifice as 
multifaceted though violent; it is not solely destructive, as its purpose is to save the 
community from violence. 
Understanding sacrifice as purely destructive does not seem to make sense, 
then, even when sacrifice is understood as violence. Bataille, however, claims the 
opposite. In ‘Hegel, Death and Sacrifice’, he reads sacrifice through Hegel, but 
understands it through Alexandre Kojève’s interpretation, which emphasises the 
Hegelian idea of reality as nothingness. In this reading, sacrifice is synonymous with 
death; in fact, ‘[f]or Kojève, “the ‘dialectical’ or anthropological philosophy of 
Hegel is in the final analysis a philosophy of death”’.49 There are several issues with 
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points this out in ‘Sacrifice, Atonement, and Renewal,’ 49. 
49 Georges Bataille, ‘Hegel, Death and Sacrifice,’ Yale French Studies 78 (1990): 10. 
Bataille does highlight the affinity of sacrifice and holiness through his treatment of 
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this analysis. Nothingness only implies death insofar as death entails complete 
destruction, that is, in an atheistic worldview. This is the whole point for Kojève – to 
show that Hegel is an atheist at heart. The problem is that, for Kojève, ‘Nothingness’ 
or ‘negativity’ is opposed to the Hegelian god, whereas for Hegel, nothingness is god, 
not in the atheist sense – that god does not exist – but in the sense that god is 
‘Indeterminate’.50 Although Hegel’s attitude to Buddhism and Chinese religion was 
one of surface disdain, Timothy Morton argues that ‘there is a remarkable and 
historically probable collusion between Hegel’s view of the nothingness of the in-
itself … and the dominant form of Tibetan Buddhism of which he was aware.’51 A 
long quotation from Phenomenology of Mind that Bataille supposes will support his 
reading clearly states that ‘the life of Spirit is not that life which is frightened of 
death, and spares itself destruction, but that life which assumes death and lives with 
it.’52 The inference Bataille makes is a very expected one – to assume that death is 
equal to destruction – and is likely to be the reason why many readings of Hegel tend 
towards a mystical interpretation. However, the concept of death as understood here 
is not opposed to life, but is part and parcel of it. Bataille and Kojève’s idea that 
death equals annihilation is in opposition to sacrifice as conceived of in this study. 
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It is not only the influence of Kojève that emphasises sacrifice as destructive here; it 
is also likely to be a result of Bataille’s reading of Nietzsche’s Zur Genealogie der 
Moral: Eine Streitschrift (On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic, 1887). The 
purpose of sacrifice as expressed by Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morality is 
the pursuit of constancy and remembrance: ‘When man decided he had to make a 
memory for himself, it never happened without blood, torments and sacrifices: …all 
this has its origin in that particular instinct which discovered that pain was the most 
powerful aid to mnemonics.’53 In this view, sacrifice is a necessary evil in order for 
humans to keep memories, to make history, and to effect a sense of continuity. It is 
not particularly far-fetched to consider sacrificial rituals as such, since rituals are by 
definition repetitive, but Nietzsche maintains that self-sacrificial actions have the 
same purpose: 
In a certain sense, the whole of asceticism belongs here: a few ideas have to 
be made ineradicable, ubiquitous, unforgettable, ‘fixed’, in order to hypnotize 
the whole nervous and intellectual system through these ‘fixed ideas’ – and 
ascetic procedures and lifestyles are a method of freeing those ideas from 
competition with all other ideas, of making them ‘unforgettable’.54 
In this sense, ritual sacrifice and self-sacrifice are two expressions of the same 
function, not oppositional pairs, as they are often seen from late Christian and 
secular perspectives. In each act of sacrifice, there is a memory of a previous 
sacrifice, and as with other rituals, these repeated acts carry with them the 
reproduction of structure, while containing the power to effect change. Despite its 
53 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Carol Diehte 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 38. 
54 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, 38. 
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ordering function, then, a paradoxical but fundamental element of sacrifice is its 
change-making properties. 
Even in the bleak view of sacrifice proposed by Georges Bataille, there is a 
redeeming element that relates to the structure- and change-making feature of 
sacrifice. In Gavin Flood’s reading of Bataille, his theory bears a strong resemblance 
to that of Girard in that it is viewed as a channel for a ‘superabundance of energy;’ 
Bataille thereby sees a resemblance between ritual sacrifice and war.55 Flood 
maintains that ‘Bataille perceives the link between sacrifice and war in his idea of 
the excess of energy that needs to be wasted to bring society back to a state of 
equilibrium; and in contemporary western society, it is war that best approximates to 
any residue of a sacrificial culture geared towards ordering or making sense of the 
world.’56 Disorder, then, is remedied by sacrifice, as it is a practice through which 
order is felt to be established and violations against that order are remedied.  
Looking at a variety of theorists above, I have arrived at the following 
definition of sacrifice as used in this thesis: acts of renunciation that confer a quality 
of transcendence to the performer of the sacrifice and the thing or person sacrificed, 
and effect an intersubjective negotiation of chaos and order in a given group. I have 
also established that, despite its ordering function, a fundamental element of sacrifice 
is its change-making properties. Furthermore, I have found that sacrifice is not only 
destructive, but can also be viewed as beneficial. These findings are primarily related 
to the role of sacrifice in a group; the next section will show what role sacrifice plays 
for the individual self. 
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Sacrifice and Self-Consciousness 
I will now look at the links between self-consciousness and sacrifice so as to lay the 
foundation for the claim that sacrifice not only facilitates intersubjectivity – that is, 
shared cognitive experience between several conscious selves – but that it is equally 
important for a subjective perception of self, or self-consciousness. I will use 
Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes (The Phenomenology of Mind, 1807) to show 
the link between self-consciousness and sacrifice and argue that sacrifice is 
compatible with a preoccupation with the self via intersubjectivity. 
Self-consciousness is often understood as a perception not only of the self in 
isolation, but of the self in relation to others. Hegel’s well-known theory of the 
master-slave dialectic posits that self-consciousness only exists in relation to the 
other, which is a basic tenet for a contemporary or poststructural understanding of 
most nineteenth- and twentieth-century anthropology.57 This theory was first 
outlined in The Phenomenology of Mind, where Hegel posits that there can be no self 
without an Other to that self, that is, no subject without an object to which it is 
related: ‘Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that 
it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being 
acknowledged or “recognized.”’58 This means that in order for humans to perceive 
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themselves as selves, they must be able to mirror themselves in an Other, who 
paradoxically becomes both an image of one’s own self and its contrast. 
The distinction between master and slave, Hegel argues, originates in the 
difference in their respective experiences of self-consciousness. The master has an 
‘independent’ and ‘immediate consciousness,’ one ‘that exists for itself,’ whereas the 
slave has a ‘dependent’ and ‘existent consciousness’ which ‘is not purely for itself, 
but for another’.59 Paradoxically, the moment that the master realises himself as such, 
he also realises that his consciousness is in fact a dependent one, since his ‘certainty 
of himself’ has to be mirrored in the consciousness of the slave in order to exist. 
Hegel states that ‘[the master] is thus not assured of self-existence as his truth; he 
finds that his truth is rather the unessential consciousness,’ which conversely entails 
the independence of the consciousness of the slave.60 
Ironically then, Hegel’s theory posits that it is not those in power who 
manage to establish an independent consciousness of the self, but those who work. 
The slave, through his renunciation of the self and creation of things through his 
work, gains a self-image, both by being mirrored in his master and in the product of 
his work.61 Hegel proposes that the activity of work is independent existence. Work 
also creates something external, which lets the consciousness of one who does the 
work experience a more or less permanent symbol of its independent existence: ‘The 
consciousness that toils and serves accordingly attains by this means the direct 
apprehension of that independent being as its self.’62 The master, who has obtained 
recognition from the slave and will therefore project an image of fully realised 	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selfhood, ultimately helps to afford independence of consciousness to the slave, 
whose self-image is reflected in that of the master. 
Hegel argues that it is by giving up a sense of self, or by putting it at risk, that 
it is possible to achieve self-consciousness.63 In The Phenomenology of Mind, it is 
postulated that 
 
it is solely by risking life that freedom is obtained; only thus is it tried and 
proved that the essential nature of self-consciousness is not bare existence… 
The individual, who has not staked his life, may, no doubt, be recognized as a 
Person; but he has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent 
self-consciousness. In the same way each must aim at the death of the other, 
as it risks its own life thereby…64 
 
Sacrificing the self is not a mere aid to the completion of a fully formed self-
consciousness, but it is required for the successful development of selfhood. In 
Douglas Hedley’s words, ‘the path to self-realization is through the sacrifice of the 
natural and immediate life of the self whereby it is in opposition to the not-self. … 
Self-conscious life is properly a continual dying to live.’65 The losing side in the 
original fight for wealth and recognition, that is, the slave, becomes the one who has 
the possibility for true self-consciousness. Hegel thus, at this stage, applies a 	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sacrificial economy to metaphysics in order to formulate a model of the creation of 
selfhood in relation to society. Knowledge of the self is the only absolute truth 
according to Hegel, but this cannot be accomplished without the other. In order to 
exist, self-consciousness has to be incorporated into another consciousness. Self-
consciousness needs acknowledgment and cannot exist without intersubjectivity, that 
is, without another self. Acknowledgment from the other creates a true certainty of 
the self and thereby the existence of self-consciousness. 
In order to connect the discussion of self-consciousness and sacrifice with the 
field of narrative, it is useful to have a brief look at recent theories in the philosophy 
of mind to see how current theories of self-consciousness inform my argument. I 
build on the theory that if the self is to be understood as having an experience of 
consciousness, it has to narrate its self-reflection to another subject. Daniel Dennett 
has proposed that the conscious self does not exist at all outside language. He calls 
the self a ‘centre of narrative gravity’, which – like other centres of gravity – is an 
entirely theoretical construct, needed in order to make sense of various concrete facts 
of life.66 This idea is based on Dennett’s heterophenomenological approach to the 
self, which entails a joining of the subjective experience of self with an 
intersubjective perspective – an attempt to overcome the binary of emic and etic 
approaches within the field of anthropology.67 
 Dennett’s theory proposes that all we can know about the self is the narrative 
that is spun around it. In Content and Consciousness (1969), he explains that this is 
the reason why, for example, we find it difficult to make sense of the consciousness 	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of animals and other sentient beings, and assume that their experience of 
consciousness must be different from that of a human experience of consciousness, 
because ‘if dumb animals are aware of things, have conscious experience, we can 
never know what it is like, since they cannot tell us.’68 Human beings understand 
self-consciousness through the narrative of the self – the self has not only got to be 
reflective, but also able to narrate its self-reflection to another subject if it is to be 
understood as having an experience of a conscious self. 
Heterophenomenology is more or less equal to intersubjectivity – Dennett 
bases his ideas on Husserl and what the former calls autophenomenology – in the 
sense that the heterophenomenological approach to the world entails not only ‘the 
subjective world of one subject – not to be confused with the real world’, but also the 
narrative that one subject imparts to another, a method that, Dennett posits, ‘leaves 
out no objective phenomena and no subjective phenomena of consciousness.’69 In 
effect, Dennett is proposing that consciousness behaves like narrative and, 
conversely, that narrative behaves like consciousness. He does not say that narrative 
is consciousness (or vice versa), despite it being a tempting conclusion to draw from 
his theory. However, what can be concluded is that narrative and consciousness have 
similar functions, which means that theories of how consciousness works may be 
fruitfully applied to narrative. 
Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers both hold that the experience of 
consciousness is a continual dialogue between sense perception and phenomenal 	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belief, which creates an ever evolving narrative about the self. If Dennett does not 
ask what consciousness is, but ‘how it behaves,’ Chalmers does ask what its 
character is, or what it is like to have a consciousness.70  Chalmers also takes it one 
step further by asking why consciousness behaves as it does and why we have one at 
all. His phenomenological stance is grounded in the importance of belief in any 
given experience of consciousness: ‘The most important phenomenal beliefs are 
first-person phenomenal beliefs: subjects’ beliefs about their own experiences and 
especially about the phenomenal character of the experiences that they are currently 
having. Examples include the belief that one is now having a red experience, or that 
one is experiencing pain.’71 These beliefs are ‘cognitively significant knowledge’; 
rather than considering beliefs as being opposed to knowledge – as is normally the 
case in a scientific paradigm – Chalmers suggests they are a form of knowledge that 
is of vital importance for us in order to make sense of phenomenal experience.72  
Chalmers’ theory is significant here in that it provides a link between belief, 
conscious experience, and narrative, where the continuously evolving narrative of 
the self is created through the belief in the conscious experiences of the self. This 
phenomenon will be exemplified in the context of sacrifice in the novels studied 
below. It relates to my argument insofar as I maintain that the novels studied show, 
through the combined use of the theme of sacrifice and the narrative strategy of 
pronoun shifts, how consciousness is constructed through the interlocking of a belief 
in the experience of the self and a continuous narrative of the self. 
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The explanation given above of how consciousness is created suggests that the 
conscious self is always re-examined, evaluated, and re-constituted as the narrative 
on which it is built is re-told. The idea that the self is a continuous work-in-progress 
is not new; Hegel posits that if the self is to be fully realised, a constant dialectic 
movement is required between the effort to make things its own to sate its desire and 
master objects on the one hand, and to give them up on the other. But as soon as 
objects are mastered, the desire for them goes away as they no longer retain a sense 
of independence. If objects are easily conquered, the self and its consciousness gets 
bored; desire has to be challenged, not just immediately gratified. There has to be a 
struggle and possibly even a sacrifice. Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only 
in the reflection or incorporation of another self-consciousness, just as in the 
sacrificial ritual, where the sacrificed object is eaten and thereby incorporated into 
the performer of the sacrifice, who gains a fuller sense of self. 
Hegel hypothesises that the ritual of sacrifice allows for the self to be 
‘raise[d]… into being this pure divine element,’ that is, the soul in its purest state as 
part of ‘absolute Being,’ which then ‘turns back into the self; and… descends, 
through this mediating process of the cult, from its universality into individual form, 
and thus combines and unites with actual reality.’73 It may be relevant to note that 
Hegel did not understand sacrifice as one may in the wake of two hundred years of 
the anthropological study of religion, and that he would probably have based his 
definition of the term primarily on early seventeenth-century German theology. 
However, as mentioned in footnote 38, Hegel did not formulate his theories in a 
Christian vacuum – he would have been aware of other religious formations and 
traditions.  	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According to Hegel, sacrifice refines the self to the point where it can experience 
moments of ‘absolute Being’ – a universal unfolding of Mind. The self can thereby 
feed into the joint community of selves, as well as return back into itself. This 
process allows for the self to be both sacrificed and re-affirmed, or realised. Sacrifice 
creates the possibility for the development of self-consciousness. Robert Brandom 
states that Hegel’s claim includes the assertion that ‘one identifies with what one is 
willing to risk and sacrifice for.’74 This also applies to the way in which ritual 
sacrifice has been interpreted by those anthropologists who agree that the community 
has to be identified with its sacrificial victim in order for it to reap the benefits of the 
rite, for instance those following in the footsteps of Hubert and Mauss. The self-
awareness of identification is thereby intimately connected with not only the notion 
of abnegation but with sanctification as well.  
Sacrifice forms an opportunity for questioning, discussing, and possibly 
resolving the tension that is the result of the tension between creating, destroying and 
recreating the self anew. The relationship between sacrifice and the self is central for 
understanding modern sacrifice, as sacrifice can be applied as a hegemonic device 
for maintaining the subjugation of certain individuals within a social group, such as 
are seen as representative of ‘change, ambiguity and compromise’ – or, in Malcolm 
Bull’s words, contradiction – but it can paradoxically also become a tool for 
understanding and even creating change.75 
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Pronoun Shifts as a Narrative Strategy 
Within the field of narratology, the preferred explanatory models are often schematic 
and rulebound. However, the innovative narrative techniques used in early twentieth-
century fiction are notoriously elusive of distinction and description. For this reason, 
it can be difficult to apply conventional narrative schemas to modernist fiction. 
Morton P. Levitt makes a case in The Rhetoric of Modernist Fiction (2006) for the 
confusion surrounding such techniques as used in Ulysses (1922) and The Waves 
(1931) as being caused by critics’ attempts to make sense of stylistic innovations 
through applying categories that do not suit the narratives. Levitt suggests that 
‘Telemachus’ lacks a narrator altogether and that it will cause problems if we ‘invent 
a narrator where there patently is none.’76 Richard Walsh has similarly argued for the 
usefulness of leaving the construction of a narrator aside because literary theory has 
moved beyond the original function of the narrator as an intermediary between 
author and work. Walsh explains that ‘[t]he purpose of the narrator is to release the 
author from any accountability for the “facts” of fictional narrative.’77 This function 
is not needed, according to Walsh, because ‘it is possible to theorize narrative … in a 
way that avoids any incommensurability between attitudes of direct engagement and 
critical knowingness; between participation in, and consciousness of, the game of 
fictive discourse.’78 
While I do not doubt that it is possible to speak of the author instead of the 
narrator, and to do so without accidentally stumbling into intentional fallacies, I am 
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not convinced that the term narrator is symbolic of ‘an unhelpfully convoluted and 
hedged theoretical orthodoxy.’79 In the case studies of this thesis, it is rather more 
helpful to think of narrators instead of authors, because it allows for the 
depersonalisation or multifaceted personalisation of the narrative voice to be more 
easily grasped. Since the authors of the novels are undoubtedly historical persons, 
using the term ‘author’ to designate a narrator that is either non-personal or shifting 
between a variety of persons would be confusing. 
When discussing a narrator that has no persona, I maintain that it is still 
convenient to use the term ‘narrator’ to designate the voice in the text that does not 
constitute direct speech, as there is no other satisfactory option. Levitt does not offer 
any alternative, but holds that to talk of a narrator in ‘Telemachus’ is to assume the 
omniscience of that narrator, a belief that would ‘deny the very heart of [Joyce’s] 
work’ according to Levitt.80 While I agree that it would be out of place to speak of 
an omniscient narrator here, there is no reason to assume that a narrator has to be 
omniscient – or that it is personified – just because it exists, even though that may be 
the general assumption. Levitt concludes that the events related are done so through 
Stephen’s consciousness. If so, it is a clear that Stephen is an intra- and 
homodiegetic narrator, according to the typology set up by Gérard Genette.81 
The problem, rather than an assumption of omniscience where there is none, 
is that the narration does not belong to Stephen in isolation; if it had, Stephen could 
have been read as an ordinary first person narrator. The effect that Joyce creates is 
that of free indirect discourse or stream of consciousness, since it allows for a sense 	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of shared experience. It does not necessarily follow that the narrator has a persona. 
Since Stephen is the focaliser, but the personal pronoun ‘I’ is not used – from which 
it can be inferred that there is no conscious exposition to an assumed audience – the 
consciousness of the character has been opened to reveal what goes on inside it more 
directly than if mediated through a narrator that was conscious of itself as narrator. 
The sort of narrative experimentation that displaces a conventional narrator 
could be termed ‘stream of consciousness,’ but in light of the fact that the term does 
not cover all aspects of shifts in personal pronouns, I prefer to use ‘intersubjective 
narration’ to designate those instances where the narration in the novels studied 
opens up to potentially include more than one subjective consciousness. Furthermore, 
the term intersubjective emphasises the quality of narration that is essential to the 
argument, which means that narrative techniques that would not normally be labelled 
as stream of consciousness, such as the second person singular, can also be taken 
into consideration here. 
Free indirect discourse is another term that could be used for some of the 
experimental modes of narration employed by Sinclair, Butts, and H. D. Violeta 
Sotirova attempts to decipher the origins of free indirect style in her study 
Consciousness in Modernist Fiction, which concerns fictional representations of 
consciousness in Joyce, Lawrence, and Woolf. The three case studies are indicative 
of an intersubjective experience between characters, and free indirect style allows for 
‘the presentation of consciousness so that it becomes evocative not of an individual 
character’s viewpoint, but of the dialogic interrelatedness of the viewpoints of self 
and other.’82 In Joyce, she specifically finds ‘vague pronominal references,’ which 
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are indicative of informal speech.83 Note that these are not narrative pronoun shifts, 
but personal pronouns used in a way that obscures to whom they refer. The free 
indirect discourse or style neither entirely encompasses nor defines the specific 
narrative strategy I explore. It is used to describe a mode of third-person narration 
that focalises one or several characters so as to lessen the narrator’s presence and 
bring the reader inside the mind of the character, which is applicable to several 
instances of third-person narration that I exemplify. I do not focus on this term 
because I do not wish to specifically highlight shifts between free indirect discourse 
and direct discourse, but only shifts within what can be termed free indirect 
discourse. My interest is in the use of a variety of personal pronouns in those parts of 
the narration that is not to be understood as direct speech, which may be described as 
a movement between different kinds of free indirect discourse. Sotirova holds that 
‘[t]he technique of free indirect style is not new with modernism. What is new is its 
internal make-up.’84 One of the elements of this internal make-up is the type of 
pronoun shifts that I look at. It seems thereby as though shifts in the pronoun that 
refers to the narrator are typically modernist, although this needs further data to be 
evidenced. 
 Previous research done on personal pronoun shifts proposes that the change 
in person is an expression of a desire on the part of the narrator to emphasise a 
certain event in the story. Working in comparative linguistics, Anna Margetts states 
in her 2015 article ‘Person shift at narrative peak’ that the meanings and functions of 
such shifts have still not been fully investigated. Her research builds on the 1983 
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shifts in personal pronouns occur due to a culmination in the narrative that is defined 
as a ‘peak’ and is distinguishable from (but normally aligned with) climax or 
denouement, which both refer to a corresponding culmination in content, whereas a 
narrative peak is where the importance of an event is marked structurally or 
grammatically.85 Margetts discusses several other linguistic factors that affect person 
shifts that are more or less contingent on the language – examples are given in Dutch, 
Saxon, and Saliba-Logea – but for the purpose of this study, it is worth noting that 
Margetts finds that ‘discourse factors impact person choice. There are … cases 
where the protagonists of otherwise third-person narratives are tracked by first- or 
second-person indexes.’86 She goes on to suggest that these are ‘peak-marking and 
internal-evaluating devices’, where internal evaluation refers to William Labov’s 
definition of narrative clauses that are formally distinguished from the rest, for 
example through a tense or pronoun shift, as indicating something noteworthy. The 
purpose of this study is to show where these noteworthy moments, marked by 
pronoun shifts, signify a sacrificial development and destruction of the self for a 
character. 
 The pronoun shifts that I am chiefly concerned with here are termed by 
Margetts as ‘person shifts proper’, which denote discursive shifts in personal 
pronoun that do not form part of reported direct speech (within inverted commas), 
questions, or imperatives.87 Person shifts proper have some tendency to occur along 
with tense shifts, but not exclusively. Margetts writes that these shifts have, among 
other functions, the potential to save the narrator and narratee from so-called ‘face-	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threatening acts’, a convention of polite society that illustrates how seemingly 
meaningless linguistic details are fundamentally associated with our perception of 
the self.88 If a prononun shift can protect one’s self-confidence, it has the implied 
potential to instill a sense of self in narrator and narratee or, conversely, to deplete it. 
What, then, does sacrifice have to do with narrative experimentation? I posit 
that formal innovations that trouble the perception of narrative voice illustrate the 
same issues that the concept of sacrifice brings to the surface, namely the 
relationship between self and community. Sacrifice temporarily dissolves boundaries 
between self and community, self and other, or subject and object, and modernist 
narrative experimentation does the same, in that it allows for a multivocal narrative. 
This multivocality lets separate individuals speak on behalf of a community, and 
furthermore questions the identity – or even the existence – of a single narrator by 
momentarily suspending the boundaries between narrator and character, that is, 
subject and object, thereby creating instances of intersubjectivity. 
The specific technique that will be focussed on is that of shifts in the personal 
pronoun used by the narrative voice. The shifts seen in the works studied here – as in 
most novels where such things occur – are usually from third person narration to first 
person narration, followed by a continuous oscillation back and forth between the 
two, but there are cases of second-person narration as well as the first person plural 
‘we’. These shifts may be, as Brian Richardson puts it, ‘compelling for readers and 
potentially problematic for theory,’ but they are nonetheless well suited to express 
the previously discussed issues that exist at the point of convergence between 
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sacrifice and modernist writing: the troubled relationship and permeable boundaries 
between individual subjects.89 
The second person singular is generally less used than the first or third person 
singular as referent for the narrator, which could be explained by the uncertainty of 
its meaning, being positioned in between the subjective first person and the objective 
third person. As Brian Richardson states in Narrative Theory (2012), ‘[s]econd-
person fiction cannot easily be reduced to either homodiegetic or heterodiegetic 
status, but hovers ambiguously between these two conventional positions.’90 It could 
be supposed that the narrator, if extradiegetic, calls the protagonist ‘you’ and ‘she’ 
alternately. However, this would complicate the reading of any parts with first-
person narration. Alternately, ‘you’ may at times simply be used as an indeterminate 
personal pronoun – meaning ‘one’ – to establish a sense of dialogue with the reader. 
Cohn suggests using the term ‘memory monologue’ as a designator for second 
person narrated texts in which the narrator and narratee are one and the same.91 As 
Fludernik points out however, this term mainly applies to retrospective narratives.92 
The history of pronoun shifts in the narrative voice goes far further back than 
the interwar period. Margetts’s examples of shifts from third to second person in 
Homeric Greek narratives are a testament to the fact that such occurrences can be 
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found throughout literary history.93 In his study A Theory of Narrative (1979), Franz 
Stanzel points to William Makepeace Thackeray as an early user of this technique in 
The History of Henry Esmond (1852). While Thackeray does employ these shifts, 
they are mainly to be understood as a way of differentiating between the narrator and 
character in so much as they are separated by time. Longacre, though analysing this 
phenomenon only very briefly, uses two examples where ‘[h]eightened vividness [is] 
obtained by a shift to a more specific person, i.e., the shift is from a third person to 
second person to first person, or form plural to singular within a given person’: 
Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities (1859) and Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The House 
of Seven Gables (1851).94 Joseph Conrad uses pronoun shifts in several works: The 
Nigger of the ‘Narcissus’ (1897), The Secret Agent (1907), and Under Western Eyes 
(1911).  
As opposed to what happens in the modernist works I look at in this thesis, 
the pronoun shifts in Dickens, Hawthorne, and Conrad do not normally generate any 
confusion as to whether or not the narrator is a character in the story, however. 
According to Allan H. Simmons, the shifts in Conrad are instead an indication of the 
specifically modernist concern of ‘individual worth and identity [that] stem from the 
very collective endeavour they challenge.’95 However, modernist authors were often 
trying to find new ways of expressing conscious experience; as David Herman 
insists, ‘the modernist accent falls less on fictional worlds than on fictional-worlds-
as-experienced.’96 While the shifts in themselves are not only to be found in 	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modernist fiction, they do feature more prominently and regularly in works of this 
period and after; Brian Richardson tends to focus on the second half of the twentieth 
century in his study of the phenomenon, as he finds that it is a common strategy for 
writers who wish to overcome binary structures of any kind, which is an inevitable 
result of postmodernity. Levitt uses Virginia Woolf’s The Waves as an example of a 
narrative where the internal subjective experience of each character blends together 
to form a whole: ‘[B]ecause of their lifetime of shared experiences, the six 
protagonists of the novel may be said to form a community; this explains both why 
they seem to share a language and why they may in other ways appear 
interchangeable.’97 This is the very essence of intersubjectivity as portrayed in 
modernist fiction, and The Waves may be the clearest instance of such narration. The 
novel is not part of the material used for the thesis however, as the shifts in pronoun 
are not unexplained – it is always clear which of the characters is currently in charge 
of the narrative. Furthermore, the purpose of its pronoun shifts is not related to 
sacrifice as a strategy for negotiating the space between the individual and the 
community. 
Of the authors studied in this thesis, Mary Butts comes closest to resembling 
Woolf’s take on intersubjectivity, primarily in two out of the three novels studied: 
Armed with Madness (1928) and Death of Felicity Taverner (1932). However, where 
Woolf lets the multivocality of her characters remain the same throughout the 
narrative – the technique of multivocality is explored in depth – Butts continuously 
alters the dynamic of the multivocality to drive the narrative towards sacrifice and 
uses multivocality to raise questions about power and narrative. According to 
Sotirova, Joyce’s experiments with multivocality are similar to Woolf’s. Using 	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Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism she argues that Joyce was aiming partly to create an 
effect of the reality of spoken dialogue, and partly to involve ‘the reader in a subtle 
dialogue with the author (or narrator) because the construal of reference requires the 
joint effort of two interactants.’98 As opposed to informal speech, ‘a reader’s 
interpretation of these pronominal references is probably not going to be automatic’ 
or even effortless.99 This exemplifies how important pronoun shifts are in terms of 
creating meaning from the narrative – they call for the attention of the reader by 
producing confusion. This is certainly true in Butts and even more so in H. D. 
In May Sinclair, the pronoun shifts are largely markers of shifts within one 
character’s consciousness. Here, shifts between levels of consciousness are 
represented by the three personal pronouns she (self as distanced object), you (self as 
proximate object or indeterminate subject), and I (self as subject). This sometimes 
occurs in Butts and H. D. as well, and will be exemplified accordingly in each 
chapter. The influence of psychoanalytic theory cannot be overlooked here. All three 
authors were interested in and informed on the topic, albeit in different ways. This 
will be further explored in the separate chapters, where I look at how this informed 
their work, from Sinclair’s struggle to reconcile herself with Freud in ‘Clinical 
Lectures on Symbolism and Sublimation’ (1916) and her critique of Jung in ‘The 
Way of Sublimation’ (1915), to Butts’ acceptance of psychoanalysis as the new 
religion in Traps for Unbelievers (1932), and H. D.’s fraught personal relationship 
with analysis in Tribute to Freud (1956). 
Shifts in personal pronoun that convey various levels of a character’s 
consciousness were used in several other novels at the time, such as Rosamond 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Sotirova, ‘The Roots of a Literary Style,’ 143. 
99 Sotirova, ‘The Roots of a Literary Style,’ 137. 
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Lehmann’s Dusty Answer (1927), which shifts between second- and third-person 
narration seamlessly. Another notable example is Dorothy Richardson’s Pilgrimage, 
a thirteen-volume novel published between 1915 and 1938, where second- and third-
person narration is intertwined primarily in the later instalments.100 Richardson 
claimed of her own protagonist Miriam that there was no one ‘there to describe her,’ 
overtly pointing to a lack of the presence of an omniscient narrator.101 In contrast to 
Sinclair’s Mary Olivier: A Life (1919) and Life and Death of Harriett Frean (1922), 
the novels of Lehmann and Richardson are more distinctively Bildungsroman in the 
sense that they mainly chart the growth and development of their characters as young 
women.102 Sinclair’s two novels are more clearly concerned with sacrifice as the two 
protagonists are shown to reach the end of their lives unmarried, which gives them a 
problematic outsider status in society in the early twentieth century. More 
importantly, the pronoun shifts in Dusty Answer and Pilgrimage are not seen to have 
a particular relation to sacrifice as this concept is not an ambiguous concern in either 
work. 
H. D. uses pronoun shifts in a variety of ways in her fiction, depending on the 
era of her writing. In some of the works that are looked at in this thesis, such as 
Paint It Today (1992), the pronoun shifts frequently cause a confusion as to the 
identity of the narrator, whereas in others, such as HERmione (1981), H. D. is more 
similar to Sinclair in her use of pronoun shifts, which primarily refer to levels of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 This is not including the posthumous March Moonlight, which was first 
published in the 1967 collected edition. 
101 Gloria G. Fromm, Dorothy Richardson: A Biography (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1994), 66. 
102 While March Moonlight does leap ahead a few years, it does not form a definite 
end to Miriam Henderson’s life in the way that Mary Olivier is thought to do and 
Harriett Frean definitely does. 
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consciousness within the protagonist. There is, however, an added element of 
multivocality that is similar to that used by Butts. H. D.’s pronoun shifts may be read 
as a combination and development of Sinclair’s and Butts’ more distinctly separate 
styles. 
While my overall argument is that the innovations in narrative technique in 
the works studied are the formal expression of the intersubjectivity that is a result of 
sacrifice, there are distinct differences in the relationship between sacrifice and 
formal experimentation, both between the three authors and within the oeuvre of 
each author. In each chapter I will therefore provide examples from specific works 
of what is maintained above in order to support my claim, and to give a detailed 
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Chapter 2 
‘Let everything go except yourself. Hold on to yourself…. 
But you felt your self going’: Two Sides of Sacrifice, 
Selfhood, and Narrative Voice in May Sinclair105 
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the concept of sacrifice in relation to notions 
of selfhood, and how this relationship is portrayed through narrative innovation in 
two works that are written in an experimental style: Mary Olivier: A Life (1919) and 
Life and Death of Harriett Frean (1922) – henceforth referred to as Mary Olivier 
and Harriett Frean. In the former narrative, sacrifice serves as a key to reaching a 
state of spiritual enlightenment and self-realisation, whereas the latter novel presents 
a dark-sided counterpart: sacrifice that leads to self-annihilation. Other novels by 
Sinclair to which the concept of sacrifice is relevant are not dealt with here as these 
are written in a realist mode and are therefore not pertinent to the central concern of 
my thesis, which is the relationship between sacrifice and narrative pronoun shifts. 
The narrative techniques used in the two novels are specifically tailored to their 
respective portrayals of sacrifice, as the novels each represent not only a side of 
sacrifice and its relation to self-realisation, but a version of the representation of 
consciousness. 
The central problem that will be explored in this chapter is what the 
opposition between the representation of sacrifice in the two novels means, and how 
this opposition is connected with the differing styles of narration in the novels. I will 
argue that May Sinclair adopts methods to describe experiences of the self that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 May Sinclair, Mary Olivier: A Life (London: Virago Press, 2002), 351. 
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resound with current theories of self-consciousness in the work of Daniel Dennett 
and David Chalmers. 
Sinclair portrays a variety of levels of self-realisation using narrative 
experiment. The novels studied show Sinclair’s concern with the self on a lexical 
level; pronoun shifts and narrative reticence prompt questions as to the degree of 
insight into the self – and thereby realisation of the self – of the main character in 
both novels. The use of second-person narration in Mary Olivier marks an attempt at 
creating intersubjectivity in that it simulates a joint experience of reader and narrator, 
suggests self-reflection within the mind of the protagonist, and questions the division 
between the subject and object of the narrative. The increasing incidence of first 
person narration towards the end of the novel indicates the growing realisation of the 
self of the protagonist through sacrifice. In contrast, the narration in Harriett Frean 
is strictly third person, focalised mainly through Harriett, who, in opposition to Mary, 
is not able to form a sense of self that is separate from that of her mother. 
It is my contention that the reason why there are less pronoun shifts in the 
narration of Harriett Frean than in Mary Olivier is because Harriett has no self 
through which to narrate her life in the first person; neither does she make sacrifices 
that can be considered conducive to the creation of such a self. This also explains 
why second-person narration is not used, as there is no self to which the narration 
can be addressed, be it from within Harriett – either from a distance of some time as 
I argue is the case in Mary Olivier, or in a direct way as an internal dialogical 
thought process represented on the page – or from any external narrator. It is clearly 
the case – as for example Suzanne Raitt and Phillippa Martindale have previously 
argued – that Mary Olivier is a representation of a successful sublimation and 
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Harriett Frean is one of unsuccessful sublimation, or repression.106 What has not 
been previously addressed is the role of sacrifice in portraying the difference 
between sublimation that is concurrent with sacrifice that has a productive outcome 
and repression that is concurrent with sacrifice that has a destructive outcome. My 
contribution to the subject is to illuminate the relation between narrative technique 
and how the sacrifices made by Mary Olivier increase her sense of self as an 
individual and as a part of a metaphysical community and, contrarily, how the 
sacrifices made by Harriett Frean have the opposite effect. The focus of the present 
chapter is therefore the difference between these two kinds of sacrifice and how 
these differences are linked to narrative strategy.  
My contention is that while Mary Olivier can be read as a case-study, 
Harriett Frean demonstrates Sinclair’s effort to write an almost antiseptic novel of 
consciousness to a greater extent. The third person narration in Harriett Frean, 
however closely focalised through the main character, is a way of approaching 
consciousness as a clinical or empirical case-study. This clinical nature of Sinclair’s 
novels, which is explored by Leslie de Bont in the book chapter ‘Portrait of the 
Female Character as a Psychoanalytical Case: The Ambiguous Influence of Freud on 
May Sinclair’s Novels’ (2017), is the reason why contemporary reviewers found the 
novel to be so modern. It was termed a ‘nearly medical’ novel by critic Frank 
Swinnerton, which intimates modernity in a sense of being scientific or clinical, but 
also insinuates a problematic lack of empathy or feeling. Frank Swinnerton’s words 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 See Suzanne Raitt, May Sinclair: A Modern Victorian (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
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taken out of context may sound like harsh criticism, but his is in fact a favourable 
review:  
 
[Harriett Frean] was a genuine advance in a particular form of 
impressionistic realism then first attracting notice. This short novel … was 
significant. It skimmed the cream, as it were, of a life. … For that reason, its 
brief simplicity, ‘The Life and Death of Harriett Frean’ is worthy of 
remembrance. It is very nearly medical.107 
  
Conversely, Sinclair was criticised in The Little Review for relying too heavily on 
psychoanalysis as a basis for her characterisations in Mary Olivier. Jane Heap stated 
that  
 
the line-up of her characters in ‘Mary Olivier’ reads like the list for a clinic. 
Pathological predestination bears small relation to creative inevitability. … 
May Sinclair did not convince me that Mary had a conception of life. …life 
ran parallel to her; she never knew what was going on. Her ‘great spiritual 
triumph’ in the end is the completion of the frustration, the capping proof that 
she had not escaped being devoured by her mother.108  
 
Whether one chooses to read the ending of Mary Olivier as a triumph or a failure, the 
consensus is that the novel is written like a medical case. I argue that while Mary 
Olivier can certainly be read as a case-study in terms of content, Harriett Frean is 
more specifically clinical in form. 
I therefore suggest that the innovative style of Harriett Frean cannot be fully 
comprehended without juxtaposing it with Mary Olivier, as they are two sides of the 
same coin, not only in terms of storyline, but of narrative style. While Laurel Forster 
argues that, as opposed to Mary Olivier, ‘what is emphasized in Sinclair’s portrayal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Frank Swinnerton, The Georgian Literary Scene 1910-1935: A Panorama 
(London: Hutchinson & Co., 1950), 307. 
108 jh, ‘Eat ‘em alive!’ The Little Review 6, no. 8 (1919): 30-2. Need to add ‘Jane 
Heap at beginning of note 
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of Harriett is the nature of childhood experiences, not the persona or individual 
identity of the child,’ I perceive the difference between the two novels as involving a 
rather more ground-breaking shift, from the experience of being a child, which is 
represented in Mary Olivier, to the ‘scientific’ observation of the experience of being 
a child, which is represented in Harriett Frean.109 
I will show in this chapter how Sinclair’s narration as a manifestation of 
consciousness is representative of two sides of the present-day consciousness debate 
in philosophy Mary Olivier is a narrative representation of the subjective or inner 
experience of one consciousness, and Harriett Frean is a narrative representation of 
the objective or outer view of the experience of another consciousness. In the first 
novel, the first- and second-person pronouns are used to capture the closeness 
between narrator and conscious experience in Mary Olivier, whereas the third-person 
pronoun used in the latter illustrates the separation between the two in Harriett 
Frean.110 
Sinclair employs sacrifice to allow her characters to form personalised belief 
systems, promoting an individualistic approach to spirituality. This does not mean 
that Sinclair connects sacrifice with purely individualist intentions, however. In 
order to reach a state of fulfilment, characters need to renounce something or 
someone, sometimes with altruistic motives but more often with a metaphysical, 
universal community of spirit in mind – what is referred to in Mary Olivier as well 
as in Sinclair’s philosophical writings on idealism as the Absolute. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Laurel Forster, ‘“Imagism … is a state of soul”: May Sinclair’s Imagist Writing,’ 
in May Sinclair: Moving Towards the Modern, ed. Andrew Kunka and Michele K. 
Troy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 115. 
110 See chapter 1 for a discussion and contextualisation of these concepts. 
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‘[T]he idea of the Absolute is not primitive. It is a very late and highly 
“sublimated” idea’: The Place of Sacrifice in Sinclair’s Psychoanalytic 
Idealism111 
The tenets of idealism and the concept of the Absolute are central to Sinclair’s 
thought and several of her fictional works, Mary Olivier in particular, and they 
provide a theoretical background for mapping out Sinclair’s understanding of 
sacrifice. Broadly speaking, idealism claims that all reality is created in the mind, 
and is therefore immaterial or non-existent outside of any perceiving consciousness.  
There are several different schools of idealism. Sinclair makes clear in A 
Defence of Idealism that she is in disagreement with Berkeley and subjective 
idealism, and that she is partial to Hegel even though she criticises his justification of 
Christianity. As to her contemporary defenders of idealism, Sinclair was particularly 
influenced by the work of T. H. Green. Sinclair’s philosophical work – published in 
two monographs, A Defence of Idealism (1917) and The New Idealism (1922) – 
builds on two basic principles: the individuality of the human spiritual consciousness, 
or Life-Force, and its unity with the greater, universal Life-Force. 
The individual Life-Force, then, is part of or can become part of the macro 
Life-Force. The concept of the Life-Force in idealism can be likened to the Brahman, 
with the corresponding Atman as the individual Life-Force, in Hindu philosophy in 
the sense that it is an indefinable entity that pervades, or can pervade, any individual 
consciousness and can only be approached through deep spiritual practices, if at all. 
As Sinclair herself points out in A Defence of Idealism, idealism’s Life-Force can 
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also be compared with Nirvana or the Dao in Buddhist and Daoist philosophy 
respectively:  
 
[In the Vedic, Buddhist, and Daoist texts,] thought leads and the passion for 
the Absolute follows; until thought overthrows the thinker; and thought and 
passion, and the desire of Life are consumed (or consummated) in Nirvana, 
or in the “Emptiness and Nothingness” of the Great Tao.112  
 
The Life-Force can be considered to be the same as the Absolute, or to be a way of 
reaching the Absolute. 
Non-binary concepts such as Sinclair’s Absolute are often irreconcilable with 
Western philosophy without some form of allowance for mysticism, which Sinclair 
readily recognises in A Defence of Idealism where she devotes an entire chapter to 
mystic knowledge of the Absolute. Claire Drewery states that Sinclair ‘echoes 
Bergson’s contention that consciousness is characterised by the conflict between a 
continuity and a stasis of the self,’ whereas the example she uses from A Defence of 
Idealism to substantiate her claim points rather to the contrary.113 Sinclair holds that 
‘[b]efore Monism can work it must have a principle which shall be both static and 
dynamic.’114 For Sinclair, it is not a question of conflict or even choice between 
stasis and flux – both exist within each other.  
The same principle is applied to unity and plurality, and the individual and 
community; these are not seen as oppositional pairs in Sinclair’s philosophical works. 
Inspiration is taken not only from Eastern philosophy, but also from chosen parts of 
Hegel’s idealism. While Hegel maintains that the individual consciousness has the 	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113 Claire Drewery, ‘Mysticism, Idealism and the Reality Aesthetic,’ Pilgrimages 4, 
(2011): 127. 
114 Sinclair, A Defence of Idealism, 334. 
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right to exercise complete freedom, he also states that the subjective will ought to 
coincide with the communal will. In other words, individual freedom ought to be 
exercised by those wills that are compliant with what is good for the society of 
which they are part.115 Idealist morality builds on this principle, assuming that the 
common good must decide what is good for the individual and what that individual 
should want. Sinclair uses the assumption of a unity between a community of 
individuals in both her fiction and other writing, as shall be seen further on. 
The idea that self-sacrifice enables self-realisation is fundamental in A 
Defence of Idealism. The works of Spinoza, as well as the British philosopher T. H. 
Green, are of particular importance to Sinclair here. Self-sacrifice and self-
realisation are intertwined concepts in both Green and Sinclair’s respective 
idealisms. It has been argued both by George M. Johnson and Hrisey D. Zegger that 
Sinclair drew on Green’s work when maintaining that the road to self-realisation is 
through self-sacrifice.116 Green posits in his Prolegomena to Ethics that ‘a perfecting 
of man’ can only be achieved in ‘a life determined by … a will of all which is the 
will of each,’ that is, a surrender of the individual will to the communal good.117 In A 
Defence of Idealism Sinclair stresses the importance of selfhood, but also of 
individuality as 
 
only one stage, and that not the highest and the most important stage, in the 
real life-process of the self. It may be that a self can only become a perfect 
self in proportion as it takes on the experiences of other selves… The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 See for instance G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baille 
(Mineola: Dover Publications, 2003), 301-2; 351-2.  
116 George M. Johnson, Dynamic Psychology in Modern British Fiction (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 17-8, and Hrisey D. Zegger, May Sinclair (Boston: 
Twayne, 1976), 19-22. 
117 T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883), 311. 
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individual … may have to die that the self may live. …this sacrifice would 
not mean what is called ‘subjective immortality,’ but rather the very opposite. 
In subjective immortality the individual lives precariously in the memory of 
posterity… [I]t is a form of consciousness to which … he has contributed but 
does not share. He has no consciousness of anything any more at all. But the 
life after death of the perfected self would mean an enormous increase of 
consciousness, through a spiritual communion in which all … is finished and 
complete.118 
 
Sinclair considers individuality to be of less value than the selfhood that comes out 
of sharing ‘the experiences of other selves’. However, any and all sacrifice does not 
perfect the self; it has to bring the self into an intersubjective or ‘spiritual’ union with 
other consciousnesses, with a world-consciousness, or world-spirit. A sacrifice that 
does not do so, one that leads to what Sinclair calls ‘subjective immortality,’ is not 
beneficial to the self-realisation of the one who makes the sacrifice. In this view, 
then, self-sacrifice is not just made for the sake of a cause that is bigger than oneself, 
but also in order to achieve the realisation of one’s own self. 
Clearly, community is key for Sinclair’s conception of sacrifice and the self; 
as the above quotation shows, the sacrifice of one subject facilitates intersubjectivity 
in the form of ‘communion’. Christine Battersby holds that ‘Sinclair is closer to 
Spinoza than to Green,’ arguing that the author puts less emphasis on the ‘social 
duty’ of women than on their individual development, referring specifically to the 
account of Mary Olivier’s progress towards becoming an artist.119 While I agree that 
there is certainly a sense of the importance of individuality in the novel, I will argue 
later in this chapter that it is only through Mary’s acts of abnegation and submission 
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to a higher power that she is able to reach a state of self-realisation and 
enlightenment. 
Although Sinclair appears to be more often concerned with a spiritual or 
transcendent community rather than a physical, social one, she argues in her 
philosophical work A Defence of Idealism (1917) that the community of the human 
race is indebted to the individual. The individual, in order to be perceived as a self, is 
sacrificed for the benefit of the community. Sinclair sometimes uses the word 
‘individual’ as a synonym for ‘self’ and sometimes as distinct from ‘self’, as in the 
quotation above where the ‘individual’ is sacrificed for the ‘self’. This is 
accomplished via sublimation, a refinement and transformation of the libido – ‘the 
primordial will-to-live’ – into ‘supreme expressions of individuality – love and 
will.’120 The sacrifice of individual for community is not so much a choice as a 
prerequisite for the healthy development of the individual for Sinclair: ‘The perfect 
individual is the person perfectly adapted to reality through the successive 
sublimations of his will.’121 Sacrifice of the libido, or transformation of primordial 
desires into outputs of creativity, is thus an integral part of what it means to be a 
complete individual. 
In the working out of her thoughts on the libido, Sinclair was naturally 
indebted to psychoanalytic theory, both Freudian and Jungian. While she discussed 
and was influenced by both, she was more inclined towards Jung’s acceptance of 
religion as an integral and necessary part of the human psyche.122 In the unpublished 
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work ‘The Way of Sublimation’, written in 1915, Sinclair also criticises Jung 
however, noting that his generalisations are too broad, and she describes him as ‘a 
bull in a china shop’ when dealing with religious beliefs. She finds that, in his work, 
‘most things under the sun are degraded (or exalted) to aspects of the Libido.’123 
Sinclair prefers Jung over Freud partly due to his lesser insistence on the Libido as 
sex only, but also because Jung acknowledges that religion can be the ultimate way 
of sublimation, if it is revisited and reformulated to suit what is known of the mind 
after psychoanalytic theory. However, she takes a stand against Jung’s description of 
ancient religion as primitive in Psychology of the Unconscious, and holds that texts 
such as the Upanishads are ‘already highly sublimated, with concepts that have been 
passed not once but many times through the crucible of the human intellect’.124 
Sinclair is primarily interested in the Upanishads for their metaphysical ideas, their 
explanation of everything as one in the ultimate state of reality, Brahman. She 
thereby relates Hindu religion, but also in some instances Buddhism and Daoism, to 
her notions of idealism and its concept of the Absolute.125 
Sinclair considered sacrifice in the form of sublimation to be the only healthy 
and productive way to deal with desire: ‘For the happy normal individual, desire is 
never repressed; it is either directed and controlled, or it wanders of its own accord 
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into the paths of sublimation.’126 In ‘The Way of Sublimation’, Sinclair argues that 
all sacrifice is made for the need of redemption, which she equates with sublimation: 
 
[P]rimitive repression … evolves in course of time into a whole system of 
repressions, carried on into civilization, sacrifices… culminating in the 
sacrifice of Christ on the Cross, a sacrifice that receives an intense 
significance through the fact, now disclosed by the study of comparative 
mythology that the Cross was originally a phallic symbol. It is all the same 
thing going on for ever – the redemption of the flesh; the redemption of the 
soul from the tyranny of flesh.127  
 
Here, repression and sacrifice are placed on an evolutionary scale, where sacrifice is 
seen as a form of ‘primitive’ sublimation and psychoanalysis the most modern form 
of sublimation. The crucifixion – the sacrifice to end all sacrifice – is seen as the 
stepping stone between ritual sacrifice and the form of sublimation as employed in 
psychoanalysis. For Sinclair, then, not all sacrifices are equal to sublimation: 
‘Christianity, Buddhism, and Brahmanism, for instance, were developed on the lines 
of repression, the primitive religions (and Brahmanism in its primitive form) 
proceeded by the open but still imperfect way of sublimation through symbolic 
ritual…’128 Sinclair viewed psychoanalysis as the modern-day variant of ‘primitive’ 
symbolic ritual, in that the soul is brought to light and cleansed through religious 
ritual in the same way that psychoanalysis can be seen as a purification of the dark, 
destructive side of the libido: ‘…the sinful, secret libido [is] dragged out of its 
hiding-place in the Unconscious into full consciousness and thus made clean.’129 
Sinclair thus compares and equates symbolic ritual with psychoanalysis and its 
sublimative power. 	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Sinclair also writes in A Defence of Idealism that sublimation is ‘the diversion of the 
Life-Force, of the Will-to-live, from ways that serve the purposes and interests of the 
species, into ways that serve the purposes and interests of individuals’; it is a 
controlling of the libido as sex drive.130 Sinclair equates the libido with idealism’s 
‘Life-Force,’ the concept of ‘mana’, Bergson’s ‘Élan Vital’ and Schopenhauer’s 
‘Will to Live,’ and thereby understands the concept as possible to re-route into other 
productive channels of energy.131 Sinclair further defines the ‘Life-Force,’ as a 
‘desire striving for fulfilment and for sublimation, an energy made manifest in such 
forms and in such a manner as to declare its spiritual source.’132 Taking control of 
the libido by sublimating it implies the sacrifice of not giving in to impulses wrought 
by it, such as passion, violence and greed. This means that sacrifice and sublimation 
are intimately connected and that both are means towards the end of becoming a 
realised self, one who is not limited by the libido as sex drive. 
According to Freudian psychoanalytic theory, sublimation, as opposed to 
repression, is the correct way of re-directing or transforming the Life-Force into 
healthy, productive channels. In ‘Clinical Lecture on Symbolism and Sublimation I’, 
published in The Medical Press in 1916, Sinclair writes: ‘Sublimation itself is the 
striving of the Libido towards manifestation in higher and higher forms. … 
[B]ecause of the blind force of the Unconscious behind [the libido], sublimation 
cannot always keep pace with instinct, and the first oscillations in the balance 
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between libido and sublimation begin.’133 A prerequisite of this balancing act is 
sacrifice as a necessary element of sublimation, but only sacrifice made by a truly 
self-effacing individual. Sinclair quotes Jung in her second paper on the subject, 
‘Symbolism and Sublimation II’, in order to indicate the nature of sacrifice as 
sublimation: ‘The aggressive, self-assertive ego cannot make the indispensable 
sacrifice. …only through the mystery of self-sacrifice is it possible to be “born 
again.”’134 It is the willing sacrifice of the self – as opposed to the assertiveness of 
the ego – that effects sublimation. 
Scholars often tend to read Sinclair’s work as highly individualistic and 
diametrically opposed to a high valuation of institutions such as family and religion. 
Allison Pease, for instance, notes in her article ‘May Sinclair, Feminism, and 
Boredom: “A Dying to Live”’ (2006) that sublimation ‘requires the strength to assert 
one’s own individuality … and to reject the social institutions such as family or 
religion.’135 However, in ‘The Way of Sublimation’ and ‘Symbolism and 
Sublimation’ Sinclair – like Hegel – clearly finds that selfhood can only be achieved 
through taking part in and giving yourself to a community. As has already been 
noted, she overtly equates sublimation with symbolic ritual, and emphasises the 
primary role of religion for sublimation in a footnote to an enumeration of various 
manifestations of sublimation in ‘Symbolism and Sublimation I’: ‘I have arranged 
them provisionally on what I think Professor Jung would consider the right 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Sinclair, ‘Symbolism and Sublimation I,’ 119-20. 
134 Sinclair, ‘Symbolism and Sublimation II,’ The Medical Press, 16 August 1916, 
142. 
135 Allison Pease, ‘May Sinclair, Feminism, and Boredom: “A Dying to 
Live”.’ English Literature in Transition, 1880-1920 49, no. 2 (2006): 170. 
Sanna Melin Schyllert 
 71 
ascending scale. Personally, I should place Religion first and last.’136 The specifics 
of her argument suggests that she places ‘primitive’ religion first and contemporary 
Christianity last, as she regards ritual sacrifice in archaic traditions as sublimative 
and what she perceives as contemporary Christian sacrifice to be repressive, a view 
that is based on the previously mentioned idea of human thought evolving from 
magic to religion to science. Nevertheless, given this statement, Sinclair’s 
association of sacrifice and sublimation merits further investigation. 
For Sinclair, the product of sublimation is when the libido (which she equates 
with both will and desire) takes the shape of a productive outlet, such as artistic 
creation, whereas the outcome of repression is the libido in its destructive form – the 
performance of a sacrificial act with the purpose of self-aggrandisation, for example. 
Matthew Kibble writes of the matter as discussed by Sinclair in ‘Symbolism and 
Sublimation’ that 
 
…May Sinclair… suggests that each successive life-form in the evolutionary 
chain might be seen as the ‘sublimation’ of the previous one, so that Jung’s 
‘libido’ becomes a creative, divine life-force striving towards a higher moral 
end. … She does not see Libido as a sexual drive at all, but as a divine will 
with a natural progressive aim. Perversion has no useful relation to cultural 
production here: it is even seen as ‘unholy’ and destructive.137 
 
It is important to note that the ‘evolutionary chain’ of life that Kibble mentions is, 
for Sinclair, wholly non-deterministic; in A Defence of Idealism, she clarifies that 
sublimation constitutes evolution, which is for that reason not biologically 
determined. This may seem counter-intuitive if evolution and biological determinism 
are thought of as going hand in hand. However, Sinclair’s use of the concept of 
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evolution in relation to individual identity, inspired by Herbert Spencer, suggests the 
possibility of change within each individual (Lamarckism) rather than any implied 
fixedness in a hereditary chain: ‘Individuals, in their successive (and successful) 
sublimations, raised the primordial will-to-live from the level of mere need and want, 
through the stages of desire, to those supreme expressions of individuality – love and 
will.’138 To suggest that Sinclair is saying that all individuals are determined to be 
sublimations of previous generations through the inescapability of evolution – and 
thereby sublimation – is, I think, to misunderstand her point, since she makes it quite 
clear that sublimation rarely happens by default. Furthermore, she emphasises the 
tentative nature of the idea of the human race as a unified organism and is troubled 
by evolutionary determinism. She does not, however, dismiss it out of hand, but 
addresses it from several angles in the book’s first chapter, which is on the theories 
of Samuel Butler, and concludes that 
 
if we narrow [the individual] down to his bare achievements as an individual, 
the small experience he acquires for himself in his short lifetime, compared 
with his immense accumulations in the persons of his progenitors, doesn’t 
really amount to a row of pins… If you say it is all for the Race and not for 
the individual, and that the individual only exists in and for the Race, that 
doesn’t make the affair a bit more intelligible or a bit better. In fact it makes 
it worse… For what is the Race but an abstraction, if it is not the sum of the 
individuals that compose it?139 
 
Towards the end of the chapter, she stands firm in her conviction that individuals 
contribute to the evolutionary chain but remain detachable from it: ‘The individual’s 
heritage is his, if we allow him … “a little dose” of selfhood over and above his 
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sense of need, over and above reason and judgment, over and above memory. The 
Individual is not his heritage. His heritage is his.’140 
I further disagree with Kibble’s understanding of Sinclair’s notion of the 
libido as asexual – she clearly includes the sex drive in the term, but does not restrict 
it to mean only that. This can be seen throughout the article as she mentions the 
‘sexual libido’ when she wishes to refer to that specific element within her wider, 
more inclusive understanding of libido as a term. Kibble nevertheless points to an 
important distinction between a creative and a destructive side of the Life-Force, 
which leads to positive and negative ways of enacting sacrifice, or sacrifice based on 
sublimation versus sacrifice based on repression. 
According to Sinclair, a sublimated will is the foundation of everything that is the 
result of human culture. Sublimation, she writes, 
 
is Here – everywhere. Always and now. … All religion, all art, all literature, 
all science are sublimations in various stages of perfection. … The houses we 
live in, the pavement we walk on, the steamships, trains and motor cars we 
travel by, chairs and tables, machinery and the products of machinery are so 
many instances of sublimation carried out in the concrete.141 
 
Her idea that sublimation is the source of everything, even tables and chairs, builds 
on the notion that the productive energy of the libido is liberated through sublimation 
and can thereby be channelled into the creation of art and innovation. ‘Civilisation’ 
can for that reason be seen as having been made purely through sublimation, which 
is a transformation of the libido into creative energy – a productive form of sacrifice. 
In its destructive counterpart, the libido is repressed and will take illness or 
perversion as its outlet. Sinclair exemplifies both of these processes in her fiction. 
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* 
Sinclair’s stance on the relations among sacrifice, self, and community is noticeably 
ambiguous when her early fiction is contrasted with the more experimental novels. 
In the pre-war novels and stories, Sinclair emphasises the way in which sacrifice 
relates to the so-called woman question, and points to the choices that women have 
to make in order to have the freedom to work as creators. At this early stage, 
sacrifice primarily illustrates a feminist point by questioning the fact that women are 
not allowed to combine a family life with work, but also provides the starting point 
of her concern with the opposition of individualism and community that is at the 
heart of the concept of sacrifice.142 
 With the advent of the First World War, the conceptual treatment of sacrifice 
in Sinclair’s writing becomes more complex in that it takes the community on a 
national level into consideration. In Journal of Impressions in Belgium (1915), her 
own first-hand account of the early days of the war in Belgium, Sinclair expresses 
some reservations as to the purpose of sacrifice. Being required to take a step back 
and observe the sacrifices of others for herself and the nation, she salutes the bravery 
of the soldiers and nurses while questioning the sense of it all. The enforced 
passivity is palpably distressing to her: ‘I’m bored’, she writes, plainly and 
impatiently – but there is not much that can be done to remedy it.143 On the one hand, 
she wishes to be an active participant in the effort, but on the other, she is unable to 	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make herself useful due to her age and inexperience. Sinclair’s seething frustration is 
felt in the text, especially in one rambling sentence that cannot be quoted in full here 
due to its extreme length: 
 
To have nothing to do but hang about the Hospital on the off-chance of the 
Commandant coming back unexpectedly and wanting a letter written; to pass 
the man with the bullet wound in his mouth a dozen times a day … to see all 
this and be utterly powerless to help … to sit in a hateful inactivity, and a 
disgusting, an intolerable safety … to want to stop it and to be unable to stop 
it, and at the same time to feel a brute because you want to stop it – when 
they are enjoying the adventure – I can only say of the experience that I hope 
there is no depth of futility deeper than this to come.144 
 
Wanting but not being allowed to make a sacrifice comparable to those she sees 
around her, Sinclair is dejected. Not only is the inactivity depressing to her, but the 
misery that surrounds her is a constant reminder of how little she herself is suffering 
– her lack of physical danger is what pains her the most. Not being able or allowed 
to give herself to the joint cause, her treatment of the war is fraught with 
ambivalence, even though she clearly supported the war effort; she appears to have 
been torn between positions on the war due to the frustration of not being able to 
take part in it. Her fictional accounts of the war – most prominently The Tree of 
Heaven (1917) – interrogate assumptions of sacrifice being inherently good or bad. 
 Sinclair’s correspondence also shows that she was personally aware of the 
multifaceted nature of war sacrifice, and the importance of belief in the war as a 
communal cause, in a 1916 letter to Charlotte Mew, commenting on Richard 
Aldington being called up to fight in France: 
 
Poor H. D.! She has been so fine in the way she’s taken her husband’s being 
conscripted. It isn’t her country’s War, and yet she behaves as if it were. I 
wish he could have been spared for her sake as well as his own. I can’t 	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imagine anything more awful than being sent into the trenches to fight for a 
cause you don’t believe in – unless it is the state of mind that doesn’t believe, 
and that can imagine that anything that’s been thought and written (within the 
last twenty years anyhow) more important than the winning of the War!145 
 
Sinclair expresses her sympathy for those who do not believe in the war but are 
forced to make sacrifices for it anyway, yet, in the second part of the same sentence, 
she deplores those who do not believe in anything at all apart from the importance of 
philosophy and literature. It is yet another statement that attests to Sinclair’s 
ambiguous attitude towards the idea of the nation and its demand for sacrifices in the 
war. 
In the more experimental works written after the war, where Sinclair lets the 
reader into characters’ minds in order to explore insecurities and ambivalence 
regarding the function and value of sacrifice, the focus is on the application of self-
sacrifice as a possible road to self-realisation. The communities of womanhood and 
the nation fade into the background, and instead it is a form of metaphysical 
community – spiritual unity with the world – that is sought through sacrifice by 
protagonists like Mary Olivier. The concept of sacrifice, then, is central to Sinclair’s 
work throughout her career, and is concerned with a way out of the juxtaposition of 
the need to realise the self on the one hand and sacrificing the individual for the 
benefit of community on the other, be it in the context of feminism, war, or spiritual 
fulfilment. The following section looks at Sinclair’s idea of sacrifice in the two 
experimental novels Mary Olivier and Harriett Frean, and explores the way in 
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which Sinclair presents the dynamics between sacrifice and selfhood by using 
innovations in narrative technique. 
 
‘Your self willed. It was free to will’: Sacrifice, Narrative Position, and the 
Realisation of the Self in the Experimental Fiction of May Sinclair146 
The stories of Mary’s and Harriett’s lives, from infancy to maturity, are not only 
strikingly similar to May Sinclair’s own lifestory, as has been pointed out in 
previous scholarship, but also to one another.147 While Harriett’s story is one of 
repressive, destructive sacrifice, Mary Olivier portrays sacrifice as a way of 
producing creative energy. One way in which it is possible to tell that sacrifice is 
sublimative rather than repressive for Mary is through its results: she is enlightened, 
she is content, she has her secret happiness, and an insight into her self, which she 
feels can never be taken away from her. She has a centre of narrative gravity, which 
is displayed to the reader where she occupies the first-person narrative position in the 
text. 
The formal experiments that I look at in relation to sacrifice in Sinclair are, as 
in Butts and H. D., pronoun shifts that mark various plateaux of the respective 
protagonists’ renunciation and realisation of the self. Mary Olivier is primarily a 
depiction of sacrifice as self-fulfilment, but it also shows how sacrifice and self-
fulfilment can contrast if the impetus to sacrifice is external and not motivated by an 
inner spiritual commitment. The story is one of struggle for independence and 
freedom from the domination of Victorian family life, but also a portrayal of the 	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desire to fulfil the expectations of society by conforming to culturally determined 
mores. I explore how Mary carves out a place for herself in the world by navigating 
to a point of agreement between what is expected of her and her own individual 
desires. Her struggle with ambivalent feelings regarding sacrifice is displayed by 
shifts in the narration that not only question the identity of the narrator, but also the 
various levels of development of self-realisation that she undergoes. In the following, 
I argue that these shifts are concurrent with the stages of Mary’s development that 
concern her notion of self in relation to sacrifice. 
 
‘Letting go had somehow done the trick’: Mary Olivier’s Self-Realisation through 
Self-Sacrifice148 
Mary Olivier is sometimes described as a novel that tracks the development of the 
female artist, in comparison with James Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man (1916) or Dorothy Richardson’s Pilgrimage (1938).149 Mary goes through a 
number of stages in her growth on the way to becoming a self-sufficient, published 
writer, who relies only on her own capabilities. I argue that her self-realisation is 
wholly dependent on the sacrifices she makes, both physical and spiritual. Through 
giving up her individuality, she paradoxically achieves a higher, enlightened sense of 
self that affords her the space to exercise her creative power. While performing 
repeated transgressions against the rules and norms of society, Mary also continually 
enacts sacrifices to atone for the same, making herself into a Girardian scapegoat by 
breaking the rules of society, accepting and internalising the blame that others place 
on her, and performing a sacrifice that brings her world back to a state of 
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normalcy.150 Sinclair does not discuss the scapegoating function at length elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, this model of conduct is the foundation for most of Mary’s life 
decisions, and consequently the basis of the narrative. 
Mary’s upbringing is entirely based on the principle of self-abnegation. Mary 
Olivier and Harriett Frean can both clearly be read as narratives through which 
Sinclair tries to come to terms with the Victorian ideal of womanhood.151 During 
Mary’s formative years, her mother inculcates this behavioural model by means of 
religious instruction. She teaches Mary that she must never be naughty, a concept 
that includes a wide range of behaviours – from reading the wrong sort of books to 
desiring her brothers’ toys – but it can broadly be summarised as acting selfishly. 
Mrs Olivier suggests that God will punish any offence against this characteristic, as 
she warns Mary that he ‘hates selfishness and self-will. … He wants [you] to give up 
[your] will,’ thereby linking God, or godliness, with selflessness.152  
Sinclair’s views on Christian sacrifice being a form of repression – as 
opposed to the kind of ritual sacrifice that constitutes sublimation – that she 
expressed in ‘Symbolism and Sublimation I,’ come to the fore in Mrs Olivier’s 
oppressive teachings of destructive self-abnegation: the kind of sacrifice that 
produces nothing but pain and anxiety. She assumes that Mary wants to satisfy God 
above herself and therefore uses guilt to make her daughter behave well, stating that 
if Mary only behaves well when and if she feels like it, that too is morally 
reprehensible: ‘Being good when it pleases you isn’t being good… It’s not what 
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Jesus means by being good. God wants us to be good all the time, like Jesus.’153 
Mary’s mother continually uses the example of Jesus and the threat of God in her 
lessons of morality for Mary and wants her to refrain from giving way to her 
impulses and inclinations for the purpose of ‘being good.’ 
In relating Mary’s studies of Greek mythology, the novel again echoes 
‘Symbolism and Sublimation I’, where ritual sacrifice in archaic traditions is 
regarded as sublimative and Christian sacrifice as repressive. Mary finds that Zeus 
has some things in common with Jehovah; but she has the liberty to contemplate the 
Greek god with a certain amount of freedom, as ‘you hadn’t got to believe in him’: 
‘He liked sacrifices. But then he was honest about it. He didn’t pretend that he was 
good and that he had to have them because of your sins.’154 In other words, Zeus is 
more likeable because he appears more human, is not aloof and does not make 
himself out to be morally superior, like Jehovah, who is supposed to be better than 
humans despite thirsting for sacrifices to be made in his honour. The two gods’ 
respective personifications and attitudes to sacrifice correspond to Sinclair’s view of 
different kinds of sacrifice and their varying sublimative effects. 
Mary’s struggle with the Christian conception of sacrifice is rooted in her 
disbelief in the figure of Jehovah as presented to her by Mrs Olivier: the God who 
has a benign, forgiving side and a dark, punishing side. Mary cannot reconcile the 
two: ‘The one God was the nice, clever, happy God who made Mamma and Mark 
and Jenny and the sun and Sarah and the kittens. He was the God you really believed 
in.’155 She is unable to accept the forbidding God, who decided that Jesus was to be 
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crucified ‘because you were naughty.’156 This brings the theodicy problem to mind: 
why do good people have to suffer if God is truly benevolent? Sinclair addresses the 
issue of suffering as conceived in Christianity in A Defence of Idealism: 
 
It would be absurd to say that Christian asceticism was worse than any other, 
but none has been more unclean and more profane in its repudiation of the 
earth. Christianity took to itself the ritual of the world it conquered; but it 
refused the one thing in that ritual which was necessary to its own salvation – 
the simple, sacramental attitude to life. In spite of its beautiful doctrine of 
love and mercy and pity, it was instinct with the spirit’s cruelty to the flesh. 
And it is precisely this atonement manqué, this failure of a spiritual religion 
to be spiritual enough, that is at the root of half the evil and the sickness and 
the suffering of the modern world.157 
 
Sinclair appears to be saying that Christian sacrifice is, in fact, not sacrificial at all in 
the strict etymological sense of the word, as it does not make anything holy – rather, 
in its austere opposition of body and spirit, it fails to convert physical suffering into 
transcendence or epiphany. 
Questioning the Christian notion of sacrifice and thereby God’s persona, 
Mary is increasingly drawn towards an interest in idealist philosophy, the idea that 
everything has a cosmic or spiritual unity, and consequently a belief in Pantheism. 
She looks up the concept in the Encyclopaedia Britannica and finds that it is an idea 
of God that she can accept, and ends up formulating her own personal belief on the 
grounds that the ‘universe, material and mental, is nothing but the spectacle of the 
thoughts of God.’158 Mary’s Aunt Lavinia is similarly sceptical towards the received 
teachings of the family religion. Mary learns of the sacrifices that her aunt has had to 
make: to give up the man she loved because he belonged to the wrong church, and 
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give up being a teacher because she had promised her mother to take personal care of 
a ‘weak-minded’ sister. Despite this, or rather because of it, Lavinia professes to be 
happy in her old age: ‘I’ve got all I want. I’ve got all there is. When everything’s 
taken away, then God’s there. … Until everything’s taken away there isn’t room to 
see that he’s there.’159  
Believing in the pantheistic nature of God is not an instant solution to the 
conflicted emotions that Mary feels regarding the sacrifices she herself is required to 
make, however; she is initially devastated when her plan to follow her friend and 
possible love interest Mr Sutcliffe on a several month-long voyage to the south of 
France is cancelled due to her brother Roddy being taken ill. During the process of 
trying to come to terms with these events, the narration shifts briefly into the second 
person and Mary’s internal dialogue thereby becomes visible on the page: ‘…it 
seemed to her that it was impossible to give up going to Agaye. You simply could 
not do it.’160 Struggling internally, she lies in bed praying for strength, just as she 
was taught to do as a small child: ‘If Anything’s there – if Anything’s there – make 
me give up going’.161 In infancy, Mary similarly lies in bed and prays for strength to 
give up her wish for a cat. She is able to renounce her desire the next day, but is later 
given the cat anyway after having badly hit her head – an early lesson in sacrificial 
economy.162 
Giving up the journey abroad with Sutcliffe in order to act as a nurse for 
Roddy constitutes Mary’s first realisation of the power and potential of self-sacrifice. 
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To her own surprise, her prayer for strength is followed by an experience of serene 
acceptance and even delight in the forthcoming sacrifice: 
 
Her mind left off crying. … She was aware of a sudden checking and letting 
go, of a black stillness coming on and on, hushing sound and sight and the 
touch of her arms on the rough counterpane, and her breathing and the 
beating of her heart. There was a sort of rhythm in the blackness that caught 
you and took you into its peace. When the thing stopped you could almost 
hear the click. She stood up. … She had a sense of exquisite security and 
clarity and joy. She was not going to Agaye. She didn’t want to go.163 
 
The introspective depiction of Mary’s moments of self-realisation is delivered in the 
second person, signalling a narrative move inward – a gain in self-realisation – but 
also of losing oneself to ‘the blackness that caught you’. Realising that she can 
transform her desire in this way – from wanting to go to Agaye to not wanting to go 
– is a crucial moment in Mary’s development. She still dwells on the loss of an 
experience of worldly enjoyment, but the episode quoted above is her first glimpse 
through a door to her own inner, spiritual depths, previously unknown to her. As is 
evidenced toward the end of the novel – which I will return to below – Mary 
considers this inner space to be a source of feelings of strength and fulfilment that no 
outward circumstance can shake or damage. The episode also makes Mary consider 
the meaninglessness of life; after her brother’s death she studies the Upanishads and 
Buddhist sutras, and reads that the material body is nothing and that all things that 
are of essence, Mary’s self as well as the selves of others, are the same.164 
Her sacrificial epiphany in combination with studies of Eastern religion and 
idealism allows Mary to join ideas about the importance of the individual self on the 
one hand and sacrifice on the other. The sacrifice that Mary makes in order to 
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conform to society’s expectation that she stay at home and take care of her brother 
thus becomes internalised and consequently transformed into an individual choice, 
which not only affords her happiness because of the convergence of her wish with 
the larger community, but also because it creates a moment of joyous epiphany. 
* 
Mary Olivier is one of Sinclair’s more experimental works as regards narrative voice. 
The narration is three-tiered; it consists of a mix of first, second and third person 
narration. The focus of Mary Olivier is, as opposed to most of Sinclair’s pre-war 
fiction, on Mary’s navigation through a variety of thoughts and feelings about the 
sacrificial experiences she has, rather than outward manifestations of them and how 
they are perceived by other people. The narrative style used is specifically well-
suited to this, as it mediates between Mary’s feelings of doubt and commitment 
while still retaining the sense of a unified self. The unconventionality of the 
narration also forms a vehicle for events in Mary’s life that do not lend themselves 
easily to description, for instance her mystic experiences. Through the shifts in 
narrative person, the reasons for and justification of Mary’s sacrifices as she herself 
perceives them, and how these connect with her perception of mysticism, can be 
transmitted directly to the reader. Furthermore, the pronoun shifts employed 
represent the movement between the introspective self in the first person, the 
intersubjective self in the second person, and the objectification of the self in the 
third person in a literal way on the page. 
The second- and third-person variations are those that are most used, and 
fairly equally so, whereas the first person is only used towards the end of the novel. 
Even in the third person, a resistance to conventional distance between character and 
narrator can be discerned, as the name ‘Mary’ is only used on a few occasions – ‘she’ 
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is used most frequently throughout the book, which means that Mary is always the 
point of focus as there is seldom any need to clarify to whom the pronoun refers. As 
the three different tiers are used interchangeably and irregularly, and are not 
necessarily marked by paragraph breaks, gaps or other such divisions in the text, the 
impression created is that of a more or less seamless shift between the narrative 
positions. 
As Sinclair was greatly influenced by the theories of psychoanalysis, she 
wanted to find new ways of depicting inner lives through her fiction. She was also 
evidently fascinated by the way in which Dorothy Richardson had managed to give 
her readers a sense of looking into her main character’s mind. She first 
acknowledged the narrative technique of staying as close as possible to the 
protagonist in her 1918 review of Pointed Roofs, Backwater and Honeycomb, the 
first three novels of the Pilgrimage series. Sinclair writes that Richardson gets 
‘closer to reality than any of our novelists who are trying so desperately to get 
close.’165 Sinclair had a sense that the only reality that a novelist could accurately 
describe was an entirely subjective reality, immersed in the consciousness of one 
main character. This, writes Sinclair in the review, creates ‘the effect of an extreme 
concentration on the thing seen or felt’ – not the thing in or by itself as in Imagism – 
which makes descriptions more vividly subjective.166 Another quotation from the 
review could just as well be used to describe Mary Olivier: ‘The first-hand, intimate 
and intense reality of the happening is in Miriam’s mind, and by presenting it thus 
and not otherwise Miss Richardson seizes reality alive.’167 Through her experiments 	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with narrative voice in Mary Olivier, written around the same time as the review of 
Pilgrimage, Sinclair herself attempted to ‘seize reality alive’ in stressing the 
centrality of the perceiving self. 
I argue that the first-, second- and third-person modes of narration reflect 
Mary’s mind at various stages of self-realisation and development, but not in a 
strictly linear sense. The interposition of the second person – and, more seldom, the 
first person – into what is otherwise a novel mainly narrated in the third person does 
not just create the assumption that there is no other narrator but Mary, but indicates 
the protagonist’s struggle with the unification of her self into a single entity. This is 
indicative of the well-known concern of the recognition and overcoming of the 
fragmented self in modernist fiction. 
Generally, shifts in tense in Mary Olivier are unremarkable because they 
follow the pronoun of the sentence’s noun phrase; the third-person narration of the 
novel is generally written in the past tense, while the first person is mostly in the 
present. One example of first person narration in the past tense can be found in 
chapter 35: 
 
Last night I began thinking about it again. I stripped my soul; I opened all the 
windows and let my ice-cold thoughts in on the poor thing; it stood shivering 
between certainty and uncertainty. I tried to doubt away this ultimate passion, 
and it turned my doubt into its own exquisite sting, the very thrill of the 
adventure. … If it never came again I should remember.168  
 
This quotation briefly shifts the narrative into a journal or epistolary style, one which 
is an abrupt move towards conventional first-person narration in an otherwise 
unconventionally narrated novel. The section is brief, however, and conspicuously 
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personal pronouns as signifying movement from an outer perspective of reflection to 
an inner perspective of experience. The first person narration in the past tense mixes 
the two and creates an inner perspective of reflection. 
The second-person narration is for the most part in the past tense, but there 
are some exceptions; towards the end of the novel, there are a few instances where 
second person narration briefly meets the imperative: ‘Let everything go except 
yourself. Hold on to yourself…. But you felt your self going.’169 This example gives 
the impression of a direct exhortation to the self from within the self – an illustration 
of the multiplicity of the unified self mentioned earlier – to hold on, because that is 
the only stable point in Mary’s experience of reality. But the self, too, is subject to 
change, and Mary is taken out of the present tense as she relates the realisation that 
she is no longer able to hold on to her self. However – as posited by Hegel – it is 
only through giving up her self that she can fully realise her self; she is not actually 
able to lose it. This sentiment is expressed in a following instance of second person 
present tense: ‘Knowing reality is knowing that you can’t lose it. … That’s the risk 
you take.’170 It seems that this shift to the present tense points to an important shift in 
Mary’s consciousness: the realisation that no matter what happens, her self can never 
be truly lost. 
Both the pronoun and the tense shifts, then, are intermittently – although not 
wholly or regularly – concurrent with the stages of the development of Mary’s self. 
The possibility is created due to the character’s successful sublimation of libido. 
There is a striking clarity with which the shifts in narration are used; although it 
might be assumed that a novel in which three narrative levels alternate would be a 
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complex read, Mary Olivier is remarkably lucid. The narration may be in constant 
flux, but there is a steady unifying point, a centre of narrative gravity that holds the 
narrative together and creates a cohesive whole. The idea that ambivalence does not 
have to mean disintegration of the self comes from Thomas Schramme’s theories as 
presented in ‘On Being Wholeheartedly Ambivalent: Indecisive Will, Unity of the 
Self, and Integration by Narration.’171 The term ‘centre of narrative gravity’ was 
coined by Daniel Dennett, who argues that the self is a fictional construct of 
consciousness, created in order to make sense of the world.172 This core unity is 
essential for the reader’s experience of the text, and more importantly the main 
character, as coherent. If one were to understand the first-, second- and third-person 
narrators in Mary Olivier as three distinctly separate voices, belonging to different 
identities, the story would become confusing indeed. But since the narrator, 
regardless of the shifts in personal pronouns, still has the semblance of a unified 
being – Mary – the story remains coherent. 
In the first of Mary’s moments of spiritual bliss, the narration as experienced 
through her mind is a describer of objects. Here, Mary’s mind can be considered as 
an objective camera lens that acts as an impersonal narrator. There is no person or 
action in the narration at all, only the visual image of her natural surroundings: 
 
A queer white light everywhere, like water thin and clear. Wide fields, flat 
and still, like water, flooded with the thin, clear light; grey earth, shot 
delicately with green blades, shimmering. Ley Street, a grey road, whitening 
suddenly where it crossed open country, a hard causeway thrown over the 
flood. The high trees, the small, scattered cottages, the two taverns, the one 
tall house had the look of standing up in water.173 	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The effect the scenery has on Mary lasts a lifetime, and the exhilaration that she gets 
from the beauty of her surroundings recurs throughout the novel. What is interesting 
here is that there is no narrator, in the same sense that the first part of James Joyce’s 
Ulysses can be read as having a narrator without a persona – or, as Morton P. Levitt 
argues, no narrator at all – the text is directly inside the consciousness of the 
protagonist.174 Battersby similarly suggests that parts of Mary Olivier ‘interposes the 
voice of an impersonal narrator,’ but gives no examples or textual evidence that what 
she perceives as narrated by no one, or someone other than Mary, could not just as 
well be read as part of Mary’s own experience.175 
The intermittent use of the second person appears to be rather haphazard, as 
it occurs on both auspicious and mundane occasions. I hold that its main purpose is 
to portray the multiplicity inherent within not just Mary, but any consciousness. 
Monica Fludernik’s contention that ‘novels [that] contain only segments of second-
person fiction and are therefore framed within a first- or third-person narrative… 
are… easily naturalized as interior monologues in the second person’ underpins the 
understanding of the second-person narrator as Mary’s interior monologue.176 As 
Sinclair outlines in A Defence of Idealism, the unity of the self is arbitrary in the 
sense that it is made up of several different entities: ‘a plurality of finite 
consciousnesses, a plurality of finite selves, held together by one Real Self, existing 
in and through and for one Real consciousness; and that without loss to the integrity 	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of one finite item of the finite complex, without rupture to the unity of the one 
Self.’177 The nature of the self as understood by Sinclair can be likened to a sort of 
membrane: permeable, yet still delineated by borders. The fictional representation of 
Mary’s self (or selves) is befittingly multiple yet unified; it is divided by the use of 
different pronouns that remain in unison as they all refer back to the same self. 
 The second-person pronoun can at times also be read as pertaining to the 
reader of the novel, as opposed to Mary herself. Several of the instances when the 
second person is used, it refers to commonplace experiences in life, such as the 
experience of walking over frost-bitten grass, and breathing crisp, clean air on a 
bright winter’s day: ‘The white, ruffled grass stood out stiffly and gave under your 
feet with a pleasant crunching. The air smelt good; you opened your mouth and 
drank it in gulps.’178 However, the ‘you’ cannot be read as such throughout the novel, 
as in the opening of chapter III of ‘Infancy’: ‘Aunt Charlotte came in first with a 
tight, dancing run. You knew her by the long black curls on her shoulders.’179 Since 
the ‘you’ supposedly knows Aunt Charlotte – it is not necessarily the case that all 
readers of the novel can be presumed to have experienced frost, but this must be 
considered as a more commonplace experience than recognising Aunt Charlotte by 
her curls.– this reference is more likely to be read as Mary addressing herself rather 
than the average reader of the novel. Suzanne Raitt similarly supposes that the ‘you’ 
refers to both Mary herself and the reader, as she proposes that ‘[t]he text’s continual 
slippage into the second person’ is the result of ‘a formal exploration of the 
impossible condition of self-knowledge,’ and that it ‘registers the continual 
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disintegration of consciousness into unanswerable questions… which imply that 
“you”, in fact, have as good a chance of knowing “I/me” as “I” have.’180  
The reasoning above is crucial to my understanding of Sinclair’s narrative 
use of sacrifice in order to construct Mary’s sense of self. Raitt’s assertion adds 
evidence to my argument that Mary Olivier is an intersubjective or 
heterophenomenological narrative. The self not only has to be self-reflective to exist, 
but also needs to narrate its self-reflection to another subject if it is to be understood 
as having an experience of a conscious self, according to Daniel Dennett as outlined 
in chapter 1. 
Mary is an object in both the second- and third-person perspectives, but as 
the ‘impersonal narrator’ and first person narrator, she becomes a subject, which 
points to the purpose behind the use of shifts in narration: showing the development 
of the self through sacrifice. The question of the objectivity of Mary, her mind, and 
her narration has been discussed ever since the publication of the novel; Sinclair 
wrote in a letter to Ezra Pound in 1919, in response to Pound’s opinion that the 
narration in Mary Olivier was subjective, that ‘Mary’s mind is “objective” to me.’181 
Taking the quotation above as an example, they are both right. It seems as though, 
for Sinclair, the subjective and the objective are not polar opposites as regards 
literary representation, but rather two aspects of an experiential reality. The sense 
experience that passes through Mary’s mind is objectively narrated in the passage, 
but the experience itself is subjective, since it belongs to Mary. Sydney Kaplan 
argues that Mary can be usefully thought of as a tripartite subject, since she is 	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relating memories from several different viewpoints at once: a direct presentation of 
the event, her internal commentary – from the time of the event – and her external 
commentary – from the distance of a later date. Kaplan’s conclusion is that the 
events that are related are subjectively selected for inclusion by Mary as narrator, 
based on her ‘quality of thinking at the specific time’ of the event: ‘Each incident 
captures the quality of Mary’s mind at that stage of her growth, but it does not 
necessarily give us the mind itself.’182 Sinclair herself had consciously attempted to 
make Mary’s mind objective and a ‘mirror of “objects”’, an attempt which can 
sometimes be seen to succeed.183 If an objective mind means that the mind is not an 
object but an invisible or transparent medium, it would follow that in the long 
quotation above where there is no perceived narrative position but it is inferred that 
the description is that which Mary sees, Mary’s mind is objective in this instance, 
because if her mind is objective, the mental process is not represented on the page, 
only the things perceived. 
 Mary’s epiphanic moments may occur repeatedly through the narrative, but it 
is also pointed out that they are never exactly the same: ‘She would go back and 
back to the places where it had come, looking for it, thinking that any minute it 
might happen again. But it never came twice to the same place in the same way.’184 
While Mary’s behaviour is cyclical in that she tries to recreate the circumstances 
under which she can reach a transitory state of spiritual fulfilment, her experiences 
are not duplicated from one time to another. Similarly to ritual sacrifice, then, the 
epiphanic moments are repeated but never identical, even though the conditions may 	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be the same. The similarity between Mary’s epiphanic moments and ritual acts 
points to the sublimative potential for Mary in the epiphanic moments as opposed to 
her attempts to practice Christianity. 
Towards the end of the novel, when the first-person narration starts to appear 
and gradually becomes more frequent, the narrative gravity has grown stronger and 
pulls harder towards its centre. First-person narration signifies a move towards 
freedom for Mary; the first instances of first-person narration coincide with the time 
of Mary’s mother’s death. They are also concerned with Mary’s thoughts on her 
relationship with Richard, something that indicates that she is ready to let go of the 
mother-daughter symbiosis which denies her existence as an individual self. The first 
time first-person narration occurs is when Mamma suffers a stroke; the second is 
when Mary wakes up from a dream in which her mother has died.185 On the first 
occasion, Mary thinks that if Richard wants her mother dead and is able to will her to 
for instance have a stroke, she has to counteract him through the use of her own 
psychical powers. The way in which these are described is reminiscent of the 
telepathy at work in Sinclair’s short story ‘The Flaw in the Crystal’ (1911). Much 
like Agatha, Mary lies flat on her back in darkness when she summons her power 
from within. On the second occasion, Mary asks: ‘Why can’t I dream about 
something I want to happen? Why can’t I dream about Richard?’186 Mary as a first-
person narrator – the two sentences are not within inverted commas – reflect back on 
the things that happen in her own consciousness and question her mind’s inner 
workings. 
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As is suggested by the pronoun, first-person narration signifies a focus on the 
narrative self. The impending loss of her mother is forcing Mary to become a fully 
independent individual. She wants to stay awake until her mother sleeps, for her 
mother’s sake ostensibly, but also for her own sake, so as to make the most of every 
single moment that she has left with her. The element of self-centredness in Mary’s 
grief caused by the anxiety of losing someone close to her is covertly indicated by 
the use of the first person perspective. The first-person singular pronoun ‘I’ signifies 
that we are dealing here with the self and the ego, which, taking Sinclair’s interest in 
psychoanalysis into account, implies that Mary is coming to terms with her desires 
and trying to gain a balance between the sacrificial self and the assertive ego. The 
issues at hand are directly related to the libido: love and death.  
The feelings expressed are uncharacteristically self-centered: wanting her 
mother to live, despite Mamma’s explicit wish for death, and wanting to dream about 
pleasant things like Richard instead of her dying mother. For once Mary appears to 
put her own needs before those of Richard and her mother. As has been argued 
previously by Christine Battersby in a comparison of Mary Olivier and A Portrait of 
the Artist as a Young Man, Mary Olivier only ‘attains the status of an individual’ as 
her mother dies.187 It is not surprising, then, that she should express these feelings in 
the voice of the individual, subjective ‘I’ that simultaneously and paradoxically 
wishes both for freedom from the mother and for the mother to live on. Sacrifice is 
shown here to be the key to Mary’s navigation between self-centered and selfless 
thoughts and emotions; only when she can be reconciled with the idea of sacrifice 
can she let go of her self, and thereby become self-fulfilled. 
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The sacrifice of Richard Nicholson, the last of Mary’s suitors in the novel, is more 
complex than the earlier renunciations. He is initially thrown over because of Mary’s 
mother, as is evidenced by the tortured conversation between her and Mary after the 
former has received a note from Nicholson to ask for her daughter’s hand in 
marriage: ‘Mamma had been crying all evening. … “I’ve no security with you, 
Mary….”’ In brackets, Mary thinks ‘I’ve killed myself…. This isn’t me.’ Here, the 
sacrifice she has to make feels like suicide, or an annihilation of the self, without any 
epiphanic feeling of joy. The mother comments as though she could hear Mary’s 
thoughts: ‘“I’d rather see you in your coffin.” “I am in my coffin.” “I wish I were in 
mine,” her mother said.’188 At this juncture, Mary has yet to undergo the process of 
sublimation and is therefore prone to think of the sacrifice as destructive to her self 
rather than affirmative of it, particularly in a situation where her mother is pressuring 
her to make the sacrifice, which removes the agency from Mary and makes her feel 
that it is not her own decision. 
However, before Mary ends the relationship, and even before her mother 
expresses her opinion on the matter, there are several hints that Mary’s desire is 
simply to be with Richard, rather than to marry him. Her anxiety in connection with 
Nicholson is expressed as ‘uneasiness’: ‘[T]here was something else. Something to 
do with Richard Nicholson. Something she didn’t want to think about. Not fear 
exactly, but a sort of uneasiness when she thought about him. … She was not sure 
she wanted Richard Nicholson to come back.’189 When Richard expresses his wish to 
marry, her reaction is not so much joyous as fearful: ‘“I want to marry you, Mary.” 
(This then was what she had been afraid of. But Mamma wouldn’t have thought of 
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it.) “I didn’t think you wanted to do that. Why should you?” “It’s the usual thing, 
isn’t it? When you care enough.”’190 The reasons Richard lays out for wanting to 
marry are closely bound to the expectations of society. Mary on the other hand 
thinks that ‘we should spoil it by marrying’, thereby upsetting the stereotypical 
assumption that women want to marry above all else and men want to keep 
themselves free and single. Richard states: ‘We can’t exactly go on like – like this, 
you know.’ Mary’s reply substantiates her unwillingness to even contemplate 
marriage: ‘Don’t let’s think about it. Here we are. Now this minute. It’s an hour and 
a half till dinner time. Why, even if I go at nine we’ve got three hours.’191 She is 
happy to be living in the moment when they are together, without any further 
demand being placed on her. Their conversation ends with an intimation that Richard 
is becoming a threat to Mary: ‘He had got up. He wanted to stand. To stand up high 
above you.’192 Even though Richard is supportive of Mary’s writing, appreciative of 
her intellect, and encourages her bike-riding, Mary would become his subordinate, 
legally and socially, if they were to marry, which would impede Mary’s self-
development. 
To give up marrying Richard, then, is not unequivocally a sacrifice 
demanded by Mary’s mother; the text suggests that Mary is unwilling to untie the 
familial bond to her mother only to enter into another that may become just as 
oppressive of her quest to realise her self. When she tries to explain this to him, he 
becomes angry and confused: ‘You’re trying to tell me you don’t want me. … I’m 
sorry, Mary. You seem to be talking about something, but I haven’t the faintest 
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notion what it is. But you can make yourself believe anything you like if you keep on 
long enough.’193 He tries to suggest that her hesitation is only ‘nerves’ and in 
response to her explanation of past mystical experiences of epiphany patronisingly 
says ‘Poor Mary.’194 She responds: ‘You have to find it out for yourself; and even 
that might take you all your life...’195 Their relationship ends both because of Mary’s 
anxiety about her mother and because of her need for self-realisation. 
The sacrifice of Richard is not, then, portrayed as necessarily negative or 
unwanted. Rather, the ensuing solitude is a prerequisite not only for Mary’s self-
realisation, but for the occupation that affords her a sense of accomplishment and 
satisfaction: writing. Mary’s creative output is read by Diana Wallace, Suzanne Raitt, 
and Emma Domínguez-Rué, among others, as a sublimation of her unfulfilled 
sexuality and an escape from the oppression of her mother, but none of them 
consider Mary’s sacrifices as necessary for her development of her self, which is 
what facilitates her ability to channel desire into creative output. There is a strong 
focus on sexuality in these three discussions of Mary’s sublimation, as in much 
critical literature on Sinclair. The combination of the author’s marital status on the 
one hand and her interest in psychoanalysis on the other has invited many to draw 
the conclusion that Sinclair was a sexually frustrated spinster who tried to find a way 
to sublimate her own desire by way of creative writing, and the autobiographical 
hints in Mary Olivier produces the further assumption that the same is true of Mary: 
‘Sinclair’s belief in sublimation allows her to show female sexual energy being 
redirected into artistic creation or philosophical thought, rather than necessarily ... 
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producing neurosis.’ 196 The focus on sexual frustration strengthens the reductive 
image of Sinclair as ‘spinster novelist’, overlooks the many facets of desire that she 
portrays in her work, and undermines the project of establishing her as an important 
modernist writer as it makes her seem simplistic and single-mindedly focussed on 
the plight of the spinster, when in actuality her various treatments of sublimation 
cover many more aspects. The strongly Freudian interpretation of Mary Olivier by 
Domínguez-Rué – in an article titled ‘Pen-Is-Envy’ – is particularly difficult to 
reconcile with Sinclair’s disagreement with Freud in general, and with the reading of 
Mary’s narration as identical with Sinclair’s thoughts in particular: ‘Although 
Sinclair always made it clear that her concept of desire was not exclusively sexual, 
she compares it with “the feeling you had when you thought of babies: painful and at 
the same time delicious” (Mary Olivier, p. 263).’197 Apart from the ill-advised 
practice of conflating the words of a fictional character with the ideas of an author, 
interpreting a ‘painful’ but ‘delicious’ feeling, which is connected to babies, as 
necessarily sexual might also be considered jumping to conclusions. 
Bearing in mind Sinclair’s thoughts, inspired by idealism, on the importance 
of sacrifice for the development of self, it is remarkable that Mary’s sacrifices are 
not normally read in this light. Rather, the sacrifices – if considered at all – are 
thought of as repressive, destructive of the self, and enforced by Mary’s mother, who 
is seen by Domínguez-Rué as ‘…some terrible goddess whose rage can only be 
appeased with sacrifice.’198 This is a one-sided view of sacrifice, which fails to see 	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the usefulness of sacrifice for Mary, and disregards the many occurrences in the 
story where sacrifice facilitates epiphany. It also overlooks Mary’s choices later in 
life, when she makes sacrifices that are not demanded by her mother, and her choices 
as a girl to refuse to conform and make certain sacrifices that are demanded – 
relinquishing her pursuit of knowledge, for instance. Raitt does find that ‘the idea of 
sublimation as a form of self-discipline allowed her to construct the self as, in the 
end, its own salvation’, but does not say anything further as to how self-discipline 
(or self-sacrifice) as sublimation leads Mary to her moments of epiphany.199 
The description of Mary’s feelings about an idea for a play that she wants to 
compose is similar to the feelings that she has in her moments of epiphany: it affords 
her an intense happiness, which is reliable and stable, something that will always ‘go 
on, whatever happened. Whatever happened, it would still be happy.’200 No matter 
what occurs, this will remain the same, just as her ecstatic moments will remain the 
same. Her enjoyment of the solitary task of writing is translated into words that 
imply a sense of unity with something external to her as an individual, as she 
describes her writing as a companion, an entity in itself. 
Mary wishes to keep both her ‘secret happiness’, her ecstatic epiphanical 
moments, and her writing happiness to herself and not share it with others, not even 
Richard. The self that experiences the spiritual ecstasy must not be associated with 
the self that enjoys her time with Richard: ‘She didn’t want to mix him with that or 
with the self that had felt it. She wanted to keep him in the clear spaces of her mind, 
away from her memories, away from her emotions.’201 When he is finally allowed to 
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read her writing and wishes to publish it, she is afraid of the sacrifice she assumes 
will have to follow: ‘Now that it had happened she was afraid, seeing, but not so 
clearly, what would come afterwards: something that would make her want to leave 
Morfe and Mamma and go away to London… She was afraid of wanting that more 
than anything in the world.’202 The joys brought by Richard, London and a budding 
career are all fragile because they are transitory; she knows that she is not allowed to 
indulge in these activities because of her sense of duty to Mamma. However, her 
happiness in writing, as well as her ecstatic happiness, cannot be taken away from 
her; both are products of sacrifice, rather than things than can be threatened by it. 
Mary’s epiphanical moments are closely associated with sacrifice and the 
sublimation of desire. The way in which Mary’s secret happiness in the later years of 
her life is described makes it still more akin to religious ecstasy than before. Her 
moments of enlightenment, even though they are only moments, are also everlasting. 
She feels safe in the knowledge that they will always return, even if the intervals are 
long: ‘Whatever It was, It was there. You could doubt away yourself and Richard, 
but you couldn’t doubt away It. It might leave you for a long time, but it came back. 
It came back. Its going only intensified the wonder of its return’.203 She trusts in ‘It’ 
as Mrs Olivier trusts in God. Mary’s unshakeable belief in ‘It’ stands in stark 
contrast to her feelings towards the Christian image of God that has been introduced 
to her as the punishing and erratic father figure. Belief in ‘It’ also helps Mary to 
make the most difficult sacrifice of all: giving up her relationship with Richard. She 
feels that she ‘couldn’t possibly have done’ that on her own, ‘not like that, all at once, 
making that incredible supernatural happiness and peace out of nothing at all, in one 
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night, and going on in it, without Richard’.204 Her ability to make the sacrifice while 
simultaneously retaining her happiness affirms her belief in ‘It’; her successful 
sacrifice proves to her that ‘It’ exists. The sacrifice has gone from destructive to 
productive by way of faith in a higher, spiritual entity, of which Mary’s self is one 
small part. In giving herself up to ‘It’, Mary gains a sense of self-fulfilment that she 
is unable to have with only Richard; she needs the affirmation of a spiritual world to 
get anywhere in the worldly sphere. She needs the support of something other-
worldly, here expressed as ‘It’, which may be assumed to be Sinclair’s conception of 
the Life-Force. 
In giving up marrying Richard, Mary not only gains a sense that she will 
never truly lose his love, but is also reassured in her belief in the constancy of her 
own real self. Perfect happiness is not the happiness that is associated with worldly 
links with other people; it can only be found within oneself, in the spiritual 
community with the Life-Force. Paradoxically, Mary finds that this is the way she 
can avoid losing Richard: by finding her real self in the Absolute, she also finds 
Richard’s real self. The Absolute is what reality and the real self means to Mary by 
the end of the novel, and the only way to retain it is to let go. There is no risk 
involved in the sacrifice when she feels that she will not lose her real self: 
 
Loving him more than herself she had let him go. Letting go had somehow 
done the trick. … If there’s anything in it at all, losing my real self would be 
losing Richard, losing Richard’s real self absolutely and for ever. Knowing 
reality is knowing that you can’t lose it. That or nothing. Supposing there 
isn’t anything in it? … Supposing there’s nothing in it, nothing at all? That’s 
the risk you take. There isn’t any risk.205 
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The conscious analysis of the self and the awakening of the ‘real self’ through 
sacrifice are here intertwined with the shifts in personal pronoun between ‘she’, ‘my’, 
and ‘you’. The quotation displays the continuous dynamic between certainty and 
uncertainty of the reality of the Absolute, which is the heightened plane of existence 
where she feels that she is at one with everything and everyone – including Richard 
– and as the section closes by the determined statement that there is no ‘risk’, 
indicating a final sense of strong conviction, Mary Olivier should be considered to 
have a happy ending. 
My contention, then, is that Mary Olivier is a tale of productive sacrifice, 
with a positive outcome for the person performing the sacrifice, even though it may 
not seem like it at first glance. Mary’s story has a happy ending, both in a spiritual 
and a feminist sense. She does not marry, and that does not constitute failure for her 
– unlike many other female protagonists, she enjoys a sense of fulfilment that comes 
from within herself, rather than from conforming to the societal norm that assumes 
that a happy conclusion to a woman’s bildungsroman has to involve a suitable 
marriage. Boll maintains that ‘[h]appiness through sacrifice became a closed 
question in this novel.’206 Jean Radford’s contends in her preface to the novel’s 
Virago edition that sacrifice is an important theme in Sinclair’s writing, and that the 
self-immolation displayed by Mary Olivier builds on a view of sacrifice that she 
paradoxically connects with first-wave feminism: the self-effacing Victorian angel in 
the house. Radford’s analysis evokes the notion of a destructive kind of sacrifice that 
appears to be the only way out of the traditional roles available to women. However, 
as has been shown here, Mary’s sacrifice is not of the destructive kind, and the end 
of the story shows her to be content, fulfilled, and realised as a person in her own 	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right. Nothing in the text suggests that she has failed at life – contrarily, the 
quotation above strongly suggests that she finds a sense of fulfilment towards the 
end of her life – but many readers are inclined to equate the happy ending of a 
woman’s story with the fulfilment of romantic love. The lack of married bliss at the 
end of Mary Olivier seems to be the main reason for it being perceived as an 
unhappy, or at least troubling, ending.  
Readings of Mary Olivier have become slightly more favourable in later 
years – critics contemporary with Sinclair were ‘generally lukewarm or 
unenthusiastic’ – and Suzanne Raitt reads Mary as a self-sufficient woman who has 
‘perfected’ the process of sublimation and ‘needs no one’ except ‘some sense of a 
presence beyond her own.’207 In contrast, Boll – a generally favourable biographer 
but necessarily a product of his time – cannot resist a reading of Mary Olivier that 
supposes Sinclair to be an elderly spinster conjuring up a dream of romantic young 
gentlemen, assuming with a hint of disapproval that ‘Richard Nicholson is a fantasy 
based upon Richard Aldington, who was about thirty years younger, not six years 
older, than May Sinclair.’208 It is difficult to find any reading, even a current one, 
that does not express a sense of discomfort with Mary’s choice to remain single. 
However, the text clearly shows that Mary is not unhappy at the end of the 
novel; rather, she is to be envied, firstly because she is in control of her own life, and 
thereby independent, and secondly because she has realised the full potential of her 
self. The conclusion of Mary’s spiritual journey resembles that of a sage who 
denounces worldly things in order to fulfil herself spiritually more than that of a 
pitiable spinster whose life has come to nothing. The sacrifices that oppress and limit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Raitt, May Sinclair, 239; 232; 233. .  
208 Boll, Miss May Sinclair, 245 
Sanna Melin Schyllert 
 104 
her paradoxically afford her spiritual happiness as well as the possibility of 
becoming a writer, as Mary realises her inner self and its unity with a larger world-
spirit. The following subsection will outline what happens in a narrative where there 
is no such success, but rather the opposite: where sacrifice becomes destructive of 
the self due to repression of the libido. 
 
‘It was through her renunciation that he had grown so strong, so pure, so good’: 
Harriett Frean’s Destructive Sacrifice209 
If Mary Olivier is described as a novel that depicts the development of a woman 
writer, Harriett Frean is often referred to as a portrayal of the wasted life of a 
Victorian spinster.210 Harriett means to get happiness out of unhappiness, a sense of 
self-worth out of self-sacrifice, just like Mary Olivier. Yet, something goes wrong; 
her sacrifices yield only misery for herself, as well as for the people around her for 
whose benefit she is supposedly bending her will. The experimentality of Harriett 
Frean has so far mainly been considered in terms of the novel’s brevity; a life 
spanning over sixty years is portrayed in under two hundred pages. Other 
considerations of the narrative strategy deal with content that is left out, partly due to 
the narrator’s detachment from the central character. Suzanne Raitt comments that 
‘Sinclair’s ironic distance … is signalled through the novel’s style,’ and that it is 
‘formally … an advance on Mary Olivier,’ and Leigh Wilson contends that the 
structure of the novel depends upon ‘gaps and lacks,’ and the spaces in between, as 	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its ‘narrative device is structured around silence and absence.’211 I suggest here that 
these spaces between are the necessary product of a narrative that is meant to 
represent the consciousness of an unrealised self: a consciousness that is unable to 
take the subjective position. 
The development of Sinclair’s stylistic manifestation of consciousness in 
Harriett Frean can be clearly seen when juxtaposing the first handwritten draft of 
the novel with the published version. Before revisions, the first page was more 
similar to the beginning of Mary Olivier, where the mother is referred to as ‘Mamma’ 
even when the narrative voice is in the third person: ‘Mamma said it a third time. 
And each time Baby laughed. … “I wonder why she thinks it’s funny,” said Mamma. 
Papa said, “I don’t know.”’212 The effect is a greater proximity to Harriett’s 
subjective experience, as the language is simpler, and the parents are called by the 
names ‘Baby’ would use. It reads as a representation of what would be happening in 
Harriett’s consciousness at the time, as opposed to the outside rendering of the same, 
which is seen in the revised version: ‘Her mother said it three times. And each time 
the baby Harriett laughed. … “I wonder why she thinks it’s funny,” her mother said. 
Her father considered it. “I don’t know.”’213 Interestingly, Sinclair adds words rather 
than deleting them here, which would seem to go against those rules of imagism to 
which the novel otherwise adheres. Laurel Forster writes of Sinclair’s revisions that 
‘nonessential words are deleted, adding to the economical expression, and such 
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“cutting” of superfluous words and phrases was a well-known technique of the 
Imagists.’214 It is unsurprising that the two of Sinclair’s novels that ‘[treat] the “thing” 
[if the thing in this case is the self] directly, whether subjective or objective,’ have 
been labelled imagist.215 It is understandable that the brevity of Harriett Frean has 
caused it to be more overtly perceived as part of that movement, but there is 
arguably ‘no word that did not contribute to the presentation’ in Mary Olivier, 
despite it being a longer text and regardless of whether or not Mary’s mind is 
thought subjective or objective.216 
In answering the question of what Harriett’s sacrifices are lacking for the 
development of her self, it is pertinent that she is a little too eager to make them; as 
outlined above, where the performance of a sacrificial act with the purpose of self-
aggrandisation is equal to repression for Sinclair. This prompts the question of 
whether they are the result of a sublimation of desire, which in Mary Olivier is 
portrayed as a difficult state to attain. In opposition to Mary, Harriett willingly 
engages in self-abnegation with the express intention of pleasing others, primarily 
her mother. As a child, she is rewarded for standing apart from others at a children’s 
tea party by not clamouring for a piece of cake when she was accidentally not given 
any. Her mother explains to her: ‘It is better to go without than to take from other 
people. That’s ugly.’ Harriett takes it to heart and from then on equates selflessness 
and self-sacrifice with being good and beautiful. She realises that although it may 
hurt to give up something you want, in the end you are rewarded by feeling good 	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about yourself: ‘Ugly. Being naughty was just that. Doing ugly things. Being good 
was being beautiful like mamma. ... Sitting up there and being good felt 
delicious.’217 Behaving well is equal to being beautiful; behaving badly is to be ugly. 
Harriett learns that she can feel good not only about herself through sacrifice, for 
example by giving up cake in order to receive praise from her mother, but also that 
she can elevate herself to a level of righteousness above other people, whose motives 
are considered egotistical and less pure or righteous than hers. This sense of pride in 
Harriett quickly grows stronger, as her continuous sacrifices make her feel morally 
superior to others. 
When the narration is wholly channelled through Harriett, the focalisation 
invokes the reader’s understanding and sympathy; it creates an understanding of the 
main character as someone who has been forced to sacrifice things, even though the 
legitimacy of the sacrifice itself is questioned. When the narrative voice shows a hint 
of disdain towards the sacrifice, implying that the actions of the protagonist are not 
as righteous as she believes them to be, it produces an awareness of the protagonist 
as an unreliable focaliser. This can be seen at any point where the narrator is overtly 
distanced from Harriett, for example when she goes to visit Priscilla and Robin after 
their marriage and she experiences sensations of jealousy towards Priscilla, who, 
despite being paralysed and having lost her baby, feels ‘voluptuous content’ as she 
tells Harriett of all the things Robin does for her. Harriett, meanwhile, ‘was aware of 
a sudden tightening of her heart, of a creeping depression that weighed on her brain 
and worried it. She thought this was her pity for Priscilla.’218 The ironic distance 
with which this and other events are narrated reinforces the reader’s perception of 
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Harriett’s reasoning as misguided and sets up an opposing viewpoint in the form of 
an otherwise anonymous narrative voice. 
 This strange relationship between the narrative voice and Harriett – 
alternately understanding, alternately condescending – creates a sense of stream of 
consciousness akin to that used in Mary Olivier, but the intermittent instances that 
allow narratorial comment to break through are more suggestive of free indirect 
discourse as used by Virginia Woolf in Mrs Dalloway (1925) and To the Lighthouse 
(1927), as the narrator is impersonal though permeable for the most part. However, 
since the narrator is clearly external to Harriett, it is not a case of dissonant self-
narration, that is, ironic distance between self as narrator some time after the event 
and self as protagonist at the time of the event, like the parts of Pilgrimage and Mary 
Olivier that cover the early years of the respective protagonists’ lives seem to be. 
 Self-denial is not only reported to make Harriett feel good, it even makes her 
think of herself as almost divine, ‘sitting up there’ on a pedestal alongside the 
flawless Mamma, who, according to Harriett, is equal to God and Jesus in her beauty. 
Harriett substitutes devotion to God for devotion to her parents, believing them to be 
omnipotent, omniscient and without fault. Harriett is scolded for her blasphemous 
comparison of Mamma to God and is warned that she ‘mustn’t say things like that, 
Hatty; you mustn’t, really. It might make something happen.’219 It is understood by 
Harriett that the idea is that God would punish her for comparing him to Mamma, 
but she doesn’t appear to be frightened by the prospect. She is much more terrified 
of displeasing her mother, whose approval means more to her than anything else: 
‘Saying things like that made you feel good and at the same time naughty, which 
was more exciting than only being one or the other. But Mamma’s frightened face 	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spoiled it.’220 Harriett’s morals are thereby shown to be tied to a sense of desire to 
please her parents, who in Harriett’s eyes are on an equal footing with, or perhaps 
even more important than, God. 
Harriett feels that she has an inadequate understanding of the Christian faith 
because of the conflation of devotion to her parents with that of devotion to God. 
She thinks of her mother’s faith as unavailable to her; for Harriett, it is an unknown 
faculty that enables belief and trust in God: ‘Her mother had some secret: some 
happy sense of God that she gave to you and you took from her as you took food and 
clothing, but not quite knowing what it was.’221 Mamma becomes the mediator 
between her and God, not unlike the way in which Mother Mary is in Roman 
Catholicism, as a more accessible divinity to which you may confer your thoughts. 
This also means that she never has the incentive to develop enough of a sense of self 
to achieve a direct unmediated belief or relation to God. Rather than directly praying 
to God, who is too far removed from humans to be communicated with, Mary as 
well as other saints can be more easily approached. Harriett’s imitation of belief is 
only made possible through her devotion to Mamma as a deity, which is also why 
she cannot make sacrifices for God directly. 
The sacrifices Harriett makes, then, are not a matter between herself and a 
spiritual reality, but between her and her parents. This is evident from what ensues 
after she strolls down Black’s Lane and picks red campion as a child, where there is 
a house with ‘something queer, some secret, frightening thing about it,’ and she is 
not allowed to go.222 Interestingly, there was a folkloric belief widespread in 
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northern England in the nineteenth century that picking red campion would cause 
one’s mother to die, a connection that implies that disobediance toward the mother is 
a symbolic killing of the mother.223 Harriett is being deliberately disobedient on this 
occasion, and delights in the act of naughtiness: ‘She kept on saying to herself: “I’m 
in the lane. I’m in the lane. I’m disobeying Mamma.”’224 The same feelings of 
instant gratification that are at work here, however, are also what prompt her 
subsequent obedience and continual sacrifices. As her father explains, ‘nothing is 
forbidden. We don’t forbid, because we trust you to do what we wish. To behave 
beautifully...’225 Mr and Mrs Frean are counting on Harriett to want to please them; 
the threat of being seen as undutiful, and thereby ugly, is unbearable to Harriett 
because of her religious devotion to her parents. 
The surface value of the ‘beauty’ or ‘ugliness’ of behaviour in the novel is 
significant; it constitutes a critique of what gives aesthetic pleasure that stands in 
stark contrast to Mary Olivier. Mary’s sense of aesthetic beauty is developed through 
her exposure to poetry and natural surroundings, not through obedience. In Harriett 
Frean, Mamma is beautiful because of her behaviour as perceived by Harriett, and 
the phrase ‘behaving beautifully’ indicates the necessity of adhering to a set of 
observable rules, as opposed to in the earlier novel, where the turn away from such 
rules and towards a free-spirited, creative energy permits Mary to reach aesthetically 
greater heights in her writing. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 The plant is known as ‘mother-die’ in Cumberland. Roy Vickery, Garlands, 
Conkers and Mother-Die: British and Irish Plant-lore (London: Continuum, 2010), 
53-4. 
224 Sinclair, Harriett Frean, 17. 
225 Sinclair, Harriett Frean, 23. 
Sanna Melin Schyllert 
 111 
Not only is Harriett’s notion of sacrifice coloured by the view of her parents as 
venerable, it is also affected by her sense of self-worth being bound up in the feeling 
of pride after she has forgone something. The shame she feels when learning that she 
has let them down is detrimental to her self-image, which is built on forgoing 
pleasure to please others. The small spark of insurrection against this creed is 
effectively quenched by hurting Harriett’s pride, telling her after she has gone down 
Black’s Lane that she is ‘guilty of … [b]reaking trust. Meanness. It was mean and 
dishonourable of you…’226 As Harriett breaks down in tears, the narrative voice 
states that ‘[s]he would always have to do what they wanted; the unhappiness of not 
doing it was more than she could bear.’227 This feeling is the diametrical opposite of 
that which she experiences after she denies herself cake. For Harriett, unhappiness 
becomes emblematic of doing things according to her own will. 
 Harriett learns as a child that she should behave beautifully for two reasons, 
then: because her parents expect it and because it feels good to receive their 
validation. The good feeling comes out of pleasing her parents, and the knowledge of 
having done something that is morally justifiable to them. She also learns that 
behaving beautifully involves sacrificing one’s own wants and needs – that is, 
ridding oneself of desire. But Harriett’s sacrifices seem to almost increase rather than 
eliminate her desire, as her desire is to be perceived as unselfish. Just as other 
children would be unable to say no to cake at a party, Harriet appears to be unable to 
deny herself the feeling she gets from behaving beautifully, which for her means to 
deny herself anything that she wants. 
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The practice of this belief culminates in the love triangle between Harriett, Priscilla, 
and Robin, which ultimately ends in heartbreak for all three. Harriett falls in love 
with Robin, a man who is engaged to be married to her childhood friend Priscilla. 
Robin eventually lets Harriett know that her feelings are requited, but she turns him 
down, telling him he must keep his promise to Priscilla. Harriett’s desire of doing the 
right thing overtakes her desire to marry Robin, which is conveyed through a 
dialogue that almost seems like a parody of a love scene due to the sudden emotional 
outburst in a text that is otherwise characterised by a restrained tone in both dialogue 
and narrative: 
 
‘You can’t say you don’t love me, Hatty.’ No. She couldn’t say it; for it 
wouldn’t be true. … ‘I can’t. I’d be doing wrong, Robin. I feel all the time as 
if she belonged to you; as if she were married to you.’ ‘But she isn’t. It isn’t 
the same thing.’ ‘To me it is. You can’t undo it. It would be too 
dishonourable.’ ‘Not half so dishonourable as marrying her when I don’t love 
her.’ ‘Yes. As long as she loves you. She hasn’t anybody but you.’228 
 
Robin argues that it would be more wrong for him to marry a woman who he does 
not love, rather than to leave her for Harriett, whereas Harriett cannot but think that 
it would be bad behaviour to steal her friend’s fiancé. According to her idea of 
continual sacrifice, which she puts above both her and Robin’s feelings, they must 
give up being with each other because of Priscilla. She finally convinces Robin that 
it would be indecent of them both to rob Priscilla of her expected marriage, and he 
finally concedes to the marriage with the ominous words: ‘Whatever it’s like I’ve got 
to go through with it.’229 The choice of words conjures up a feeling of resignation 
and dejection. Robin sees that he has to throw himself on the sword of marriage with 
Priscilla in order to remain good in Harriett’s eyes. Her high standards of behaviour 	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affect Robin because of his love for her; he wants to show her that he is an 
honourable man by laying down his life for her moral standards. Conversely, his 
sacrifice consists of marrying another woman. 
Robin is forced to give up his love for Harriett, and as he does not submit to 
this sacrifice freely nor is able to see any positive outcome of it, it is, as with 
Harriett’s abnegations, another destructive sacrifice. Harriett’s decision to refuse him, 
and to persuade him to marry Priscilla, leaves him in a less than desirable situation 
with an exacting wife who does nothing but give him orders. Robin becomes ‘moody 
and morose,’ increasingly showing his growing impatience and frustration with life 
as time goes by.230 It slowly dawns on Harriett that he might be very unhappy and 
that she is partly to blame for it, but the thought is quickly beaten down with a 
sanctimonious mantra: ‘She thought of her deep, spiritual love for Robin; of Robin’s 
deep, spiritual love for her; of his strength in shouldering his burden. It was through 
her renunciation that he had grown so strong, so pure, so good.’231 Harriett again 
tries to eliminate any feelings of guilt or thoughts that can lead to a sense of having 
done wrong. She clings to the notion that Robin has grown stronger through her 
sacrifice and refuses to think that he has fared badly from his forced sacrifice, in a 
similar way as she represses her emotions regarding her own supposed sacrifices for 
the morality in which she has been instructed. In contrast to Mary’s renunciation of 
Richard, there is no inner turmoil or struggle for Harriett that is followed by a serene 
determination to give up Robin – she has not internalised the decision to sacrifice, 
but does it simply on account of what behaviour will be approved or condemned; it 
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is the performance of a modest attitude – which Sinclair links to repression as has 
been shown above – rather than a sacrifice in which Harriett actually believes. 
The motivation of this sacrifice is to be seen as having ‘behaved beautifully’, 
as opposed to confirming that it is what would be best for her construction of 
selfhood. The dependence on acknowledgement of the ‘beauty’ of the sacrifice is 
shown by Harriett turning to her parents for assurance, which she is readily given. 
The choice of words – describing the sacrifice as beautiful – signifies its 
superficiality. Her father reassures her of having made the right decision, and the 
sentiment is reiterated internally by the narrative voice as focalised through Harriett: 
‘She couldn’t. She couldn’t. It was no use thinking about him’; however, a comment 
on the deeper truth of Harriett’s feelings is inserted in the following sentence: ‘Yet 
night after night, for weeks and months, she thought, and cried herself to sleep.’232 
The objective way in which this is described is crucial in relation to the meaning of 
the sacrifice for Harriett’s sense of self. It is a way of showing that this struggle has a 
different meaning and outcome for Harriett than Mary Olivier’s struggle does when 
she gives up Richard – Harriett overtly pushes conscious thought to one side, but her 
emotional reaction is a testament to the fact that she is hurting, and before she 
succeeds in repressing her feelings, she is inconsolable. Harriett’s decision, then, is 
an ambiguous one. She struggles with thoughts of what might have been, as well as 
with emotions of sadness and loss, even though she is convinced that she has made 
the right decision, led by her moral compass that has been shaped and reinforced by 
her parents. She tells herself that she has done the right thing and believes it on a 
superficial level. But despite this, she still cries over Robin. It is thereby evident that 
she has not sublimated her desire for Robin, but only repressed it – as suggested by 	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Jean Radford in the introduction to the novel in its 1980 Virago edition – with the 
consequence that Robin is forced to make a sacrifice that he does not choose or 
understand.233 In stark opposition to Mary Olivier, who makes sacrifices that are not 
always acknowledged by the people around her, but who has a firm conviction that 
she is doing the right thing, Harriett has done what is outwardly seen as the right 
thing, but experiences inner turmoil due to regret and later guilt.  
The repression of desire on which Harriett’s sacrifices are based becomes 
even clearer when, after seeing Robin as an aged, ill-tempered man, she is deeply 
bothered by the fact that she no longer finds him attractive; ‘she couldn’t love him, 
couldn’t go on being faithful. This injured her self esteem.’234 Her desire for Robin is 
connected to her self-esteem because of the misconception of sacrifice as repression 
instead of sublimation; as she has built her self-image on the sacrifice of her desire 
for Robin – which was not a sacrifice in the form of sublimation, but merely a 
repression of her desire – her self-esteem is injured due to the realisation that the 
sacrifice is no longer valid, as Robin is no longer an object of desire.  
Robin’s sacrifice is not the only one that Harriett’s behaviour incurs, 
however. It has previously been pointed out that the novel, as indeed Sinclair’s 
whole oeuvre, is full of dead babies.235 Priscilla and Robin’s, as well as Maggie’s 
child, die because of Harriett actions. In addition to the dead human babies, there is 
also the doll that Harriett has to share with Connie Hancock, which she later pretends 
is dead and buries in a box in the cupboard – simply because she had had to share it 
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with her friend: ‘If I can’t have her to myself I won’t have her at all.’236 The dead 
doll, like the dead babies, is dead because of Harriett’s selfishness, the difference 
being the overt or conscious decision to ‘kill’ the doll, whereas the babies die for the 
indirect reason that Harriett has made selfish decisions. This seems to suggest that 
since Harriett is unable to sublimate her desire for approval from her parents – that is, 
to be disobedient to and thus ‘kill’ them, as the red campion scene implies – and 
equally incapable of sublimating her romantic desire for Robin, the symbolic 
sacrifice of the younger generation – dolls and babies – takes place instead. The final 
full thought in Harriett’s mind before she loses consciousness on the operating table 
at the end of the novel – that it is ‘sad to go through so much pain and then to have a 
dead baby’ – not only suggests that the dead baby trope is particularly strong in this 
novel because it is emblematic of Harriett’s life and death, but also indicates the 
latent guilt Harriett feels over the behaviour that she now realises was selfish.237 She 
feels responsible for the death of the babies, in the first instance because of her idea 
of what self-sacrifice should be, and in the second due to the opposite: an 
overpowering emotion wanting Robin and Maggie respectively for herself. 
The sacrifice of Robin remains in Harriett’s mind as a good thing, up until 
the point when she finds out what Robin really felt about her in his later life. His 
niece Mona comes to visit and appears to be in the same situation that Harriett was: 
she is in love with a friend’s fiancé and he wants to break off his previous 
engagement. Harriett advises Mona not to let him do it, using the example of her 
own sacrifice in order to try to make her point. Mona gives a response that punctures 
Harriett’s carefully maintained beliefs: ‘How could you? ... You insulted Aunt 
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Prissie. ... That’s how she got her illness. And it’s how he got his. And he’ll kill 
Aunt Beatie. ... Look at the awful suffering. ... There’s no common sense in it. ... Of 
course he hated you, after what you’d let him in for.’238 This no-nonsense speech 
manages to get through to Harriett and finally crushes the image of her beautiful 
sacrifice. 
The narrator, however, has always shown an awareness of the fact that this 
sacrifice was not a good thing at all. This is first done through a short re-telling of 
the nervous breakdown that Harriett seems to have after her rejection of Robin, 
entirely devoid of details and emotions: ‘Towards spring Harriett showed signs of 
depression, and they took her to the south of France and to Bordighera and Rome. In 
Rome she recovered.’239 The great distance between the narration and Harriett here 
is symptomatic of the lack of sympathy for what she is going through at this point: 
learning to think of the sacrifice of Robins as a good thing. When Harriett’s face is 
described as having acquired an ‘arrogant lift,’ this suggests further distance, and a 
disapproval of Harriett from the narrator’s point of view.240 
The narration here is phenomenological in the sense that it is a representation 
of beliefs about Harriett’s own experiences and their phenomenal character, as 
described by David Chalmers and outlined in chapter 1. However, it does not relate 
Harriett’s inner narrative in the way that Mary Olivier does; because Harriett has no 
self, she has no centre of narrative gravity, and as such allows for an objectification 
of her inner processes to a further extent than that seen in Mary Olivier. This means 
that the narrator can keep their distance from Harriett and still describe what is 
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taking place inside her psyche, even to the extent of knowing what Harriett herself is 
unable to realise because it is in her unconscious. When Harriett goes to see Robin 
and Priscilla after their marriage, she is portrayed as deriving an almost illicit 
pleasure from witnessing Priscilla’s inability to be a satisfactory wife to Robin: ‘She 
still thought of Prissie’s paralysis as separating them, still felt inside her a secret, 
unacknowledged satisfaction. Poor little Prissie.’241 The comment ‘Poor little Prissie’ 
is indicative of the disdain for Harriett that the narrator sometimes exudes, here 
under the guise of free indirect discourse – this is presumably a thought going 
through Harriett’s mind – that at the same time creates a sense of ironic distance 
between narrator and protagonist, as it is easily inferred that Harriett is repressing a 
feeling of resentment towards Prissie for having ended up with Robin. 
After the conversation with Mona, the gap between Harriett and the narrator 
becomes narrower, as Harriett can no longer be comforted by the honourability of 
what she believed was an altruistic act. Even though she outwardly maintains that 
she would do it again if she had to, her inner voice of reassurance is gone forever, 
replaced with the truth as spoken by Mona, up until this point understood by the 
narrator but kept repressed and silent. As Leigh Wilson points out, the distance that 
has been kept up between Harriett and the narrator dissolves here.242 As the 
narrator’s knowledge comes to the surface of Harriett’s understanding, not only the 
space between narrator and protagonist, but also that between reader and story, 
diminishes. 
Why does Sinclair feel the need to insert Mona into the story here? Surely the 
reader has understood all along that what Harriett did was wrong and that Robin 
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hated her for it. It must be assumed, then, that Mona fills a different function: that of 
showing how Harriett’s subjectivity is dependent upon the realisation of her self, 
which in turn is dependent on whether or not the truth about Robin is repressed or 
realised. Although she tries to push the realisation away, it is acknowledged by the 
narrator as ‘the truth’ in a sentence describing what Harriett sees, which expresses 
the struggle within Harriett between repression and realisation. The reason why 
Mona is needed in the scene is to provoke this struggle. Harriett comes closer to the 
narrator in this scene because she is on the verge of making a realisation pertaining 
to the undeveloped self: that she has never sublimated her desires. 
Mona functions as a catalyst, not only for the realisation of the truth, but for a 
possible intersubjective experience of consciousness for Harriett: 
 
Harriett sat a long time … trying to see the truth. She saw the girl … flashing 
out the truth. Was it true that she had sacrificed Robin and Priscilla and 
Beatrice to her parents’ idea of moral beauty? Was it true that this idea had 
been all wrong? That she might have married Robin and been happy and 
been right? ‘I don’t care. If it was to be done again to-morrow I’d do it.’ But 
the beauty of that unique act no longer appeared to her as it once was, 
uplifting, consoling, incorruptible.243 
 
The narrative stays in the third person past tense – never straying into the first or 
second person, except within inverted commas – but the focalisation moves closer to 
Harriett’s hidden inner truth in the three questions posed; for a brief moment, the gap 
between Harriett and narrator is closed, as the questions appear to be the product of 
her conscious mind. As the narrator then relates her direct thought within inverted 
commas, however, the gap returns, all sense of truth is gone, and Harriett is back in 
her state of repression. The final sentence makes clear that the repressed thought has 
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not disappeared, but remains deep down in Harriett’s unconscious, hindering her 
from feeling good about her sacrifice of Robin. 
In the light of Sinclair’s interest in psychoanalysis, Harriett must be read as a 
fundamentally undeveloped adult, whose unsublimated childish desire for parental 
approval controls her life completely. Contrary to Allison Pease’s reading, that 
Harriett ‘lack[s] anger and desire,’ I hold that it is precisely her abundant, 
uncontrolled desire that makes her self disintegrate under the weight of her sacrifices, 
rather than, as Mary Olivier, gain a stronger sense of self through self-abnegation.244  
Harriett’s sacrifices are detrimental to her sense of self because they are not 
based on any spiritual fulfilment though sublimation, but rather on feeding her desire 
and pride. This is why she, in order to keep her spirits up when she is feeling low, 
needs to remind herself of how good it felt to make the sacrifice, and the rush of 
emotion connected to the act. When her mother dies, ‘[s]he consoled herself by 
thinking of the sacrifices she had made, how she had given up Sidmouth, and how 
willingly she would have paid the hundred pounds [for the operation that could have 
saved her mother’s life].’245 She pretends to accept her mother’s death calmly and 
serenely, but inwardly, ‘[s]he wanted her back again. And she reproached herself, 
one minute for having been glad [that her mother is at peace after a painful illness], 
and the next for wanting her.’246 In a vulnerable position such as this, Harriett tries to 
shield herself from pain by reminiscing about sacrifices made, which gratifies her 
desire for external approval. Her memory of the renunciation of Robin similarly 
functions as an indulgent pleasure for the ego: ‘At her worst she could still think 
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with pleasure of the beauty of the act which had given Robin to Priscilla.’247 The 
enjoyment of recalling this to mind is disturbed by the frankness of Mona; after 
Harriett and Mona’s conversation about the sacrifice, ‘the beauty of that unique act 
no longer appeared to [Harriett] as it once was, uplifting, consoling, incorruptible,’ 
despite trying to push the comprehension of the true nature of the act out of her 
consciousness.248 The loss of the reassurance formerly connected with this memory 
creates a sensation of a ‘crumbling away, bit by bit, of her beautiful and honourable 
self, dying with the objects of its three profound affections: her father, her mother, 
Robin.’249 The ego is thus easily shattered by Mona’s questioning of Harriett’s 
intentions and moral; compared with Mary Olivier’s indestructible self that slowly 
builds towards fulfilment, Harriett’s ego is as robust as a house of cards. 
 It is not enough, then, for Harriett to remind herself about past experiences of 
self-denial, not only due to Mona Floyd’s view of the sacrifice of Robin, but because 
Harriett’s memories soon fade, and consequently fail to give her the same 
satisfaction of desire, and thereby sense of self, as before: ‘If only she could have 
remembered. It was only through memory that she could reinstate herself. … She 
clung to the image of her mother; and always beside it, shadowy and pathetic, she 
discerned the image of her lost self.’250 Sinclair explicitly states that Harriett has in 
fact lost her self, and places this insight in conjunction with the image of the dead 
mother. Harriett has never before had a sense of self as separate from her mother, 
then, which in a psychoanalytical reading is strongly suggestive of a lapse in 
Harriett’s development, as Philippa Martindale states: ‘Harriett … suffer[s] from … 	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a pre-Oedipal complex from which she is never able to escape.’251 The bond to the 
mother forms Harriett’s only understanding of her self, which means that when she 
loses her parent, she also loses her self, as the self is only experienced via the mother. 
The reading is problematic, however, due to the application of the Oedipal complex 
on a female child, who, according to Freud, would not suffer from such a complex 
due to her inability to completely reject the mother, with whom she must necessarily 
identify on account of her gender. 
Harriett’s failure to sublimate her desire, and her subsequent actions, are 
based on her failure to realise a sense of self. It later transpires that her growing 
‘feeling of insecurity,’ ‘almost physical sense of shrinkage,’ and ‘the crumbling 
away, bit by bit, of her beautiful and honourable self,’ are all connected with ‘Mona, 
with Maggie and Maggie’s baby.’252 Both Mona and Maggie have pointed out to 
Harriett that she has made two decisions that have had life-changing consequences 
for others due to her own selfish reasons: to give Robin to Priscilla, and to send away 
Maggie and her baby. 
It is difficult to differentiate between the third person narrator and Harriett’s 
consciousness in this quotation; the two blend almost seamlessly and blurs the 
distinction between Harriett’s perceptions, unreliable as the narration shows them to 
be, and those of the narrator. Read from a psychoanalytical perspective, this could 
also be seen as Harriett finally realising something that has been hidden away in her 
subconscious all along.  
Another example that shows an instance of minimal distance between or even 
conflation of Harriett’s consciousness and the narrative voice is that which relates 
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her realisation of her mother’s knowledge that she was dying and yet actively 
choosing not to be treated for her disease: ‘That was her secret. That was why she 
had been so calm when Papa died. She had known she would have him again so 
soon.’253 Again, the gap between narrator and character closes for a few sentences; 
on this point, however, it is not opened back up as Harriett is unable or unwilling to 
push this realisation aside, even though she does not discuss it openly with friends. 
The symbiotic narration is retained as the chapter is brought to a close: ‘…to herself 
she said that everything had not been done. Her mother had never had her wish. And 
she had died in agony, so that she, Harriett, might keep her hundred pounds.’254 
Interestingly, Harriett has a rare moment of clarity and is able to say something ‘to 
herself’ that is based on true insight instead of wishful thinking or caricatured 
behaviour. It is conceivable that the conversation with Mona and the experience of 
intersubjectivity it brings has created the possibility for instances of openness to her 
self. However, it is also important to note that the realisation is not of Harriett’s own 
misguided sacrifice, but of her mother’s self-immolation. While it may be a 
disturbing realisation, it is not connected to Harriett’s desire or her sense of self, 
which allows the narration to stay on the level of Harriett’s conscious mind. 
The distance between narrator and focaliser means that the focaliser is 
fundamentally incapable of being subjective in terms of narrative position. Harriett 
has no realised self, but the self-image that she does have is primarily based on two 
conditions: the first being the beauty of her sacrifice of Robin, and the second is that 
Harriett needs to occupy the role of the baby. When these two conditions can no 
longer be met, her sense of self starts to ‘crumble,’ and ultimately disintegrates. As a 
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result, the narrative voice can never be fully subjective; even when Harriett’s 
thoughts are related without inverted commas, her focalised narration still has to be 
mixed with that of an impersonal narrator. 
On some points, the narrator appears to be suspiciously silent. One of these is 
the reason why Harriett is sent away to boarding school; while it may not seem to 
require any explanation other than her parents wanting her to receive an education, it 
does not answer the question why they send her away from home to do so; she is not 
particularly gifted academically, and there is no trouble within the home that is 
known at this point in the novel. Chapter III begins with a description of the 
Hancocks, which ends abruptly with the following sentence: ‘She was glad Connie 
hadn’t been sent to her boarding school, so that nothing could come between her and 
Priscilla Heaven.’255 There is a gap in the narrative here; suddenly Harriett is packed 
off to school, for which there is no explanation. As the preceding lines portray the 
Hancocks, it is possible that some event that concerns them has taken place, which 
necessitates Harriett’s removal. Such a theory would be pure conjecture if it were not 
for the memories that resurface in Harriett’s mind at the very end of her life on the 
operating table: ‘…the doctor was really Mr Hancock. … Don’t let him touch me… 
There’s a dead baby in the bed. Red hair. They ought to have taken it away.’256 
While it is possible to argue that these memories are conflations of events – Mr 
Hancock is not the only person with red hair in the novel; there is also ‘the red-
haired woman in the sweetie-shop [who] has got a little baby, and its hair’s red, too’ 
– it is suggestive of a trauma of some sort.257 The implication is that Harriett’s past 
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experiences have made her emotionally repressed and unable to work toward self-
realisation despite continuously making sacrifices. The circular re-telling and 
repetition of certain events further suggests narrative reticence in the sense that these 
things are not possible for Harriett to approach directly, but must be related in a 
similar manner as they are realised in her consciousness. 
A further implication of repetition in the novel is that the only way for 
Harriett to retain a sense of self after her mother’s death is through memory.258 In a 
way that is reminiscent of ritual ancestor worship, Harriett must repeatedly conjure 
up the sense of the mother out of whom she has constructed her own ‘lost’ self. The 
return to childhood that she experiences at the end of her life is intimated not only by 
the replication of her relationship with the mother through Maggie, and the 
resurfacing of repressed memories in her final moments in the hospital, but in the 
reassessment and replaying in her mind of what her formative years were like; ‘her 
mind would go backwards, returning, always returning…’259 She redecorates the 
drawing room to appear as it did when she was a child, and reinstalls the blue egg 
workbox that was hidden away at her mother’s death: ‘She sat gazing at it a long 
time in happy, child-like satisfaction. The blue egg gave reality to her return. When 
she saw Maggie … she thought of her mother.’260 As previously mentioned, her 
‘shadowy’ self is constructed entirely from the recognition she gets from the mother, 
which is why she experiences a loss of that self when her mother dies: ‘It was only 
through memory that she could reinstate herself. …always beside [the image of her 
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mother] … she discerned the image of her lost self.’261 Harriett’s only sense of self 
ever came from the reflection of herself in the mother. The reversion to childhood, 
then, not only emphasises the circularity with which the entire story is narrated, but 
also the importance that the repetition of memory has for Harriett’s self-image after 
the death of her mother. 
Since Harriett does not experience a sense of self before her mother’s death, 
the sacrifices she makes up until then are not proper sacrifices in the sense that they 
do not open up an avenue to Harriett’s spiritual fulfilment or self-realisation, and 
they do not contain the potential to ‘make holy’ either the object or the performer of 
the sacrifice. They may be similar to the transactional sacrifices described by Marcel 
Mauss in The Gift, which I mention in chapter 1, in the sense that Harriett gives 
something up with the expectation of receiving something else in return. However, 
there is a significant difference between the two: Harriett’s sacrifices are entirely 
secular, made out of surface intentions, and based on wanting to be perceived as 
‘beautiful’. During her mother’s illness, Harriett urges her mother to undergo an 
expensive operation because ‘[s]he wanted to feel that … she had shrunk from no 
sacrifice.’262 Harriett’s focus is on the surface appearance of whether or not she has 
been willing to make a sacrifice, not on whether her mother wishes to have the 
operation or whether it is likely to be beneficial to her. Sinclair’s phrasing here – 
‘she had shrunk from no sacrifice’ – has a further suggestive significance: Harriett’s 
self has shrunk from not making any productive or sublimative sacrifices. 
After Harriett’s mother dies, however, ‘she felt the vague stirring of her 
individual soul,’ as the inevitable consequence of losing the self, as she has done 
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through the death of her mother, entails an awakening and rebirth of the self.263 As 
she realises that she is free to make her own choice about where to go to church, and 
consequently switches to a high church service and priest, Harriett is torn between 
guilt for abandoning her mother’s brand of theology and a longing for the cure that 
her own individual soul needs: ‘[S]he felt that she had done something cruel and 
iniquitous, but necessary to the soul.’264 Although she attempts to create a sense of 
individuality at this point, it appears to be too late to start building a self that can 
withstand questioning from the outside world, as the scenes with Lizzie Pierce and 
Mona show. Although Harriett tries to keep up the appearance of feeling secure 
within herself in front of her acquaintances, the stirring of her burgeoning 
individuality is disrupted by her repressed feelings about Robin and Priscilla, and 
Maggie and her baby. After the events from the death of Mrs Frean to Harriett’s own 
illness, she can no longer find pleasure in anything, but instead only finds an 
increasing ‘feeling of insecurity’ within.265 
 The satisfaction Harriett retains in middle age is that which she gains from 
her idea of ‘exclusiveness.’ Lacking a community, she tells herself that she is too 
good for the company of others: ‘[H]er perishing self asserted itself in an increased 
reserve and arrogance.’266 Reverting to the notion that her parents are the only 
worthy people with whom she has ever come in contact, she rejects the possibility of 
social interaction with her neighbours. She calls on them only because the man of the 
house, Mr Brailsford, writes for the same paper to which Mr Frean used to be 
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‘connected,’ but at this point Harriett has turned into ‘an unnecessary little old lady’ 
in the eyes of her neighbours, whose company is neither sought nor required.267 
 Throughout the story, Harriett’s inability to form an independent self is 
reiterated; it is as though she has never really been a real person. This stands in 
contrast to her friends Lizzie, Sarah, and Connie, who all appear to have some form 
of realisation of their selves. If Harriett might be read as undeveloped due to never 
having married, Lizzie Pierce is a character that will show any such psychoanalytical 
reading to be reductive, as she too remains a spinster, but is clearly worthy of the 
narrator’s implicit admiration, while Harriett finds her ‘provoking’: ‘Harriett had no 
patience with Lizzie’s affectation in wanting to be modern, her vanity in trying to be 
young, her middle-aged raptures over the work – often unpleasant – of writers too 
young to be worth serious consideration. They had long arguments in which Harriett, 
beaten, retired behind The Social Order…’268 Clearly, the narrator is not particularly 
sympathetic to Harriett here. Sinclair is criticising those of her own generation who 
are not supportive of the members of the young avant-garde; she was herself well-
known for the patronage of many such writers, Richard Aldington and Mary Butts 
among others.269 Lizzie Pierce is explicitly portrayed as a woman who has managed 
to make an individual of herself through intellectual effort rather than as a traditional 
Victorian middle-class wife and mother, and when Harriett argues against her 
modern ideas with a reference to her being her father’s daughter, Lizzie retorts: ‘I’m 
William Pierce’s, but that hasn’t prevented my being myself.’270 The comment 
presupposes an understanding of Harriett as not being herself, not having realised her 	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self, because of her preoccupation with being the daughter of her parents as opposed 
to a free individual. 
Having built her notion of self entirely on the acknowledgement gained from 
her parents, Harriett’s self-image falls to pieces when they are both gone. After her 
mother’s death, she is ‘horrified’ to realise that she is unable to retain her self-image: 
 
[S]he had seen herself surviving as the same Harriett Frean with the addition 
of an overwhelming grief… But she was not there. Through her absorption in 
her mother, some large, essential part of herself had gone. … All her 
memories of her mother were joined to the memory of this now irrecoverable 
self.271 
 
Similarly, in the final years of her life, Harriett reverts back to childhood and 
substitutes Maggie for her mother, leaving behind all attempts at being an adult 
individual: ‘She was happy in the surrender of her responsibility, of the grown-up 
self she had maintained with so much effort, clinging to Maggie, submitting to 
Maggie, as she had clung and submitted to her mother.’272 She wants to become part 
of Maggie, like she was part of her mother. When Maggie finally leaves to care for 
her dying mother, Harriett cries; in the chapter immediately following, she falls ill 
and dies. 
Harriett’s words in the last two pages of the novel suggest yet again that she 
was never a full, living person, separate and self-sustaining: ‘It’s sad – sad to go 
through so much pain and then to have a dead baby. … Mamma – ’273 The first 
sentence could allude to a possibility that Harriett has had a stillborn child out of 
wedlock. The line also intimates that Harriett’s thoughts run on Priscilla and Robin’s 
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child that dies in infancy, or Maggie and her baby that dies after she sends them 
away, which is of course conceivable as it may be argued that the line does not have 
to be read as meaning that the child is dead at birth. A third possible interpretation is 
advanced by Suzanne Raitt; it is Harriett herself who is the dead baby, and that her 
realisation at the very end of her life is that she has in fact not fulfilled the hopes and 
expectations of her parents, since she has not succeeded in becoming an individual: 
‘Harriett herself… is  metaphorically a dead baby, one that failed even to begin the 
process of development.’274 As she has never realised her self, she is, in effect, 
stillborn; her mother gave birth to her, but was never separated from her, because 
Harriett never became a subject of her own, but remained a dependent subdivision of 
her mother. 
In her own death, Harriett does in some way achieve what she has been 
longing for: an experience of symbiosis with or resemblance to her mother. Being 
diagnosed with cancer, the same disease that killed her mother, she is allowed to 
believe that she can re-live, or at least re-enact, her mother’s final months of life and 
subsequent death: ‘She was raised to her mother’s eminence in pain. With every stab 
she would live again in her mother. She had what her mother had.’275 Raitt also 
points to the opposition between this ‘ecstatic, and fatal identification with her dead 
mother’ and the ecstasy of creation portrayed towards the end of Mary Olivier, as the 
results of repression and sublimation of desire, respectively.276 The trouble for 
Harriett is that despite having the same illness as her mother, she does not in fact 
have ‘what her mother had’; she has no family of her own, no religious belief in 
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which she trusts, and no self. Therefore, she cannot make the sacrifice her mother 
made, because she has nothing for which to make it: ‘Only she would have an 
operation. This different thing was what she dreaded, the thing her mother hadn’t 
had …’277 
Harriett does not understand the basic relationship between self and other, or 
herself and other people, because she has no self. Her performances of sacrifice are 
attempts at copying her mother’s actions, but she does not succeed in her mimicry as 
they lack the foundational beliefs of her mother. The sacrifices themselves have no 
deeper metaphysical meaning for Harriett because she has no developed self with 
which to experience that meaning; she therefore has a limited cognitive capability of 
other people’s subjective experiences.  
* 
This chapter has looked at sacrifice and the internal experience of the self in two 
experimental narratives by May Sinclair, where the Hegelian idea of self-realisation 
through self-sacrifice, coupled with the psychoanalytic theory of sublimation as 
necessary for the development of the self, are represented through narrative 
experiment. Narrative voice and position depend on a sense of self in the two novels 
studied. Mary Olivier is written in a mixture of third, second, and first person 
narration, which allows for a manifestation of the well-developed sense of self – and 
thereby spiritual intersubjectivity – that Mary Olivier attains throughout the novel. 
The flow of the use of the different pronouns shows the oscillating nature of the 
intersubjective experience; it is neither constant nor stable. In comparison, the 
intersubjective nature of the narration in Harriett Frean is less frequently attained, 
and never reaches the point of the protagonist being fully in communion with any 	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other subject, which is symptomatic of the lack of her own sense of self. I have 
pointed to the way in which Sinclair grapples with the difficulty of relating 
experiences of the self in text by using two different narrative approaches, one 
heterophenomenological and the other objective to the point of being ‘very nearly 
medical’. 
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Chapter 3 
‘It is for art to take over the anthropologist’s material’: 
Sacrifice, Community, and Narrative Construction in Mary 
Butts278 
 
Mary Butts’ fiction incorporates a plethora of images of sacrifice from crucifixion to 
self-immolation, as well as a constant negotiation of the space between communal 
responsibility and individual freedom. The texts repeatedly pose the questions of 
whether or not humans need structure, and whether it is possible to institute a 
community that is not too restrictive for the individual. While all of the sacrifices in 
Butts’ novels appear to be made with the aim of bringing about structure, I suggest 
here that not all of them are successful in doing so, for reasons that will be explored 
in this chapter. 
I posit that, while sacrifice in the novels is ostensibly justified by the needs of 
the community, it is the embedded narrative, or the narrative within the narrative – 
what Mieke Bal refers to as hyponarrative – surrounding the sacrificial act that 
creates the structure upon which a cohesive community can be built, rather than the 
sacrificial act in itself.279 To evidence this, the chapter will primarily look at Butts’ 
three novels Ashe of Rings (1925), Armed with Madness (1928), and Death of 
Felicity Taverner (1932), as these are her most characteristic works of fiction in 
terms of style and subject matter, as well as being her most well-known works. I will 	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consider those of her works of non-fiction that deal with the theme of sacrifice, such 
as Traps for Unbelievers (1932), a pamphlet on the contemporary state of religion in 
England. Butts’ short fiction and two historical narratives – The Macedonian (1933) 
and Scenes from the Life of Cleopatra (1935) – are not included in this study as they 
are not paramount to a study of sacrifice in her overall work as they only deal with 
the theme peripherally, if at all. One story that has sacrifice as a more central theme 
is ‘Friendship’s Garland,’ in which the first person narrator refers to two of her 
friends as officiating a ‘cult’ in a Paris café turned ‘temple’: ‘They were priests 
there, and I hoped a sacrifice. All the same, I was afraid of their temple.’280 The 
ambivalent attitude to sacrifice that can be seen in Butts’ novels is also expressed 
here; there is a simultaneous fascination with and disgust of the concept. The story 
ends with a mystical experience, involving a talking tree that instructs her to ‘[k]eep 
tabu.’281 Afterwards, the narrator feels cleansed and rejuvenated, ‘like a child that 
has been dipped in dew,’ pointing to the link between sacrifice and purity.282 
 
‘With human divinity about, human sacrifice is never far away’: The Context 
of Mary Butts283 
Mary Butts’ placement within the spectrum of modernist literature seems to be 
gradually moving from that of a peripheral point to becoming more central. A 
number of recent publications on modernism deal with her work at length and 
several others mention it as part of general discussions of modernist literature. In the 	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1980s and early 90s, when Christopher Wagstaff was compiling material for the first 
full-length critical biography of Butts, there was very little research done on her, 
however, and the consideration of her work was certainly not helped by most of it 
being out of print. Following the rediscovery of women modernists that was 
generated by among others Bonnie Kime Scott’s The Gender of Modernism: A 
Critical Anthology (1990), as well as the discussion of Butts’ work in Patrick 
Wright’s On Living in an Old Country (1985), a number of Butts’ novels and short 
stories were republished in McPherson & Co’s series ‘Recovered Classics’ in the 
1990s. A critical interest in her work appears to have been sparked around the 
millennium, when not only Wagstaff’s book A Sacred Quest (1998) was published, 
but also Natalie Blondel’s biography Mary Butts: Scenes from the Life (1998). The 
publication of extracts from Butts’ journals edited by Natalie Blondel in 2002 soon 
followed. From then on, a small number of literary scholars have worked steadily 
towards Butts’ re-establishment within the heart of the modernist movement. 
Caroline Maclean’s The Vogue for Russia: Modernism and the Unseen in Britain 
1900-1930 (2015) is one example of a recent study that takes Butts’ writing into 
account. 
 Whereas the work done on Butts at the end of the twentieth century mainly 
revolved around feminist readings, the more recent scholarship appears to have 
turned its focus to the importance of religion for Butts. Roslyn Reso Foy’s Ritual, 
Myth, and Mysticism in the Work of Mary Butts: Between Feminism and Modernism 
(2000) pioneered the study of Butts in relation to religion. Reso Foy argues that, in 
combining ‘a Judeo-Christian spirituality with a matrilineally pagan one’, Butts 
constructs a new womanhood, one which unites ‘feminine qualities of the past with 
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those of the present.’284 The study also stresses the importance of Jane Harrison for 
Butts, suggesting that ‘the primal female principle that revels in its identification 
with the natural world and with the cosmic order outside subjective time and space’ 
are at the centre for both writers.285 Jane Garrity’s Step-Daughters of England (2003) 
develops the picture of Butts’ national imaginary, which is built with the mixture of 
archaic myth and progressive femininity. Garrity’s study additionally deals with the 
work of Dorothy Richardson, Virginia Woolf, and Sylvia Townsend Warner, and 
foregrounds these authors in relation to interwar nationalism in Britain. Like Reso 
Foy, Garrity combines her investigation of Butts’ interest in anthropology with a 
feminist perspective, and argues that Butts used the work of Jane Harrison to 
construct her ideas of British nationality.286 More recent studies of Butts and 
spirituality are Matthew Sterenberg’s Mythic Thinking in Twentieth-Century Britain: 
Meaning for Modernity (2013), which again foregrounds Butts’ interest in ritual, 
myth, and magic, and relates this preoccupation to the overall concern with forms of 
spirituality aside from Christianity in modernist literature, arguing that the study of 
anthropology opened up the exploration of new religious formations, not just for 
Mary Butts, but also for John Cowper Powys, Charles Williams and David Jones, 
who all shared Butts’ interest in the legend of the Grail.287 
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Andrew Radford’s Mary Butts and British Neo-Romanticism: The Enchantment of 
Place (2014) is another recent full-length study on Butts. Like the previously 
mentioned scholars, Radford looks at Butts’ emphasis on nature as feminine, the 
relationship between her work and the anthropological study of religion, and the 
political interests that can be inferred from her writings. The book places Butts 
within the context of neo-romanticism, and proposes that ‘Butts’s work shifts from 
canvassing, with subtle accuracy, the human body’s navigation of unfenced natural 
terrain, to a defensive chauvinism.’288 Neo-romanticism is considered by Radford as 
a strand of modernism that shows a particular interest in both ancient religion and 
new religious formations, as well as the natural environment, which makes it a 
category into which Butts fits neatly. Problematising this, Radford finds the 
‘patrician nativism’ that Butts exudes to be ‘a crucial caveat to revisionist textual 
scholarship that presupposes unproblematic links between aesthetic modernism and 
the industrial “modernity”’ that can be found in her later work.289 I will return to and 
discuss the significance of scapegoating in relation to Radford’s argument in the 
following section. 
 While a number of studies have been devoted to Butts and religion, none 
have focussed specifically on sacrifice. Radford, Garrity, and Reso Foy have written 
to some extent about the scapegoating mechanisms that Butts uses, but they all 
contend that it is the sacrifice in itself that Butts employs to create a new structure, or 
to reinforce an archaic one. I argue in this chapter that such a reading disregards the 
importance of the hyponarrative, around which all three of the studied novels 
revolve. 	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Butts set out her own view of the current state of religion in the pamphlet Traps for 
Unbelievers, published in 1932. The text argues that secularisation will not deliver 
us from the need for moral laws in society, and that in an era of ‘indifference to the 
forms as well as to the spirit of every variety of Christianity’ people will turn to 
other truths, for instance belief in science.290 Psychoanalytic theory, having become 
firmly established in the intellectual world and its discourse by the time of Butts’ 
writing the pamphlet, is perceived as filling such a function. In stating this, Butts 
uses a familiar trope, as she writes that ‘psycho-analysis is one of the lambs of God 
who is taking away the sins of the world just now.’291 The lamb of God, or the 
scapegoat, absolves people of their transgressions against the moral code; in a 
society without gods, this lamb has to be replaced by something else that has a 
cleansing, ordering effect which helps us to make sense of the world and our place in 
it. 
Mary Butts was an avid reader and devoured the main works of 
psychoanalytic theory. According to her journal, she spent Boxing Day in 1918 
studying Psychology of the Unconscious: ‘Have done little else than read Jung – I 
think that I am a fair example of libido rising freely into the conscious. There is the 
good life.’ Butts then goes on to quote a few lines from William Blake that point to 
the imagined fruitful outcome of giving in to desire: ‘“Abstinence sows sand all over 
/ Thy ruddy limbs & flaming hair / But desire gratified / Plants fruits & seeds of 
beauty there.” (…) All asceticism but an introversion of libido.’292 Butts’ reading of 
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Jung appears to have confirmed her own thoughts about expressions of her desire; 
repressing the libido will not lead to ‘the good life.’ Evidently, the issue of women’s 
libido is not only one that pertained to Butts’ private life, but one that affected her 
fiction too; at a time when women were not generally considered (or supposed) to 
have such desires, Butts’ female fictional creations were allowed to express as much 
sexual desire as the male ones. Psychoanalytic theory and research strengthened the 
notion that the sexual libido exists in most people irrespective of gender, and as such 
it is no wonder that such an explanatory model would appeal to Mary Butts. Her 
diary shows that it was a satisfactory way of rationalising her own emotions, as well 
as a perfectly good ground on which to base her characters. 
Like Sinclair, Butts seems to have taken to Jung, whose works she refers to 
frequently in her journal, and she accepts his theoretical standpoint with more ease 
than she does Freud’s. In an entry on 17 July 1920, she comments: ‘Dreams want 
tackling – now especially with Freud uncontaminated with Yang about, & so 
popular. It is undignified to run the gauntlet of anal eroticism-criticism – Yeats has 
protested; more protests & quick.’293 Although clearly critical of ‘the great game of 
Hunt-the-Complex,’ she still thought of Freudian theory as valuable for her creative 
process.294 As she starts writing Death of Felicity Taverner in 1928 and records the 
process of conception, she writes a note to herself on the side: ‘Use Freud.’295 
Nevertheless, Jacqueline Rose argues that Butts ‘rejected his account of the 
supernatural as pure psychological projection. And in the process she mounts a 
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wholly convincing critique of the limits, not to say anthropocentrism, of Freud.’296 
This is in reference to a line in Armed with Madness: ‘Freud very useful in the case 
of irrational fear … what had happened today was objective and odd.’297 An 
interesting side note is that Butts’ first husband John Rodker came to publish the 
collected works of Freud, with the assistance of Anna Freud, in the 1940s, after the 
Freud family had settled in England. 
Butts posits that the substitution of religion for psychoanalysis is a step back 
towards the assumed archaic belief in the divinity of man. She writes, considering 
the welter of books being published at the time on the topic of ‘Primitive Animism,’ 
that ‘it looks as if we were back where we started… Shall we… devise a suitable 
formula for that most reasonable of magical conclusions, the worship of the God-
Man?’298 The divinisation of man entails, for Butts, human sacrifice, since there is an 
even bigger need to keep strict boundaries of cleanliness and hygiene if physical 
human beings are to be worshipped. Her problem is that modern society has not yet 
figured out a way in which to ‘redescribe’ this ritual to suit its needs: ‘With human 
divinity about, human sacrifice is never far away. That might come in again if, O 
profoundly magical process! the right word could be discovered to redescribe it. 
Lacking these, there are some very curious practices about.’299 Butts suggests that 
‘the right word,’ the right formula, can bring about a ‘magical process’ that will 
reawaken human divinity. The ‘curious practices’ that have temporarily replaced that 
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cleanliness and hygiene, ‘now often become a rite.’300 In this way, Butts’ argument 
suggests that the hygiene ritual is reborn as a product of science to replace ritual 
sacrifice. 
Science taking the place of religion, however, implies a deficiency for Butts, 
since it is missing some element of the magical or mystical; the magic involved in 
primitive religion does not exist in science. As Butts does not spell out the exact 
nature of the magic that science is missing – she states that ‘[m]agic has not yet been 
properly defined’ – it is difficult to grasp the full meaning of that deficiency.301 Since 
Butts herself considered magic undefinable, it is a problematic endeavour to try to 
establish any coherent demarcation of the concept as used by her. As it is represented 
in her writing, both fictional and otherwise, it is primarily a mystical concept: 
something that is experienced rather than objectively evidenced. When describing a 
magical episode in her childhood, in which stones come to life as people, Butts 
draws a connection between magic and mana, which is another central concept for 
her: ‘[The stones] stopped being persons and became again plain stones. … A magic. 
It usually meant – this was when I was very little – that the mana of some bead or 
button had replaced them.’302 It is the magic, or mana, that enables the stones to 
become personalised: a non-permanent, mystical essence of vitality. Butts appears to 
have seen the possibility of magic in almost everything – even her own hair 
according to her biographer Natalie Blondel – but most predominantly in nature, 
especially trees and stones, as is attested by a sequence in Death of Felicity Taverner 
where particular kinds of stones have the potential to ‘become a magic … if they 
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aren’t broken up and built into a house.’303 As a concept, magic is not integral to my 
discussion; while it may be used to denote the transmutative element involved in 
certain types of sacrifice, magic is not central for a discussion of the constructive  
and community-building functions of sacrifice, which is the focus here. 
It can only be assumed that Butts purports to point to something in Traps for 
Unbelievers that is inherent in the ritual of sacrifice, since the lack of magic in 
science is the reason why human sacrifice might ‘come in again.’ Butts describes the 
sense of magic in sacrifice as ‘a very peculiar kind of awareness,’ one which ‘has 
something to do with a sense of the invisible, the non-existent in a scientific sense, 
relations between things of a different order.’304 Butts is trying to describe some 
form of communion with the supernatural, which is of course absent from ordinary 
scientific endeavours as we know them; the twentieth-century hygiene rituals of the 
West do not include any intention of forming a link with the supernatural – rather, 
the very definition of these rituals as scientific precludes any association of them 
with the unseen, unmeasureable, and unverifiable sphere of the supernatural – but 
they are about creating order, which is why Butts sees them as watered-down 
replacements for religious rituals. While Mary Douglas in Purity and Danger (1966) 
relates rituals of hygiene to religion, she does not suggest as Butts does that the 
modern-day obsession with hygiene is symptomatic of a lack of religion or a 
replacement for ritual sacrifice.305 
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Human sacrifice, Butts argues, may become popular again, not only due to its 
addition of that magic which does not exist in science, but because it is contingent on 
human divinity, in that human divinity brings about human sacrifice and vice versa. 
The supposition that a sacrifical object is holy or divine coincides with the Hubert 
and Mauss definition of sacrifice, which had an important impact on anthropology as 
a discipline. The part of the Hubert and Mauss definition that is referred to here is 
that which states that the thing sacrificed becomes sacralised, is made holy, in order 
for the sacrifice to be complete; the sacrificial object is ‘consecrated, it [is] 
sacrified…’306 Butts clearly took an interest in the study of anthropology, even 
noting in her journal that ‘[i]t is for art to take over the anthropologist’s material’ in 
order to fully make sense of the beliefs of mankind, since ‘even the best of them [the 
anthropologists], Frazer hardly, gives one the least idea, the least suggestions of the 
passion, the emotion that made men behave like that.’307 The work of J. G. Frazer 
and Jane Harrison is alluded to a number of times in Butts’ journals, along with 
evidence that Butts continually re-read The Golden Bough, Prolegomena to the 
Study of Greek Religion, and Themis.308 In Butts’ answer to the problem of a lack of 
magic in an increasingly secular society, she proposes to reinstate the ‘magical 
process’ of primitive ritual through sacrifice. The notion that human sacrifice is due 
for a comeback is evident in her fiction, with the scapegoat theme in Death of 
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Felicity Taverner as one of the main representations of human sacrifice. I will return 
to the topic of scapegoating in Butts for a longer discussion below. 
Another influence on the idea of human divinity is the Nietzschean view of 
the androcentrism of a secular society, which proposes the worship of the perfected 
human being. Butts asks whether we should ‘devise a suitable formula for that most 
reasonable of magical conclusions, the worship of the God-Man.’309 In Nietzschean 
terms, the God-Man may be supposed to correspond to the Übermensch or 
Superman, a higher level of being that evolves from a state of secularism and 
subsequent nihilism. After the death of God, the Superman replaces man’s former 
object of veneration, thus making the perfected human into a divinity himself, 
Nietzsche suggests in Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen (Thus 
Spake Zarathustra, 1883-5).310 
Several scholars have previously indicated the impact of Nietzsche on 
Butts.311 Robin Blaser discusses the topic at length, also pointing to the importance 
of the work of A. R. Orage, in particular Friedrich Nietzsche: The Dionysian Spirit 
of the Age (1906).312 Blaser outlines the general impact of Nietzsche on early 
twentieth-century culture and literature, emphasising how nihilism affected Butts’ 
writing. I will return to this outline in my discussion of the characterisation of Nick 	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Kralin in Death of Felicity Taverner. Jennifer Kroll also points out that ‘[q]uotations 
from Nietzsche are laced throughout much of [Butts’] work. The concept of the 
Apollonian and Dionysian seems to have been especially central to her creative 
vision.’313 Butts mentions Nietzsche on several occasions in her journals, verifying 
that she did indeed read his work.314 Roslyn Reso Foy comments specifically on a 
line in Armed with Madness that states that the age of modernity is an age of 
‘[r]evaluation of values,’ and that this echoes ‘Nietzsche’s “transvaluation of 
values,”’ which in Ecce Homo (1888) is outlined as ‘an emancipation of all moral 
values, in a saying of yea, and in an attitude of trust, to that which hitherto has been 
forbidden, despised, and damned.’315 While the wording certainly suggests that 
Butts, as so many other modernists, took her inspiration from Nietzsche in 
considering herself to be at the dawn of a new age, the overall ideology of the 
Taverner group in Armed with Madness certainly does not coincide with the 
Nietzschean critique of modernity and his call to reject values like love, ‘self-
abnegation and modest retirement,’ in favour of ‘a heart transformed to brass.’316 
They do not embrace the Nietzschean disdain for traditional morals and values, but 
rather the opposite. In the Taverner world, a continuation of traditional beliefs are 
paramount; they may be mixed up with a measure of permissiveness that seems to 
throw them over, but that does not amount to a rejection of humanism. 
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Nietzsche also allows for a certain amount of respect for tradition. In Jenseits von 
Gut und Böse: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft (Beyond Good and Evil, 1886) 
he states that ‘[d]eep reverence for age and the traditional – all law rests on this 
twofold reverence – belief in and prejudice in favour of ancestors and against 
descendants, is typical of the morality of the powerful,’ as opposed to progressive 
and, in Nietzsche’s work within inverted commas, ‘modern’ ideas.317 This is likely to 
have rung true for Butts, as would the tendency to value highly matters of the 
between. Beyond Good and Evil is particularly emphatic on the point of placing 
itself between, or beyond, polar opposites. Nietzsche berates the tradition of Western 
philosophy for being too preoccupied with binary thinking, or ‘antithetical 
values.’318 Scholarly interest in this trait has formed the basis of comparisons of 
Nietzsche’s work to Daoist classics like the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, where non-
dichotomial thinking is a key fundament.319 Butts makes incidental references to 
Daoism in her journals, at one point drawing a parallel between the Dao and the 
Grail.320 Jennifer Kroll confirms that Butts was ‘very much attracted to Taoism’.321 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 196 (§260). 
318 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 34 (§2).  
319 See for instance Nietzsche and Asian Thought, ed. Graham Parkes, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991); Hans-Georg Moeller, ‘The “Exotic” Nietzsche – 
East and West,’ The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 28 (2004): 57-69; Katrin Froese, 
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Daoist Thought: Crossing Paths In-Between (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2006); Ge Ling Shang, Liberation as 
Affirmation: The Religiosity of Zhuangzi and Nietzsche (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2006). 
320 Butts, Journals, 413 
321 Kroll, ‘Mary Butts’ Unrest Cure for the Waste Land,’ 167 
Sanna Melin Schyllert 
 147 
Butts apparently had an interest in several aspects of Chinese religious practices, as 
her unpublished papers contain a poem called ‘Advice of the Yi-King.’322 
On several occasions in her journals, Butts comments on the importance of ‘letting 
go’ and being ‘free from the pair of opposites;’ at times, she attests to the 
impossibility of the task however, and advocates compromise through magic: 
 
Since we are not free from the pair of opposites, we have to make an image 
of that freedom in the world and call it a compromise. But the English should 
remember that they cannot be free of the pair of opposites till they know what 
they are like. This ‘magic in the world’ consists of an agreement – often 
tacitly come upon – to provide outlets from the destroying passions which in 
the same time will give relief to an amiability now stale.323 
 
The ‘agreement’ that is suggested here is fundamental to Butts’ thinking, it seems, 
since it is based on the core concept of magic. The wish to come to a compromise or 
agreement regarding binary opposites is noteworthy, since it indicates an ambiguity 
at the heart of Butts’ understanding of the world. 
Magic appears to be related to the Greek concept of sophrosynê – meaning 
well-balanced or moderate with positive connotations – according to notes made in 
Butts’ journal. The term has no direct English equivalent. It has been suggested that 
it has the same meaning as the Swedish concept lagom, which is likewise difficult to 
translate, but can be understood as perfection through moderation.324 Jane Harrison 
writes of sophrosynê in her essay ‘Scientiae sacra fames,’ and refers to Gilbert 
Murray’s Four Stages in Greek Religion (1912) in terming sophrosynê as something 
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akin to ‘the scientific spirit … which knows and is quiet, which saves and is 
saved.’325 An unfinished thought recorded in her 1918 journal indicates that Butts 
thought of the concept of sophrosynê in conjunction with magic:  
 
The conception of Sophrosynê as it developed among the Epicureans & today 
by Norman Douglas & Anatole France?  
“Epicurus approves none of these things.” The Epicurean & rationalist & the 
subconscious emotions demanding their secret satisfactions 
Magic –326 
 
In 1917, Butts quotes Rise of the Greek Epic (1907) by Gilbert Murray, one of the 
Cambridge Ritualists, in her diary on the definition of the term: ‘It is something like 
Temperance, Gentleness, Mercy, sometimes Innocence, never mere Caution, or 
tempering of dominant emotion by gentler thought.’327 Two years later, she writes an 
entry where she defines it as ‘[t]he moment when one reaches the point of the union 
of opposites … One is then conscious of the state which is beyond good & evil.’328 
Butts thus connects magic, sophrosynê, and Nietzsche’s call to move beyond 
oppositional binaries. 
It is clear, then, that Butts appears to have picked through Nietzsche’s 
writing, choosing aphorisms to include in her own writing, which suited her own 
philosophy, and interpreting these according to her own taste. Robin Blaser holds 
that Butts formed her interest in Nietzsche through Blake, ‘in whose work the issues 
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emphasising the issue of ambiguity and a departure from the binary opposites that 
colour most of Western philosophy, and, furthermore, that Butts’ fiction shows a 
sensitivity to the ‘loss of cultural meaning’ that is typical for modernism.329 As the 
influence of Christianity on Western philosophy creates an opposition between ritual 
sacrifice and self-sacrifice, Nietzsche, in his criticism of Christian values, keeps the 
idea of the opposition between the two, but values ritual sacrifice above self-
sacrifice. The loss of meaning in Butts’ novels is substituted with a belief in the 
magic of things, such as is evidenced in Traps for Unbelievers, which – if it includes 
human sacrifice – could be interpreted as ‘reverence for all that is severe and harsh,’ 
as Nietzsche proposes in Beyond Good and Evil.330 However, Butts’ idea of magic 
and ritual sacrifice does not preclude the need for self-sacrifice, as I will show 
below. 
Butts’ journals further propound the fact that she was ultimately, and 
throughout her life, concerned with the inherent magic in objects, places, and people. 
This being the foundation of her belief, she went through several phases of interest in 
various systems of thought, from Aleister Crowley’s paganism during the early 
1920s to Anglo-Catholicism in the final years of her life. The autobiographical 
account The Crystal Cabinet attests to the establishment of Butts’ concern with 
magic in childhood. Her earliest memories include an experience of the natural 
environs of her home, Salterns, as a soulful, living creature, brought to life in the 
child’s eyes via magic; the house is ‘a place on the magic map a child makes of its 
home, apart from the green wood… a place about which, if I had been asked, I might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 Blaser, ‘Here lies the woodpecker who was Zeus,’ 212; 213. 
330 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 196. 
Sanna Melin Schyllert 
 150 
have said: “There are deads about it.”’331 She goes on to describe a scene in which 
she perceives a little man digging among the bushes, only to realise that the man is 
not really there, but is some sort of spectre or incarnation of nature. After this vision, 
she perceives a change in the wind, and is filled with a sense of mystery and 
sacrality: ‘These were matters you were supposed to hold your tongue about, as 
about things like that wind, and a goddess called Artemis who shot with the new 
moon.’332 Nature as holy in Butts’ fiction is a topic on which much has been and 
may be said, but here it is sufficient to note that the magic perceived in nature is 
deeply connected to a sense of meaningfulness for Butts; the magical qualities of 
nature are what make it spiritually significant.333 
According to her journals, Butts was not interested in the research of magical 
practices that entailed going about it in what she called a ‘direct’ way; on 15 March 
1921, she writes: ‘Is magic too direct an approach [to reach the astral plane]? All 
profound perception is in some way or seems to be in some way oblique. Then it is 
fruitful. Direct magical practice fatigues & rather disgusts me (I except [sic] the 
evocations & the earth pentagrams).’334 She did however take an initial liking to the 
occult philosophy of Thelema, and visited Aleister Crowley in Sicily in 1921. While 
unimpressed by Crowley’s leadership skills and distinctly opposed to certain parts of 
his practice, Butts appears to have found through her trip to Sicily an outlet for her 
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own creativity in getting to know the supernatural or astral realm through new 
avenues; she wished to do so in her own individual way.335 
Butts’ interest in alternative and archaic religious practices and beliefs has 
been well-researched in the past. Spanning from a belief in magic to a dedication to 
the study of anthropology, Butts’ writing – both fictional and non-fictional – covers 
a wide and diverse spectrum of religion. This is reflected in her treatment of 
sacrifice, the multifaceted nature of which I will demonstrate below. The following 
sections of this chapter look at the varieties of sacrifice in the novels, and how these 
relate to narrative technique, in order to establish the importance of narrative 
structure for the meaning and function of the sacrificial scenes. 
I argue that the variations in Butts’ depictions of sacrifice coincide with 
variations in the narration, and that it is the forms of narration rather than the acts 
themselves that control the success of the sacrifices. I deal with the three novels 
chronologically, starting with self-sacrifice in Ashe of Rings and its relation to Butts’ 
initial use of experiments in narration, moving on to look at instances of disorderly 
sacrifice in Armed with Madness and the disorder of its narration, through to a 
reading of Death of Felicity Taverner, where the structure of the embedded narrative 
creates a foundation for the successful structuring of a society through sacrifice. 
 
‘[T]he pictures in their minds’: Sacrifice, Multivocal Narration, and 
Intersubjectivity336 
I make a distinction between the three novels studied here based on the type of 
sacrifice depicted in them: scapegoating in Death of Felicity Taverner, disorderly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Blondel, Scenes from the Life, 99; 103-5. 
336 Butts, The Taverner Novels, 227. 
Sanna Melin Schyllert 
152 
sacrifice – sacrifice that lacks organisation and therefore does not have the desired 
effect – in Armed with Madness, and self-sacrifice in Ashe of Rings. While the 
different kinds of sacrifice do not exist in isolation in the respective novels, there are 
distinct types that are representative of each novel. The central focus here is on the 
way sacrifice specifically coheres with the narrative technique to which it is 
connected. 
Butts’ use of a variety of narrative techniques alternately represents the 
creation of community and communal experience as well as the destruction thereof 
in the depiction of both uninterrupted intersubjective storytelling – a mode of 
narration where several characters function as one cohesive voice – and the gaps and 
cracks that appear in the shared narrative flow. As outlined in chapter 1, the function 
of sacrifice as seen on a structural level is to create a space of intersubjectivity and 
thereby allow for a communal experience. Effective applications of this function, as 
well as less successful attempts to employ it, are revealed through the narrative 
technique employed in Ashe of Rings, Armed with Madness, and Death of Felicity 
Taverner, with an increasing clarity and self-consciousness of the correlation 
between narration and intersubjective experience from the first novel to the last. I 
start this exploration by looking at Ashe of Rings, in which ritual sacrifice 
unexpectedly takes an inward turn towards the self instead of being projected onto an 
object or scapegoat, but still retains what Butts perceived as the benefit of ritual 
sacrifice: reinstating the magic of communal tradition and belief.  
‘[T]hey can’t hurt my soul’: Ritual Self-Sacrifice in Ashe of Rings337 
337 Mary Butts, Ashe of Rings and Other Writings (Kingston: McPherson & 
Company, 1998), 188. 
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Butts’ works suggest that self-sacrifice and ritual sacrifice are not to be placed on 
two divergent ends of a spectrum, although the latter would appear to be the one 
most noticeable. In Ashe of Rings, the most prominent sacrificial scene depicts the 
killing of a dog, described as a ritual sacrifice, in conjunction with an attempted rape 
of the protagonist, Van Ashe, who in this situation is portrayed as performing a self-
sacrifice. The scene takes place on the Rings, a hill that is understood to be imbued 
with mystical and holy significance for the Ashe family, who live on an estate 
nearby. Instead of conferring a sacredness or holiness onto the characters involved, 
however, these acts are seen as attempts to defile the Rings; the perpetrators, Judy 
and Peter, are what could be described as frenemies – friends who are also enemies – 
of Van Ashe. 
Although the slaughter of Peter’s Airedale is described in terms of ritual 
sacrifice it is also rendered as a fairly random event, not properly planned out 
beforehand but rather thought of in the spur of the moment, according to Judy: ‘It 
[Rings] drinks blood. Give it a drink, and it works. We’ve given it a drink… We’ve 
given it Peter’s dog.’338 The second intended sacrifice – that of Van’s purity – is 
thought out on the spot when she appears on the scene. Far from being a well-
planned and regulated ritual, then, these sacrifices do not have the potential to right 
any wrongs or make order out of chaos, rather the contrary. Van points out the 
futility of this to Judy and Peter: ‘If you take my blood, it won’t give you power for 
ever…’339 Van, the spiritually superior individual, knows that there are certain laws 
to which the person performing the sacrifice must adhere in order to attain the 
desired result. 
338 Butts, Ashe of Rings, 186. 
339 Butts, Ashe of Rings, 187. 
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As the murderous pair realise that a human blood sacrifice will not be conducive to 
their ends, they devise a new plan: for Peter to rape Van. As this intention dawns on 
Van, she ponders what to do to save herself: ‘Move? Run? Run away? … That’s no 
good. … Wrap up in the light and lie still. Become part of this place, and they will 
only find a stone. Anyhow, they can’t hurt my soul.’340 She comes to the conclusion 
that she, having the upper hand on the spiritual plane, will trust herself to become 
immersed in Rings, her ancestral grounds. Even if they do hurt her bodily, her soul is 
immune to any distortion; she is too pure to be marred by their actions. 
Paradoxically, this is a simultaneous self-sacrifice and avoidance of sacrifice, as Van 
willingly surrenders – an attitude which frightens Peter and inexplicably renders Van 
invisible, thus putting an end to the act. Peter’s exasperation turns to fright as he 
hypothesises that the killing of the Airdale has made the Rings come alive: ‘“Where 
the devil have you got to? I won’t touch that stone. It’s alive – we woke it up earlier. 
I remember. The dog’s blood turning into a white poison and moving the stone. Oh, 
God!” She heard him crashing back, and wondered how she could ever have been 
afraid of him.’341 It is as though the self-immolation of Van in combination with the 
ritual sacrifice of the dog and the sacred nature of the Rings has such power over 
Peter that he either cannot bring himself to go through with the deed, and therefore 
claims not to see Van, or really cannot perceive her as separate from the stone, thus 
making the stone ‘alive’. 
Two examples of not only sanctification through sacrifice, but also a 
paradoxical resurrection, are Christ and the Fisher King, who both offer themselves 
up for the purpose of healing their respective communities, and are later restored to 
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the community. The legend of the Fisher King was a popular trope in early twentieth 
century literature partly due to Jessie Weston’s From Ritual to Romance, in which 
chapter IX is dedicated to the topic. Weston points to the similarities between Christ, 
the Fisher King, and other deities or semi-deities that are specifically connected with 
fish, for instance Vishnu in India and Guanyin in south-west China, hypothesising 
that the connection between fish and a renewal of life comes from an archaic 
understanding ‘that all life comes from the water.’342 
Giving herself up to the protection of the Rings, the holiest of places in Ashe 
of Rings, Van becomes sexually inviolate – Peter is rendered unable to rape her. 
Although it is not necessarily ‘timidity’ that effects Van’s purity, it is clear here that 
Butts equates her bodily immunity with her having a ‘pure’ mind or spirit, and with 
sexual abstinence. Andrew Radford’s contention that ‘Butts refuses to equate the 
“purity” of her natal habitation with female sexual restraint or timidity,’ which is 
certainly true for Scylla and Felicity Taverner who are both explicitly sexually active 
characters, seems to be a little out of place here.343 While she has not been sexually 
restrained or ‘timid’ up to this point, she does not engage in any apparent physical 
encounters after this event. 
As has been suggested, the Nietzschean idea of sacrifice given in for instance 
Beyond Good and Evil is not wholly concordant with that which is portrayed in the 
novels studied, despite references to Nietzsche being strewn throughout Butts’ work. 
Van, in giving herself up to the wilful violence of Peter and Judy, cannot be said to 
embody the Nietzschean idea of self-sacrifice as a sign of weakness. Van’s 
characterisation does not propose that ‘self-renunciation must be … brought to 	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court,’ although it does appear to contain ‘sorcery,’ since it can make her turn to 
stone.344 Nietzsche posits that ‘egoism pertains to the essence of a noble soul, I mean 
the immovable faith that to a being such as “we are” other beings have to be 
subordinate by their nature, and sacrifice themselves to us.’345 According to this 
philosophy, anyone who performs an act of self-sacrifice automatically becomes 
subjugated. In Ashe of Rings, however, the self-sacrificial act is portrayed as 
empowering; it allows Van to exude a spiritual advantage. Relinquishing the self 
results in Van becoming empowered. 
More importantly, the scene shows how sacrifice can successfully blur the 
boundaries between violence by one individual upon another and violence upon the 
self. The event attempts to be both a ritual sacrifice and a self-sacrificial gesture, in 
which the intended victim offers herself up willingly, but her sacrifice is cancelled 
out by the earlier act of killing Peter’s dog. It further has hedonist implications in 
that the intended sacrifice has a sexual component, which muddles the distinction 
between where a willing self-sacrifice ends and hedonism begins. 
In 1917 Butts made a note in her diary of a quote by St Augustine: ‘Love – & 
do what you like.’346 The entry, along with several others written in the preceding 
months, is about Butts’ unwillingness to choose between her two lovers John 
Rodker, who was to become her first husband, and Eleanor Rogers, who – according 
to Natalie Blondel – was the real-life counterpart of Judy in Ashe of Rings.347 To 
complicate things further, Butts had a third love interest at the time, Edwin 	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Greenwood, an actor and writer. In her journal, Butts relates a discussion with 
Greenwood on ‘attempts to resolve the antithesis between good & evil, pleasure & 
pain’, where Edwin’s ‘deepest philosophy seems to me to be a form of stoicism, 
even asceticism’, which Butts calls ‘the lost way.’348 Her own way causes 
Greenwood to criticise her: ‘Edwin accuses me of hedonism because I accept 
everything as it approaches me, & if I must choose, choose where there is least 
renunciation for any part of my nature.’349 This sounds like an unequivocal rejection 
of a self-sacrificial attitude. However, she goes on to say that ‘I too have my 
inevitable asceticism … a classic asceticism perhaps as against an eastern or a 
medieval.’350 Quoting Murray’s Rise of the Greek Epic, Butts explains the 
distinction:  
 
The East took its asceticism in orgies as it were, in horrors of self mutilation, 
bodily & mental, which are as repellent in their way as the corresponding 
tempests of rage or sensuality. Greek asceticism, though sometimes mystical, 
was never insane. It was nearly always related to some reasonable end & 
sought the strengthening of body & mind, not their mortification.351 
 
Instead of choosing between hedonism and asceticism, Butts proposes what her 
actual ‘yard-stick for all conduct’ is: sophrosynê. It is not possible to say whether 
Butts in her journal promotes either hedonism or asceticism; rather, the journal 
indicates that there are crossover points between self-sacrifice and self-indulgence, 
and that Butts was more interested in a way of moderation that is not normally 
considered in looking at her life and work. The issue of Butts’ apparent hedonism 
seems to raise a problem for scholarly work that takes her personal life into account, 	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since she is often perceived as having an extremely indulgent and irresponsible 
lifestyle. For instance, leaving her daughter Camilla to be taken care of by her aunts 
is referred to by her otherwise supportive biographer Natalie Blondel as an act of 
self-indulgence. Blondel is throughout very critical of Butts as a mother and states 
that ‘it is no exaggeration to say that Camilla’s childhood was sacrificed to Mary 
Butts’s writing.’352 It could just as well be argued that it was an act of love and 
sacrifice to entrust her child to be brought up in a safe and comfortable environment 
away from Butts herself, who, in the 1920s, had little money, uncertain living 
conditions, and an addiction to opium. 
Judy’s thirst for blood, as opposed to Van’s humility, is indicative of her 
being a symbol of violence rather than sanctity. The sacrifices that Judy encourages, 
plans, or executes are all unsuccessful sacrifices, in that they do not accomplish 
order or make things holy. In contrasting the nature of Judy and Van, as well as the 
respective ways in which the two characters view and deal with sacrifice, Butts 
shows not only the two seemingly irreconcilable sides to sacrifice converging in 
Van’s sacrifice on the Rings, but also that for a sacrifice to be successful, it has to 
cohere with a wider scheme than that which is made up to suit only one individual – 
Judy in this case. 
Although the main character in Ashe of Rings is not explicitly crucified or 
killed, Van Ashe and her kin are compared to Christ on several occasions. The most 
striking parallel is with her ancestor Florian Ashe, who was crucified: ‘There was 
one of us once who was hated. They came and found him there. They took him and 
made him wear a crown of thorns. … There they crucified him – or rather they 
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nailed him onto the wall.’353 When Anthony Ashe, Van’s father, tells the story to 
Melitta, her mother, she asks hesitantly if it was ‘quite like the Crucifixion,’ to which 
Anthony responds: ‘Like enough.’354 The words of the long dead Florian Ashe, cited 
by Anthony, directly addresses the similarity: ‘He said to them… You have forced on 
me the likeness of our Saviour; so in my own name, I forgive you.’355 Unlike Scylla 
in Armed with Madness, Florian Ashe does die on the cross, if not willingly, then at 
least resignedly. Towards the end of the novel, the likeness to Christ is expressed 
again, outside of the normal dialogue – without inverted commas – and rather self-
consciously, as Van and Melitta decide to stick a knife, the same blade that Judy 
previously thrusts through the basket of the first-borns of the Ashes, into the stone 
tower onto which Florian Ashe was once nailed: ‘Spear in Christ’s side. Oh damn 
analogies.’356 
Serge, a white émigré from Russia, is another character that seems to be 
made into a Christ figure in the novel; ‘[i]t is [his] function’ to be killed by Judy, or 
so he himself sees it.357 Van also recognises him as a martyr, since she refers to what 
Judy has done to him as similar to Florian Ashe’s crucifixion: ‘It is like a cruel thing 
I saw done at the foot of a tower.’358 Despite Serge’s apparent willingness to be 
sacrificed – ‘[p]erhaps I want to be broken’ – Van does not approve of this 
martyrdom: ‘You’ll miss spectacular martyrdom… You are looking for your 
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cricifixion [sic]. It is not sophrôn.’359 She suspects that Serge is ‘acquiring merit 
through a sexual and political martyrdom,’ and therefore resists his sacrifice because 
it is not made for holy purposes: ‘He was not to be allowed to die.’360 When Serge 
falls ill, having caught a chill from being turned out onto the street by Judy, Van 
comes to his apartment and nurses him back to health, and the image of her putting 
him to bed is described as ‘a flying pietà.’361 She manages to counteract the 
trajectory that Judy intended for Serge through her caregiving efforts. She tells him: 
‘You died and you are come alive again. You are born again.’362 Despite her 
previous statements, this line proposes Serge’s affinity with Christ – also understood 
as a victim of ritual sacrifice here – having suffered death and been resurrected to 
life again. 
While Serge’s role as a sacrificial figure mainly appears to relate to the war, 
the sacrifices made by the Ashe family all focus on another object: the survival and 
maintenance of the Rings themselves. Before Florian’s death, ‘he strained about and 
said: I cannot see the Rings,’ implying that the sacrifice he made was for the Rings, a 
hypothesis that is strengthened throughout the novel as it is gradually made clear that 
all the sacrifices made by the Ashes are for the benefit of their place of origin.363 At 
the very beginning of the novel, when Anthony ponders the trouble of taking a new 
wife in order to gain a descendant to which he will leave the estate, he thinks of the 
marriage as ‘[a] livery sacrifice to this place.’364 Van’s sacrifices are also ultimately 	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made with the intention of regaining the power of the Rings, and, by bringing them 
back to their rightful owner, reinstating their former glory. The scene where she 
gives herself up to Peter on the Rings is usually read as a sacrifice with the purpose 
of purifying the Rings, which were defiled by the love affair between Amburton and 
Melitta.365 The end goal of the act is to restore the Rings to their proper state, and the 
magic of the place is instrumental in helping Van to win over Peter and Judy. She 
tells them: ‘The Rings will betray you, you amateur invocators!’366 Van is 
untouchable, as the environment protects her where she lies ‘in the cradle of 
Rings.’367 Afterwards, Van feels the strength of her ancestral home and senses that 
the tide has turned: ‘The wall’s rumbling down that keeps us out of paradise. The 
house is laughing. I am beautiful. I have the Rings to play with. I have power.’368 
Her self-sacrifice strengthens the Rings, and the Rings give her back the power she 
has given to them, which allows her self-realisation as the rightful owner of the land 
at the end of the novel. 
Van even personifies Rings, when she says to Serge: ‘Love it, Serge, love it. 
It loves me.’369 Rings belong to her, and she belongs to them; her mother Melitta 
thinks of Rings as the creator of both herself and her children: ‘Rings that made me. 
Rings that gave me clean children.’370 The name Van is not the first name she is 
given at birth, but rather the name that she is given by Rings; in childhood, her father 	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teaches her that it is only when she goes to the holy places on the estate that she is 
‘called Van.’371 The sacrifices Van makes that benefit Rings thereby constitute a 
simultaneous self-realisation for Van, because she is identified with the place for 
which she makes the sacrifice. In this way, the Hegelian idea of self-sacrifice 
equating self-realisation comes true even in a narrative such as the one Butts 
constructs here, which is more readily associated with ritual sacrifice. When Van 
relinquishes her power to the Rings, and lets them protect her from bodily harm, she 
is repaid twofold: firstly by managing to avoid being hurt by Peter and Judy, and 
secondly by re-establishing the purity of the sacred place with which she has an 
innate affinity.  
Through sacrifice, then, Van dissolves the boundaries between self and other, 
or rather her self and her environment, in order to reset the borders of Rings as her 
inheritance and thereby reinstate order. This temporary suspension of boundaries is 
reflected in the narrative technique that Butts first starts to use here, where shifts in 
the personal pronouns used by the narrator suggest a fluid narrative persona, or a 
movement from within the consciousness of one character to an intersubjective 
consciousness, which belongs to one and all simultaneously. I will demonstrate 
below how this technique is developed in the later novels. First, however, I outline 
the beginnings of Butts’ use of experiments with narrative form in Ashe of Rings. 
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‘How dare you murder me?’ The Beginnings of Narrative Experimentation in Ashe 
of Rings372 
Ashe of Rings appears to be a work from which Butts herself felt that she needed a 
little distance; she wrote in her 1933 afterword, eight years after the first edition of 
the novel, that ‘[o]ne sees now what it is – a fairy story, a War-fairy-tale.’373 In 
relation to the Taverner novels, Ashe of Rings does come across as more of a 
fairytale, with its more reader-friendly language, straightforward narrative structure, 
and happy ending. But even in this early work, there are germs of the experimental 
techniques that Butts would develop in the later novels. 
 In some ways, Ashe of Rings is less clear than the subsequent works; in 
Armed with Madness, Butts makes use of both single and double quotation marks to 
distinguish between characters’ thoughts and the words that they actually speak out 
loud. Here, however, the inner dialogue of characters are sometimes given without 
inverted commas in the narration, for instance when Melitta’s mother comes to visit 
the family when Van is a baby: ‘Melitta said: “Please Mother, do come. So long as 
you let me know before.” Now let Anthony go to the nursery with them if he 
liked.’374 The final sentence is in the narrative voice with Melitta as focaliser. This 
technique is not only reminiscent but more or less a copy of the experimental style 
first used by Dorothy Richardson and James Joyce; Butts comments in her journal 
that she was indeed ‘tight on Joyce at the time’ of writing Ashe of Rings.375 
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At other times in the novel however, Butts makes use of the technique that has been 
discussed at length in the first chapter of this thesis: switching the personal pronoun 
of the narrative voice: ‘She was going up there to commit adultery. On the Rings. 
She wondered if there was a chance for her to come down reasonably virgin. What 
do I want? This man, and to be quite pure. Go on, and get it over.’376 The scene is 
crucial as it lets the reader follow Melitta’s reasoning prior to her infidelity with 
Maurice Amburton, which is understood to be a defilement of the Rings. 
Interestingly, we learn that she chooses the Rings as the place for which to go 
through with the act because of her wish to remain pure. What she fails to 
understand is that, instead of the Rings keeping her ‘virgin,’ she becomes a 
destructive influence on the Rings, as she pollutes them through her liaison with 
Amburton. The shift of personal pronoun from ‘she’ to ‘I’ is relatively 
straightforward here, and does not yield much confusion. In the later works, the 
pronoun shifts become more frequent and marked, with more obscurity surrounding 
the identity of the speaker than in this example. Rather than being a marker of 
intersubjectivity through sacrifice here, the shift appears a direct indication of 
internal focalisation. 
There are a few instances of the second person being used in the focalised 
narration, without inverted commas, but these are generally no cause for interpreting 
the section as anything but a character thinking to itself. In this example for instance, 
the ‘you’ is easily interpreted: ‘He [Evans, Van’s teacher] thought: A fever runs in 
these people. If you nurse their imagination, you raise insoluble terrors.’377 The fact 
that these are Evans’ thoughts is clearly stated, which means that the lack of inverted 
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commas is not confusing or disruptive to the reader. The ‘you’ is an obvious 
reference to Evans himself, since he is at that very moment trying to balance his 
instruction to Van so as not to further cultivate her already overly active imagination. 
In another instance of a shift to the second person pronoun, the meaning and 
purpose of the shift is different, but it is no less clear. The scene depicts Judy and 
Serge talking about the war in France, of which Judy is an adamant supporter. Serge 
speaks to her about his pacifist point of view, remarking: ‘“Can’t you see that it 
would be as ridiculous for me to uphold this war as for you not to do so? No?” Oh 
my dear, your pretty dress is spotted with blood.’378 Serge’s thought, while it 
remains unspoken, is still directed towards Judy. It is apparent that she is the ‘you’ 
referred to here; her aggressive, pro-war stance has already been established. The 
image of a pretty dress covered with blood stains further emphasises Serge’s uneasy 
and conflicted feelings towards her, as he finds her both attractive and heartless. He 
also addresses Van in his thoughts, as though she is speaking to him within his own 
consciousness: ‘Van, be quiet…. Love… Love, shake me out of this.’379 In the same 
way, Serge addresses Judy on another occasion when she is not there, explicitly 
stating that she occupies him internally: ‘You came with the war – you are inside 
me, playing its infernal tunes. … How dare you murder me? It’s no good. I must 
have you. It is my function.’380 The self-sacrificial ‘function’ of Serge mentioned 
earlier is here conflated with the infiltration of Judy into his consciousness, 
emphasising the association of sacrifice with intersubjectivity. 
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The play on pronouns reflects the power struggle between characters, as Serge 
continues his inner dialogue with Judy, which runs in the frame narration without 
inverted commas, throughout their spoken interaction as an undercurrent of 
commentary thought: ‘Judy, my love, you are an abominable hell. You are a pitiful, 
blind lamb. You are my peace. There is no peace. He said: “There is truth, but there 
is no peace.”’381 Occasionally, his thoughts turn on himself: ‘Why do I do this? … 
Why do I endure this? Then he said: “I am quite strong enough to rape you.”’382 In 
this way, the powerplay between the characters is in this instance mainly portrayed 
from Serge’s side; he controls the narrative from within himself, as he is allowed the 
preference of being the focaliser here. 
Judy does however focalise the narrative on occasion, but despite allowing 
her this space, the narrative is still clearly not sympathetic towards her. The purpose 
of her focalisation is not to make her motives understandable or justifiable, but rather 
it has the function of making her out to be a monster. Her inner dialogue does not 
unveil any ameliorating circumstance that explains her acts, but only shows her 
feelings of spite against Van: ‘I’m as jealous of her as hell. She shall decrease. … 
We shall ransack Rings: A competence acquired, I might practise virtue.’383 Judy – a 
character who has more likeness to a vampire than a human, as she ‘must be fed on 
blood’ – is thus portrayed as a thoroughly disagreeable character even when she is 
the ostensible focaliser of a segment.384 A certain suspicion towards any claim to a 
neutral omniscience may therefore be levelled at the narrative, which is undoubtably 
coloured by a preference for Van’s side of the story. 	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Van’s internal dialogue after the scene on the Rings with Peter and Judy suggests a 
further move of the narrative voice to one that is situated within the character, but is 
yet removed from it, as it addresses itself in the second person. The dialogue aims at 
establishing a narrative around Van’s sacrifices and providing her with a rationale 
for her actions: ‘He is my beloved. For him I trod out our jungle. I levelled it and set 
it for love. He is a grey, maimed, young man walking away. Be cheerful. Why 
should you embarrass him? … Van, you saw what Judy and Peter meant. You faced 
them. It’s done and we’re alive.’385 The plural ‘we’ may of course be read as 
referring to Van and Serge, but it is also possible to read it as Van referring to herself 
in the plural – her reference to herself by name makes the latter reading more 
plausible. 
Towards the end of the novel, there is a longer section of internal dialogue, 
without inverted commas and thus intertwined with the narration, which also 
includes pronoun shifts between first, second, and third person. Serge is the 
focaliser, on his way from the train station to Rings, discussing with himself what to 
do about his situation with Van and Judy. The purpose of such a lengthy quotation as 
the one below is to show how the shifts fluctuate back and forth between he, you, 
and I, within one scene containing a sole character. The effect is that of the kind of 
stream of consciousness that is displayed in Pointed Roofs (1915) or A Portrait of 
the Artist as a Young Man (1916), rather than the more extreme version of the 
technique used in Ulysses (1922). 
 
He turned his horse into a lane. Ride alone, look down from your horse. … 
You wanted to want her, but you don’t. Go back to your painting. Of course I 
shall go back and paint. … I’ve not done with Judy yet. He saw her on a 
green sofa… He heard himself speaking to himself. Must I? Must I? Yes. … 	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What shall I say? Hullo, and ride away. They leave me alone now. He left the 
sunk lane and rode over a field… All the evil on earth is contained in a small 
house, built anywhere. Once you go in, you pass from curiosity to curiosity; 
you find something and then you sit down and watch yourself disappear. … 
D’you see that red harrow and through it the young blades? And the cushions 
in Judy’s room are those colours, that are waiting for me. Get along with you 
into that barn.’386 
 
The third person narrative voice stating that Serge ‘heard himself speaking to 
himself’ means that besides the levels of consciousness that are represented by the 
three personal pronouns he (self as distanced object), you (self as proximate object), 
and I (self as subject), there is a parallel understanding of these levels within the 
character himself. If Serge (he) hears himself (I) talking to himself (you), it is 
possible for him to be simultaneously aware of occupying both the subject and the 
object roles at once. The dissolution of strict boundaries around the self as subject is 
further indicated by Serge’s assertion that he sees himself ‘disappear.’ 
Ashe of Rings displays a first, tentative step towards the dissolution of a 
contained, subjective narrative self, through its play with shifts in personal pronouns. 
Rochelle Rives recognises this dissolution of the self as a typically modernist trait: 
‘A more reflexive and ethically self-conscious version of Pound’s imagism, Butts’s 
impersonal modernism affirms the proximity of subject and object, dispelling fixed 
identity in favor of a more soluble sense of self.’387 Dissolving the boundary between 
subject and object is a fundamental feature of Butts’ narrative technique, which 
results in the same transcendence as the sacrificial act. Once the boundaries are 
questioned, they can be reset again, but they may not be in exactly the same place as 
before – things will have changed in the process. As chapter 1 shows, in annihilating 
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the self, the self is also realised, albeit in a different form. This will be further 
explored as I will show how fluidity of the narrative self increases in the Taverner 
novels. In the two following subsections, I will look at instances of sacrifice in 
Armed with Madness that have a tendency toward disorder, and show that this is 
related to the disorganised nature of the narration in the novel. 
 
‘You’re going down the well’: Disorderly Sacrifice in Armed with Madness388 
Armed with Madness contains several instances of disorderly sacrifice, and, 
significantly, the novel also lacks a coherent embedded narrative controlled by the 
characters. As previously mentioned, these demarcations between the types of 
sacrifice that are read into the different novels are not absolute; for example, the 
murder of Kralin in Death of Felicity Taverner, to which I will return, can be read as 
a disorderly sacrificial event, and it is possible to conceive of Scylla’s crucifixion as 
a form of scapegoating, but neither of these reflections are particularly fruitful. 
Kralin’s murder is not unplanned, but premeditated and prepared for by a group of 
people; the intention of Scylla’s crucifixion is not to blame one individual for the 
evil within a community and then exterminate her, but rather to blame one individual 
for the problems of another individual. I will return to the details of this event in my 
discussion below. 
A more ambiguous instance from Armed with Madness, in many ways due to 
its disordered nature, is that of Picus Tracy – son of the landowner at a neighbouring 
estate and Scylla’s lover – as a scapegoat. His motives are called into question 
during the hunt for the Holy Grail. The group initially turns against him, as it is 
believed that he has stolen the cup that is the supposed Grail and subsequently made 	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up a story about it in order to establish it as the holy vessel, thus playing a ‘little 
game to make you think something of yourselves and let you down,’ as Carston puts 
it.389 After the group has confronted him with various accusations, to which he 
responds that ‘[y]ou are all a pack of old women intriguing against me,’ it transpires 
that it is actually Picus’ father who has ‘done the lying.’390 Clarence sums up the 
situation by stating that ‘[w]e don’t seem to have cleaned up anything.’391 The 
blaming and consequent exclusion of Picus does not go as planned because the 
communal narrative – that is, the representation of the group’s collective ideology – 
does not support the view of Picus as a scapegoat; therefore stability is not restored 
to the group. 
There are disparate comments made by various characters that indicate a 
premature intention and desire for an embedded narrative – that is, a discourse or 
belief system that has validity within the group – to be created. This germ could have 
grown into a fully formed basis for the scapegoating of Picus, but only if someone 
had seized control of the story. As it is, these comments do no more than start the 
process, by initiating a plot to lay the blame of the group’s ‘disease’ on Picus. The 
most obvious example is a conversation between Scylla and Ross, in which Scylla 
makes the offhand remark that they will ‘get home with some martyrdom in hand,’ 
referring to the fact that they have a long walk back ahead of them, but also with the 
possible intention toward a scheme or story involving martyrdom; Ross’ sinister 
response to this is suggestive of the secondary meaning: ‘He stood with his head 
flung up, his mouth stretching into its wild-animal smile. With violent, silent 
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amusement, he said: “It’s beginning.”’392 If this embedded narrative had not only 
begun but continued to fruition, a successful sacrifice is likely to have followed. 
The scapegoating of Picus is not prepared for and maintained in this novel in 
the way that the scapegoating of Kralin is in Death of Felicity Taverner, despite 
Scylla distinctly identifying him as a scapegoat by calling him ‘Kingfisher.’393 The 
difference between the novels, however, is consistency and authoritarian control; the 
embedded narrative needs to be fashioned according to a coherent and organised 
structure that paves the way for a justification of the scapegoating. Laying the blame 
on Picus does entail a certain prologue that is created in conversation between the 
other characters. Carston’s initial dislike of Picus due to his own desire for Scylla 
leads him to start the accusation, but there is no clear leader of the group who takes 
charge of and controls the narrative. Carston retracts his attitude after having met 
Picus’ father, but by then he has told Clarence of the relationship between Picus and 
Scylla, which results in Clarence’s hostility towards them both.394 Felix also feels 
betrayed because he thinks he has been lied to and therefore throws a book on the 
fire that may or may not have proved the legitimacy of the cup: ‘I burnt the damned 
thing when Carston told me that you and Picus were playing us up.’395 Ross is 
described as inclined towards malice due to an inner deficiency and seems thereby to 
enjoy the spread of hatred for its own sake: ‘In Ross’s heart there twisted ache and 
dislike.’396 None of them, however, is motivated to pursue the course of 
scapegoating to its end. The story of Picus as villain is thus left to drift aimlessly 	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through the intersubjective consciousness of the characters; the scapegoating is 
disorganised and ultimately unsuccessful. If the embedded narrative is disorderly, 
the sacrificial acts will be disorderly as well. Below, I will return to the issue of how 
this is displayed through the narrative technique used in Armed with Madness. 
The crucifixion of Scylla is another failed sacrifice in Armed with Madness. 
While the scene depicts Scylla being tied to an effigy by Clarence, who proceeds to 
shoot at her with a bow and arrow, the narrative stops short of actually fulfilling the 
blood sacrifice, as Clarence falls asleep before he manages to do Scylla any mortal 
harm. The scene points to the uselessness of a sacrifice unfulfilled; Scylla is neither 
killed nor expelled from the group. Rather, it is Clarence whose status within the 
community is called into question by the ensuing communal narrative. Picus 
comments that ‘[h]is head’s all wrong,’ and that he ‘went off the deep-end again,’ 
emphasising that Clarence’s deed is not approved by the group, and that it should be 
regarded as the act of an individual who has stepped out of line.397 Jane Garrity 
argues that ‘Butts presents Scylla as a martyr to the cause of racial purity and 
heterosexual procreativity; the substitutive logic of the novel dictates that she, as a 
living emblem of the Grail … must displace the homosexual coupling of Clarence 
and Picus because it represents only reproductive failure.’398 While the novel clearly 
favours the relationship between Scylla and Picus over that of Picus and Clarence, 
there are no obvious references to reproduction; in fact, Scylla and Picus, while 
married in Death of Felicity Taverner, are not depicted as producing any heirs to 
either of their family estates. The assumption that Scylla is martyred for the benefit 
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of the land, due to her intrinsically belonging to it, and it to her, is rather based on 
her individual ties with nature, not on her capacity for reproduction.  
Scylla’s crucifixion is a failure, then, in two ways; she does not die, and the 
person who attempts to sacrifice her is seen as mentally unstable rather than a 
saviour and organiser of the community and its narrative. The obvious parallel to 
what is arguably the most famous image of sacrifice in Western culture is indicative 
of Butts’ tendency to place women at the centre of power and significance. 
Clarence’s treatment of Scylla towards the end of the story mirrors that of the 
Romans’ handling of Christ, as he ties her onto an effigy and wounds her on the 
forehead, in the arms and just below the ribs. Commenting on these events in 
retrospect, Picus explicitly mentions to Clarence that ‘you must have thought you 
were Apollo, or a roman official with an early christian [sic].’399 Clearly, there is an 
awareness of the theme of sacrifice displayed within the text, which is expressed by 
the characters. This overt play with mythology and ritual sacrifice is also shown by 
having Clarence tell Scylla before her crucifixion that he intends to throw her ‘down 
the well’, conjuring images of the story of Joseph and his brothers in Genesis, Saint 
Sebastian, and the Mayan sacrificial well at Chichén Itzá.400 As Scylla is strung up 
on the clay statue, Clarence shoots arrows at her with a bow and string, which is 
reminiscent of both Saint Sebastian and Mayans rituals of human sacrifice.401 In the 
last moments before Scylla faints, she goes ‘into a state, a clarté the other side of 
forgiveness.’402 This further suggests a parallel with stories of Christian martyrs who 	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make their peace with their executioners before death, following the figure of Christ 
himself and his expression of forgiveness toward his crucifiers in Luke 23:34. 
Clarence’s violence is directed towards Scylla as his romantic rival for Picus’ 
affections. Scylla’s involvement with Picus, and Picus’ previous involvement with 
and subsequent rejection of Clarence, is the reason for the violence to which she is 
subjected. However, it is Scylla who comes out on top of the situation, whereas 
Clarence is forced to admit to having been ‘off the deep-end’ and, later, feeling 
‘shame and anger mounting’ and the need to ‘have somewhere to hide … while 
Picus was with Scylla and she enjoyed the reward of warriors.’403 Scylla has 
evidently won this battle; not only by, as Barbara O’Brien Wagstaff suggests, 
bringing ‘about a stronger community by feeling past her fear and Clarence’s hatred 
to “a clarté the other side of forgiveness,”’ but through the narrative’s silencing of 
Clarence, and discrediting his version of the story by labelling him as mentally ill.404 
While this scene depicts Scylla taking on the role as a Christ figure, and a 
sacrificial object, elsewhere in the novel there are hints to suggest that she should not 
be seen as a martyr. In a narratorial comment, Carston’s notion of Scylla as a martyr 
as well as ‘the naïveté of his cult for women’ are described as mistaken: ‘He had 
made a martyr of a person who was not a martyr…’405 The narrator thereby points 
away from a picture of Scylla as a figure who might embody the saintly virtues 
normally connected with the image of martyrdom in general and Christ in particular, 
which is further emphasised by her character flaws and overt sexuality; the 
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references to her as ‘sometimes a witch and sometimes a bitch’ add to this.406 Also, 
the narrative stops short of actually fulfilling the sacrifice, as Clarence falls asleep 
before he manages to do Scylla mortal harm. Elizabeth Anderson proposes that 
Scylla is ‘fluctuating between a desire to support her masculine companions and a 
resistance to sacrificing herself on their behalf,’ and this does indeed appear to be the 
case at the outset of the novel, when Scylla has to receive Carston on her own as 
Felix and Ross go to pick mushrooms on the day of his arrival, but only with 
reference to a secular, everyday kind of sacrifice, unrelated to any transcendent 
experience.407 When it comes to the crucifixion, Scylla is explicitly unwilling to be 
offered up as a martyr to Clarence, as she thinks when she realises the danger: ‘Run 
away: Can’t: Where to?’408 She then lies about marrying Carston in order to divert 
Clarence’s jealousy, which is focussed on Picus, because ‘[c]ruelty frightened her. 
…she shrieked, and flung Clarence off, and ran to the statue.’409 Unfortunately, 
Clarence is both quicker and stronger than her. 
Rather than point to the martyrdom of Scylla, then, the novel can be read as 
suggesting Clarence as the scapegoat. Initially, he is described as a ‘martyred ass’ in 
passing.410 The scene highlights Clarence’s inability to deal with the pain and 
frustration he feels. His fury is born from the shell-shock that has afflicted him since 
the First World War, causing him to experience intense feelings of anxiety. He is 
described as having a worm inside a nut in his brain, ‘the worm boring and making a 
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wild pain that made a wild dream.’411 His ‘wild’ dreams prior to the crucifixion are 
about murdering one version of Picus in order to have the real version of the man: 
‘Picus was dead, and he was glad he was dead and it was over. The difficulty was to 
get rid of the body, which was coming alive somewhere else and following him. … 
It wasn’t till the dead Picus was in the sea, that the real one would come out of the 
hills and play with him.’412 In yet another of the novel’s twists and turns on the 
theme of sacrifice, Picus is the one that has to be killed for Clarence and him to 
fulfill their union. He hopes that ‘[s]ome day Picus would take off his cap to him,’ 
which further implies a longing for power of the subjugated man, a wish that remains 
unfulfilled at the end of the novel.413 
The text comments on Clarence’s helplessness in dealing with this problem 
by indicating his lack of belief in a higher purpose: ‘Perhaps he was the man who 
had suffered most from the disbelief and disuse of all forms of religion. … Incapable 
of Ross’s and Scylla’s faith that there was a faith, with all its pains and invisibility, 
unquestioned as air. … all that he had then was a suspicion that this was the 
punishment of a neglected set of gods.’414 Evidently, Clarence is suffering, not only 
from the shell-shock, but also from the disillusionment that the war had brought to 
those who had lived through its horrors. As he is unable to deal with the war trauma, 
his anxiety grows stronger and eventually turns into episodes of psychosis. In order 
to get over his psychotic state and return to normal, he needs to act out his frustration 
and inflict pain on someone else. The purpose of harming Scylla is to free Clarence 
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of his demons; that is, to offer her as a sacrifice to his ‘neglected set of gods’ in order 
for him to regain his sanity. 
However, a victim cannot be sacrificed for the benefit of one individual, as in 
the case of Clarence wanting to crucify Scylla in order to rid himself of demons, 
unless the communal narrative supports the act; sacrifice has to be validated by the 
story that the community tells about itself. None of the other sacrificial events that 
occur in the novels are upheld and maintained by the discourse of the characters in 
the way that the scapegoating of Kralin in Death of Felicity Taverner is, which is 
why they fail. The key difference lies in the way that the community perceives itself; 
it needs a coherent, intersubjective narrative – the embedded narrative for the reader 
of the novel – that paves the way for a justification of a sacrifice. 
It is clear that, in Armed with Madness, scapegoating, crucifixion, and other 
miscellaneous references to sacrificial acts are essentially disorderly in nature. Not 
being directed with a clear purpose towards a specific aim, the sacrifices are 
unsuccessful in the sense that they have no structuring effect. This is reflected in the 
multivocal narration of the novel, which I will explore in the following subsection.  
 
‘I’ve been so awfully misunderstood’: The Multivocal Narrative in Armed with 
Madness415 
Armed with Madness implies a further step taken in the direction to which Ashe of 
Rings points. The increase in concern with community as opposed to the fate of 
individual characters is indicated by the narrative voice becoming progressively 
equal in sympathy to all its focalisers, rather than being evidently in favour of one 
side in an oppositional pair, as with Van and Judy in Ashe of Rings. Furthermore, the 	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purpose of the Grail hunt is to resolve that ‘something in their lives’ which is 
‘spoiled and inconclusive like the Grail story,’ that is, to make sense of life in an era 
of disbelief and postwar trauma.416 
However, for the Grail to have such a purpose, the community has to 
establish its meaning in a coherent, shared narrative. As I have suggested, the 
characters in Armed with Madness do not succeed in crafting such a narrative; they 
all have different purposes and goals for the intended collective narrative, and none 
of them is given an exclusive leadership role. The result is not only that the 
scapegoating of Picus is unsuccessful, but that the purpose of the Grail is unclear. 
Dudley Carston’s role as an outsider should make him the ideal scapegoat, 
but for some reason, he never comes close to being regarded as one. Is this because 
he is completely disassociated from the group? The difference between him and 
Kralin in Death of Felicity Taverner is that Kralin has married into the group and is 
thereby given power with which to threaten it; he would not have been able to lay his 
hands on Felicity’s land and her papers, that is, her story, if he had not been her 
husband. Carston does not promote any narrative of his own, and does not appear to 
have the power to threaten the Taverner narrative. Only on one occasion is it 
intimated that he may do damage to them by ‘add[ing] an episode to what Felix calls 
the family horror,’ gossip, but Scylla takes the matter calmly: ‘At worst he’ll leave 
and blast my reputation for a bit. What of that?’417 The story Carston may tell is not 
one that will do much damage, and it seems probable that it would not be the first 
time Scylla has such stories told about her. This shows that the question of who is in 
control of the narrative is crucially linked to sacrifice – had Carston been a contender 
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for control of the narrative, he may well have become a scapegoat, or, had he been 
successfully in control of the narrative, he may have followed through on and 
completed the scapegoating of Picus. 
Despite Scylla’s suspicion that Carston may speak ill of her – a reasonable 
thing to surmise as he comes to the Taverners ‘with elaborations of the best gossip’ – 
the man himself gives no indications of being able to construct a narrative.418 He 
claims to ‘have no memories,’ a dubious statement after learning of his propensity to 
gossip, and even more so after his threat to ‘tell people … what I think of you.’419 It 
is however clear that even if Carston does have something to say, the surrounding 
milieu is not the right setting for his narrative: ‘They listened to him … At the same 
time there was something that spoiled his effects. It was the place…’420 Carston is 
out of place, and is therefore forced to take on the role of observer rather than that of 
controlling the narrative. His experience of the English countryside is apart from any 
that he has had before in either America or Europe: ‘That theatre was as another 
earth, and the plays were not a prologue to his play. …he did not know his part. … 
Lost in a green transparent world, he was blind.’421 In the end, Carston does a rather 
good job of contriving his part in the ensuing drama, as he rescues Scylla from 
Clarence, even though ‘it isn’t his game here.’422 But even though he fits into and is 
attracted to parts of the Taverner lifestyle, he is not convinced of their version of the 
truth, in particular the holy nature of the cup in the well: ‘If he could have believed 
in their belief of the possibility of a possible sanctity, gone down to them and said: 	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“Here is something precious,” he would have walked into their hearts. But that 
would not have served him, because he did not want their hearts. … Wanted 
scalps.’423 Even though Carston, like Boris in Death of Felicity Taverner, may be 
able to figure out how to ingratiate himself, unlike Boris he does not have the 
dexterity of mind or spirit to assimilate to and take full part in the intersubjective 
group narrative. Instead, he reacts with anger and violent thoughts to their idea of 
sanctity. 
Carston does not have enough previous mythical knowledge to help him find 
his footing within the Taverner group, which makes him not only angry, but 
confused and powerless, and thereby unable to pose any threat to the community. He 
is, however, still interested in engagement with it; when he arrives at the Taverner 
home, he is content with ‘[a]nything which would give [him] a human scene.’424 
Finding himself within that scene, he is unable to participate fully in it. He is left out 
of the intersubjective consciousness because he does not have the right frame of 
mind to be included in it; when the others ‘think of their sins,’ Carston does ‘not 
think of sins at all,’ at least not until he begins to understand that the others do.425 
When that happens, it gives ‘him a key. To a very old feeling,’ which implies that 
little by little he is starting to learn about traditions and ways that he is unaware of 
because of his nationality.426 
Despite not having the power to drive the persecution of Picus forward, 
Carston does have a premonition of what is to come. The scapegoating is prefaced 
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by the words: ‘Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live.’427 The sentence echoes through 
Carston’s consciousness when he thinks of Picus, whom he begins to regard as a 
kind of demon due to jealousy of Picus and Scylla’s relationship. However, the 
sentiment, as mentioned earlier, is not valid or strong enough to base the persecution 
on, since Carston’s martyrisation of Scylla is caused by his sexual desire for her, in 
combination with the ‘naïveté’ that forms part of his character.428 
Ross, on the other hand, appears to be a more real danger to the equanimity 
of the Taverners. He seems to have a presentiment of a sacrifice, when he declares 
early in the novel that the group should ‘BE PREPARED FOR LAMBING – You 
hear them mewing in the dark … and out comes the shepherd, with his hands 
covered with blood.’429 While the ostensible topic of this statement is that of sheep 
being delivered of their lambs by a shepherd, the dramatic setting coupled with the 
wording is suggestive of sacrifice, as the mention of lambs and blood connote the 
sacrificial lamb, a common trope in Judeo-Christian culture that originates in the 
lamb of the Passover sacrifice. 
It is further intimated that Ross is a rogue member of the group – possibly 
aiming to cause trouble – not only with reference to his ‘wild-animal smile,’ and his 
prediction before Carston’s arrival that the Taverners are enjoying a ‘last day’s 
peace,’ but because of his indifferent attitude to people, which separates him from 
the group: ‘Only Ross embraced his solitude.’430 He appears to regard other persons 
as his playthings: ‘Eggs hatched. And men? They were there to make him laugh. If 
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they found rest in him, he was indifferent as Nature, and in general as kind.’431 The 
same paragraph sees him being careless with regard to narrative as well, as ‘[h]e 
grinned at the old nurse’s horror-story’ that comes to his mind when he sees Nanna’s 
knitting left behind.432 The only thing Ross cares for is physical form and visual 
representation. Being ‘a man content with the tangible,’ his primary concern is ‘the 
brickness of a brick,’ rather than any communal narrative.433 Ross is amused by the 
games of Grail hunting and scapegoating, but they have no greater meaning for him 
and so he does not participate in them wholeheartedly. He is not affected by the 
same disease as the rest of the group, because of a mysterious, secret knowledge: 
‘Only Ross was all right… once his strong appetites were satisfied, he did not want 
anything in human life at all. …he knew something that [Scylla] was only growing 
conscious of. And wouldn’t tell.’434 His superiority in being unaffected by war 
trauma and his consequent disinterestedness in the communal story is possibly one 
reason why he is not part of the narrative at all in Death of Felicity Taverner. 
The importance of story in Armed with Madness is signalled on several 
occasions, even though the attempts at making the embedded narrative cohesive and 
communal are unsuccessful. Carston takes note of the fact that he has been told 
numerous times that there are certain things he will not understand unless he knows 
the entire Taverner story, which is interweaved with English national narrative in 
general and the Grail myth in particular. When he asks questions about what the 
discovery of the cup in the well entails, Scylla wants him to engage with the 
narrative, rather than give him straight answers: ‘For the third time Carston heard the 	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sentence: “That’s a long story. You must help me to explain.”’435 In an attempt to 
start off a joint narrative, Scylla instructs the others to help her shape the story: ‘The 
best way to get that story out is for everyone to say what he thinks or feels or 
remembers.’436 The game is devised by Scylla, but it is quickly over and it does not 
come to a joint conclusion of the meaning of the cup. 
Despite the embedded narrative of Armed with Madness not being controlled 
in the way that it is in Death of Felicity Taverner, the novel does establish Scylla as 
the one who would be appropriate to be in control of that narrative, if anyone. This is 
implied in the passage cited above, and in other descriptions of Scylla as a character. 
Already in chapter IV, Felix tells Carston that ‘[s]he doesn’t create situations. She 
broods them and they hatch. And the birds come home to roost. Some mighty queer 
birds. Truth isn’t everyone’s breakfast egg. She isn’t happy till it’s hatched. Calls it 
knowing where you are.’437 Butts’ play with the bird metaphor here, most often 
reserved for depictions of Picus, extends to Scylla and her way of handling the 
‘truth.’ The situation, furthermore, is not created by Scylla, but only forged by her in 
its aftermath; the story that she forges needs to be based on events that have taken 
place, which she then ‘broods’ until they ‘hatch.’ 
It is also Scylla who explains to Carston why it is important to play the 
narrative game in order to make as if ‘we know between us pretty well all there is to 
know’: ‘Swank … and instinct. To cover quite intolerable pain. … That’s why we 
rag all the time. To keep things clean, and because it’s the only gentlemanly thing to 
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do.’438 This description is typical of the postwar condition of the lost generation. 
While Scylla indeed does refer to the members of her group as ‘lost,’ she also thinks 
that they tend to deal with their problem by ‘[s]hov[ing] it off on the war; but that 
did not help.’439 Instead, she proposes the game of narrative: ‘A little poetry, a little 
witchery, a little joke.’440 As in Death of Felicity Taverner, the frame narrative of the 
novel and the embedded narrative of Scylla are similar, but here it is in the sense that 
they are both fragmented, elusive, and, it seems, not to be taken too seriously. At this 
point in time, Scylla is not consciously purposeful in playing the game, but simply 
engages in it because she enjoys it, and not with the commitment to create stability, 
as in Death of Felicity Taverner: ‘I’m tired to keeping things steady for you. This is 
my pleasure and my game. …Picus is giving us an excuse for the sacred game.’441 
After Scylla and Picus become lovers, Clarence posits that they have become 
of ‘one voice.’442 The supposition of their joint narrative position upsets the balance 
of the group, generating feelings of jealousy in both Carston and Clarence, and a 
mood of general suspicion which escalates as the accusations of Picus multiply. 
Picus does not confirm Clarence’s statement, but rather appears to disprove the 
notion by saying that Scylla has turned the group against him: ‘Scylla’s been talking. 
You are all a pack of old women intriguing against me. Making my life hell. … 
Accusing me. Boring me. Interfering with ME.’443 It is again pointed out here that 
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a scapegoat. The lack of cohesion, however, can be assumed to be caused by the 
group not speaking with a fully unified intersubjective voice due to Scylla’s 
reluctance to believe that Picus is a villain. It is not in her interest to ‘hatch’ a story 
in which he is blamed for the group’s troubles, ‘the dis-ease he imparted.’444 
Additionally, the other characters cannot trust Scylla as the chronicler here as they 
do in Death of Felicity Taverner, since they know that her narrative will be biased 
because of her involvement with the person who is supposed to be scapegoated. 
Several of the dialogues in Armed with Madness are conveyed with a 
minimum of explanatory notes as to who is talking, and sometimes it is clearly stated 
that the person who is talking could be any of the characters present: 
 
Carston heard through the jazz and the slackening rain a voice which might 
have been a woman’s or a man’s: ‘He doesn’t mind using the cup of the Sanc-
Grail for whisky and soda,’ and another voice, which might have been a man’s 
or a woman’s: ‘He doesn’t mind using for a whisky and soda, the cup we use 
for an ash-tray, the cup of the Sanc-Grail.445 
 
The lines are not only confused as to who is speaking them, but also in terms of 
meaning; if the cup is already used as an ashtray, why would it be less respectful to 
use it for a drink? Furthermore, in a work which is otherwise so pared down and 
economic with words, it is significant that nearly the same line is repeated a second 
time. The effect is that of a multivocal chorus of sorts; the repetition coupled with 
the sense that anyone and everyone utters the words gives an impression of a jointly 
sung refrain. Butts also uses the multivocal technique in Death of Felicity Taverner, 
where the effect is that of a tapestry of memories of the life of Felicity, as will be 
seen in the following section. A more overt chorus, which is sung both by Carston 
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and Picus, as well as by the group as a whole, is that of the American song Oh, Lady 
Be Good! (1924); the line ‘I’ve been so awfully misunderstood’ is especially 
emphasised here, again indicating the confusion that dominates the narrative.446 
Another kind of multivocality occurs when Clarence receives a visit from the 
shepherd’s wife who tends to him in his little studio, a first person narrator interjects 
between two lines spoken by Clarence to the woman: ‘“You’re early,” he said – “Get 
some tea.” And I’m in my clothes. “And mind you put it in with the teaspoon.”’447 
Presumably, this comment is to be read a thought of Clarence’s, since the woman 
has just seen him sleeping through the window. A page further on, after Picus has 
entered the scene, there is another line written in the first person, but seemingly from 
Picus’ point of view: ‘He had to operate on Clarence, not prick and bewilder. Had to 
undo his arts, his graces, his wit. Clarence’s first protection would be to turn on him. 
A man of perverse and subtle mind, he would be quick to distort to save himself. 
Making me think.’448 The ‘me’ here is likely to be read as Picus. Both characters are 
thus used as first person narrators within the same scene, albeit only in one sentence 
each. In this way, Butts lets the narrative flow seamlessly between the third and first 
person, and between several characters. Its lack of coherence in Armed with Madness 
is indicative of the lack of a unified narrative between the characters. Interestingly, 
the paragraph where Picus takes on the narration informs the reader of his need to 
co-opt Clarence’s thoughts, to ‘undo’ his narrative and thereafter weave an 
alternative one into his consciousness, and the perils involved in such an attempt. 
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Scylla also takes on the role of first person narrator in the text, when pondering her 
relationship with Picus: 
 
Picus had made love to her. Picus would not make love again, because they 
had been found out. Picus led Clarence a hard life. No one could go to Picus 
and say: ‘So much for your silly devilries. Turn ye to me.’ And I even 
thought of marrying him because of his beauty. I did not catch the joy as it 
flew. Damn female instincts. Picus should not have pretended it was the cup 
of the Sanc-Grail. That will do in weaker minds and more violent 
imaginations than mine and Ross’s.449 
 
The change from third to first person signals a movement inwards, to a deeper plane 
of Scylla’s consciousness, comparable to the narratorial shifts in person in Ashe of 
Rings. Both novels display this technique, but it is more clearly demarcated in the 
earlier novel to whom the voice belongs, simply by such signposting as the 
omniscient narrator explicitly pointing out that a certain character is thinking. The 
number of characters present in the scene is another factor; in Armed with Madness, 
there are many group discussions in which there are several people talking, whereas 
most passages in Ashe of Rings only feature two characters who interact. 
This happens in an earlier passage as well, but here Scylla’s first person 
narration shifts seamlessly to Felix as focaliser of a third person narrator, as they are 
thinking about the same thing. It is as though the thought travels telepathically from 
Scylla to Felix: 
 
She would propitiate Felix. How? They will all hate me. Without whom 
Picus would not have turned creator. Woman’s place indeed. Clarence 
wanted that job. He did the work, and I wear the crown. Not my fault. 
Chances of the sacred game. Swept off into stadium of the game; which is the 
pleasure in actions for their own sake. Done for the love of playing. Done for 
the fun of it. Done for no pompous end. That Felix was just a little nervous 
about.450 	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Without further comment on this relayed thought or feeling, the narration passes to 
one character from another as a sign of intersubjectivity. As opposed to such shifts in 
Ashe of Rings, it is less clear here where the consciousnesses of Scylla, Felix, and the 
supposedly omniscient narrator, begin and end. Typically for this novel, there seems 
to be a purposeful confusion surrounding for example whose the sentiment ‘[d]one 
for no pompous end’ is. 
There are also cases of first person narration in the text where the voice does 
not appear to belong to any of the characters. One such instance interrupts a 
discussion about the supposed lie that Picus’ father has told about the Grail, in which 
Scylla brings up Nanna, their old nurse, and the watch she has always kept of the 
kitchen fire, a symbol of tradition and comfort. The narrator throws in a remark 
about the Roman goddess Hestia, mistakenly printed as Hesia in the text: ‘Hesia is 
an old goddess – I think she had a name written under her altar not even the Romans 
might know. And in her case, their lives, the sap of their bodies was nourished at 
Nanna’s fire.’451 The comment on the forgotten original name of ‘Hesia’ opens up 
for the possibility that the misprint of the name is intentional. This first person 
narrator cannot be part of the group of characters portrayed, as the pronoun ‘their’ 
signals somebody commenting on the events from the outside. 
A clear example of intersubjective experience in the first of the Taverner 
novels is a shared moment of remembrance between Scylla, Felix, and Ross, of a 
visitor who ‘fainted at the sight of an egg,’ an experience related by an external 
narrative voice: ‘The pleasant memory united them; they became a triple figure, like 
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Hecate the witch, amused, imaginative.’452 Jointly remembering a past incident 
merges the three individuals into the shape of Hecate, the Greek goddess of magic, 
often portrayed in the shape of three amalgamated human forms. Another instance 
occurs just after the finding of the cup in the well, when ‘[f]ive people at once [are] 
thinking about a spear.’453 These brief scenes are suggestive of what is explored 
more fully in Death of Felicity Taverner, where memories of Felicity are shared in 
order to create and maintain a communal body, as will be shown in the following 
two subsections. 
 
‘They felt cut-off in the valley’: Scapegoats and Xenophobia in Death of Felicity 
Taverner454 
As previously mentioned, several scholars have established Kralin as a scapegoat, 
and most of these readings include a discussion of Butts’ xenophobic tendencies, 
which is indeed a problematic aspect of the characterisation of Kralin.455 Andrew 
Radford suggests that ‘[Kralin’s] macabre blurring of ethnic and sexual categories… 
makes him antithetical to Butts’s cherished anthropological ideal of “mana,”’ a term 
used to refer to an inherent form of spiritual power that Butts herself in Traps for 
Unbelievers (1932) defines as ‘that which gives a man or a woman potency in every 
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act or situation.’456 It should be noted that Butts is not very clear in her definition of 
either mana or magic, possibly due to the sacred nature of these concepts; as Amy 
Clukey notes, Butts ‘often thematizes the idea that magic is too sacred for 
discussion.’457 
While Kralin certainly does embody liminality, with his simultaneous status 
as an outsider but also as an in-law of the Taverners, he is not portrayed as 
powerless, but rather the opposite. He is described as possessing a quality referred to 
as ‘the grey thing,’ an apparently very potent attribute, as it causes Felicity to flee 
from him in ‘[p]anic-fear,’ Felix considers it to be a ‘real horror,’ and Boris, a 
Russian aristocrat, connects it with the revolution that forced him to emigrate.458 The 
Taverners place Kralin in opposition to Felicity, and thereby establish that he has a 
different kind of mana from her, but the power he is able to wield over the 
community shows that he nevertheless has mana. He is a ‘demon,’ while Felicity is a 
‘saint.’459 
When Kralin reveals his plan to take over the Taverner land and estate in 
order to convert it into a holiday resort, complete with golf links and hotels, he is 
again immediately targeted as someone to be blamed, not just for Felicity’s death but 
for all that is wrong with the current state of affairs on a larger scale. He is seen as 
denying the importance of spirituality and a mutual, consolidating cause, and is 
thereby not only representative of modernity in the sense that he wants to bring 
about change, but also by epitomizing the idea that the only value that persists in 	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postwar England is monetary. Kralin has many characteristics in common with the 
Nietzschean Superman, in that he values violence and nihilism highly, and derives 
his power from these concepts. Kralin is also an individualist, and as such does not 
have a place within the framework of a community; instead, as a man of 
independence, ‘he multiplies by a thousand the dangers which life as such already 
brings with it.’460 His individualism makes him into a perfect scapegoat, as there is 
absolutely no risk of any member of the community feeling sympathy or compassion 
for him; he actively works against all that the others represent, and thereby does not 
deserve to be defended or saved from his terrible end. 
The murder of Kralin is ostensibly performed in order to reinstate a status 
quo and to relieve the Taverner community of its built up tensions. Just as René 
Girard proposes in his theory of sacrifice, when chaos rises to an uncontrollable level 
in a society to the point where total annihilation is looming, a scapegoat will be 
appointed and expelled, which then brings society back to a state of order. Boris 
refers to the murder as the ‘[o]ne thing I have put right,’ and shiftily tells the others 
that ‘I have made your peace, such peace, with him,’ implying that the chaos that 
threatened their society has passed.461 The placement of the murder at the very end 
of the narrative further emphasises its intended resolving function.  
However, there are suggestions in the text to the contrary, that the sacrifice 
does not meet its goal. For instance, Boris’ actions during and after the murder 
indicate that he has committed a crime, not performed a sacrificial ritual. His 
furtiveness implies the murder’s illegitimacy; were it a sacrificial ritual condoned by 
the community, Boris would not have had to be secretive about it within the group. 
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Coming back from the killing, he tells them that ‘Kralin is caught on the little island 
by the tide. … He is standing on it, shouting.’462 In actual fact, Boris left him face 
down in the water, after having picked his pockets. The petty theft of ‘seven pounds, 
ten shillings’ further emphasises the irreverance of the act; it is not a sacred 
ceremony, but an offence.463 
The other members of the Taverner group also signal that there is something 
not quite right about the sacrifice, firstly because they are absent from the event 
itself, making it an act of one individual rather than a communal ritual. Their 
reactions upon Boris’ return from the deed signify nervousness, anxiety, and 
possibly guilt. Felix ominously whispers: ‘I feel I am going to be hatched… and not 
out of the right egg or into the right nest.’464 This is furthermore reminiscent of an 
episode in Armed with Madness discussed above, in which Scylla is described as 
‘hatching’ situations by way of her storytelling.465 Picus tells Boris to ‘be quiet,’ 
because he assumes him to be hysterical, although he is actually in ‘rapture.’466 
Picus’ focus is on covering up what has been done, echoing familiar phrases from 
crime fiction, like ‘what we have to do now is to tell the same story,’ a statement that 
further emphasises the fact that it is not the murder of Kralin that brings the group 
together, but the story they tell themselves, and others, about it.467 
Kralin is not necessarily the only scapegoat in Death of Felicity Taverner, 
however. Felicity’s death, while not fitting the Girardian definition of scapegoating 	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as neatly as Kralin’s, does have certain elements that signify her role as a sacrificial 
victim. Early in the story, Scylla refers to Felicity as having been cast out of society, 
like a scapegoat, and comments that it is remarkable that she ‘of all people – in the 
end had been left out. …she seemed left alone to do first-aid on herself.’468 Further 
on, it is intimated that the purpose of Felicity’s death was for the Taverners to 
discover what is rotten in their family: Kralin and his plan to turn Feliciy’s land into 
a golf course, and Mrs Taverner, Felicity’s mother, who is initially in agreement 
with Kralin. Mrs Taverner is by birth a Tracy, related to Picus, and has wed into the 
Taverner family. She is far from aligned with the Taverner narrative however; in 
fact, it is stated that ‘what she disliked was Taverners,’ and in addition to her belief 
in an old-fashioned idea of honour and propriety, this makes her resentful of her 
deceased daughter.469 The antagonism of the narrative towards Mrs Taverner is 
obvious from Scylla’s description of her: ‘Old Aunt Julia is a notable dowager and 
an infernal bully. … Once her activities had to be diluted with a strong dose of 
sentiment; lately she’s reversed gears, become as acid a cynic as she was once a 
sentimentalist. In both cases, alternate statements of the original bitch.’470 Perhaps, 
the Taverners ask themselves, Felicity died so that the community could be cleansed 
from such influences: ‘Suppose Felicity had died to make them look into it, until 
knowledge made them acquainted with their gift?’471 Rather than posing as a 
goddess, Felicity is a tragic but necessary loss to the community that will eventually 
be cleansed of bad influences and restored to order through her sacrifice. 
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Felicity serves as a sacrificial victim in a similar way to Christ or the Fisher King; 
she has to die because the community needs to survive. The reason Boris gives for 
Felicity’s destruction is ‘people hating that they should love,’ a statement that brings 
to mind the Nietzschean idea that human nature is incompatible with Christian moral 
law of loving one’s neighbour. Nietzsche comes to this conclusion in §201 of 
Beyond Good and Evil, where he claims that as long as morality is ‘useful to the herd 
[i.e. implemented to enforce controlled behaviour within a community]… there can 
be no “morality of love of one’s neigbour.”’472 The moral laws of society, Nietzsche 
argues, are instead based on fear, a much stronger drive: 
 
Once the structure of society seems to have been in general fixed and made 
safe from external dangers, it is this fear of one’s neighbour which again 
creates new perspectives of moral valuation. There are certain strong and 
dangerous drives, such as enterprisingness, foolhardiness, revengefulness, 
craft, rapacity, ambition … these drives are now felt to be doubly dangerous 
– now that the diversionary outlets for them are lacking – and are gradually 
branded as immoral and given over to calumny.473 
 
Boris appears to be claiming that people’s natural response is to hate each other, and 
as a result, violence will constantly build up in all human communities at any given 
point in time until a scapegoat is found and destroyed, releasing the pent up violence 
and bringing society back to a point of orderly equilibrium.474 Death of Felicity 
Taverner contains not only one, but two different scapegoats, Felicity and Kralin, 
who serve two separate, if not oppositional, purposes. Felicity’s love can only save 
the community after her death; the function of the murder of Kralin is conversely 
dependent upon his animosity. 
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Boris is a further suggestion for an alternative scapegoat in the novel. He, like 
Kralin, is originally an outsider in relation to the core Taverner group, and his own 
admittance of guilt in the circumstances of Felicity’s death initially labels him as 
untrustworthy. The intimation of danger to his person is underlined several times, as 
Scylla and Felix start to suspect that he has been concealing information from them. 
Boris senses the threat as he goes out walking with Scylla: 
 
He winced as though the stones’ worn gold burned his feet. Every 
superstition in him dictated a penance. …he did not dare to enter that pure 
sea. … He feared the wood. … Boris felt the sweat start out between his 
shoulderblades, as lightly and wearily, shoulder to shoulder, they mounted a 
precipice of flint-sewn chalk just above the village.475 
 
The natural environment does not recognise him as one of its legatees, and is thereby 
dangerous to him. His bad conscience, brought on by the fact that ‘he had lately 
helped kill their cousin,’ makes him feel like their country is trying to hurt him.476 
What saves Boris, however, is precisely that conscience: ‘[He was] glad and 
ashamed and indignant that his emotions were about to betray him. … There was 
virtue still in Boris. … He was there, in their house, in their hearts: eating their salt 
after helping to destroy one of them.’477 Boris throws himself on the sword before 
the community does it for him. He confesses to his involvement in Felicity’s death 
and sacrifices his individuality and freedom of thought for the benefit of joining the 
group of the Taverners, an act that affords him the power to take another man’s life. 
He consequently murders Kralin on the behalf of the community to which he has 
given himself. The guilt in Boris propels him to confess to the part he has played, 
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and in doing so, conveys the narrative’s intersubjective consciousness, to which I 
shall return: 
 
Was he [Boris] going to tell them? No. Not yet. He had been in Paris part of 
that time. There were friends, gossips, various threads and all untrustworthy 
between Felicity and him. Were the others thinking the same thing? (They 
were.) She [Scylla] tried a direct attack. ‘Boris, you were about Paris part of 
that time. …are you sure that you heard nothing? (Never mind our feelings 
… )’ … ‘I do not like to say… Only it may have been that I heard a story of 
an Englishwoman… Of a sudden brutal break…’ To Scylla his story was an 
admission.478 
 
Further on, Boris finally tells the whole story of his involvement with Felicity and 
their shared lover T’chiquo.479 It is intimated, but never stated, that T’chiquo’s 
desertion of Felicity in favour of Boris contributed to the circumstances of her death. 
Boris’ guilt over his part in this love triangle, coupled with his animosity towards 
Kralin’s Bolshevist sympathies, eventually causes him to perform the sacrifice of 
Kralin. 
 It is possible to read the whole Taverner group in Death of Felicity Taverner 
as scapegoats; they all feel ‘pickled’ and ‘cut off in the valley,’ an indication that 
they have been collectively cast out or at least disconnected from society at large.480 
If that is the case, then it is perhaps less curious that they should be using that same 
mechanism to keep their own small cosmos intact, safe from the outside world. 
However, Kralin is not only considered apart from the Taverner group, but from 
society at large as well; he is certainly not representative of normative society. If the 
Taverners are outsiders, Kralin is doubly so, both within the family group and in a 
wider context. 	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The reason for Kralin’s murder is not his inherent status as an outsider, however; it is 
rather his attempt to control the embedded narrative that make the Taverners 
perceive him as a hazard. The only way in which he is able to exert power over them 
is to take narrative control by publishing his own story about Felicity, which would 
silence or invalidate theirs. Since he does not succeed in persuading any of the others 
to subscribe to his narrative instead of Scylla’s, he has no power over the group. This 
finally results in his death, and in the perceived righteousness of Boris’ act of killing, 
because that is the only way to prevent Kralin from taking control of the communal 
narrative. 
 
‘Make us speak’: The Communal Narrative in Death of Felicity Taverner481 
The creation of the myth of Felicity Taverner is a communal experience, as the story 
is told and listened to by several people. It is difficult to tell where one character’s 
input begins and another ends; this forms the basis of the intersubjective flow that 
creates the foundation upon which the Taverner belief, and thereby its community, is 
built. Both the story of Felicity and the framing narrative of the novel are told by a 
stream of several consciousnesses, the quality of which sometimes appears to be 
seamless, and at other times is self-consciously fragmented. This flow is textually 
represented in the fluidity of the narration by personal pronoun shifts, just as in the 
earlier novels, but also through the way in which the omniscient narration describes 
the Taverner group. 
One particular scene that points to an intersubjective consciousness being 
shared by the characters is that in which Boris tells a part of the story of Felicity’s 
life in Paris, which brings tears to everyone’s eyes: 	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Nanna was sitting with them, as she often did. To the torrent of hard clear 
words a listener might have heard an accompaniment of tears, four cryings, 
from two women and two men. The words stopped; the crying went on. … 
The salt-flood brings temporary relief. The images that formed in the tension 
before it fade [sic]. As the pictures in their minds – Aphrodite-in-hiding in a 
room with eight walls, or a ghost on light-sandalled feet crossing sun-white 
harbour shores. Meanwhile a number of hands shuffled and groped for 
handkerchiefs. … It then occurred to them all that though Boris had been 
illuminating and even truthful … they did not know very much more about 
what had actually happened.482 
 
The passage is quoted at length to show why it is reasonable to assume that this is a 
portrayal of intersubjectivity; ‘they’ are crying, shuffling, groping, but – more 
importantly – thinking, feeling, and inferring the same things based on what Boris 
has just told them. They have the same mental images, the same ‘pictures in their 
minds,’ given to them in Boris’ embedded narrative about Paris, which exemplifies 
that a story can not only be created communally, as I argue that the larger embedded 
narrative of Felicity is, but also evoke communal feeling by creating a moment of 
intersubjectivity. 
Despite the importance of community for the narrative, Scylla’s function in 
Death of Felicity Taverner is explicitly stated as being the primary mouthpiece and 
inventor of Felicity’s myth. The issue of having a female take control of the narrative 
of the group is addressed in the very first pages of the book, however surreptitiously, 
by noting Scylla’s awareness of the way in which she as a woman is perceived: 
‘Scylla paused, knowing that the men were on the look-out for the bias proper to a 
female cat. Must allow for it and ignore it in her search for the story’s truth: endure it 
until its finding justified her.’483 She paradoxically has to make her story trustworthy 
enough to justify herself as its composer; the power of the narrative will determine 	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whether she will be afforded the power to claim leadership over the group, but only 
the leader of the group may ultimately determine what its narrative is supposed to be. 
Scylla’s appointed audience is Boris, for the reason that Scylla believes that 
he never met or knew Felicity. Upon his arrival in Starn, she tells him that the group 
needs him as an outsider to propel the invention of Felicity’s story forward: ‘Let us 
try and talk about it after dinner. We have been too silent about it. After dinner, 
listen to us. Make us speak.’484 Later, Boris is again mentioned by Scylla as the fuel 
for her narrative: ‘Can you bear it if I go on? It is you who will make us remember 
everything.’485 When it later transpires that Boris in fact met Felicity in Paris and has 
additional information about her, which could conflict with the story that Scylla is 
building, it appears that he runs the risk of being expelled from the community: 
‘None of them wished, they even feared, to do him wrong. Yet each was prepared to 
chance it. Accuse him? The brother and sister were on fire …’486 Despite a feeling of 
reluctance to turn against him, both Felix and Scylla are ready and willing to 
sacrifice their personal relationship with a friend for the benefit of upholding the 
narrative that supports their community.  
Scylla’s role is justified early on in the same way, by simply stating that 
‘since she told stories well, it was left to her to tell him [i.e. Boris, of the story of 
Felicity].’487 She consciously dictates the premises of the myth, as she ‘arrange[s] 
such facts as they knew into a version of the truth,’ using Boris, the intended 
recipient, ‘as a truth-elicitor, a mould into which a series of events, full of omissions 
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and each distinct and white-hot with their charge of emotion, could be poured.’488 
The tentative nature of her truth claim is straight from the start made visible here, 
and further on as she overtly comments: ‘I shall have to try round and say a great 
many things that are not true until I start a truth.’489 This highlights the fact that it is 
those who manage to tell the story and tell it well who are authorised to decide what 
the truth is in the end. 
Other members of the Taverner group occasionally try to intervene in the 
storytelling process by giving accounts or version of parts of the story that are 
different from Scylla’s. She accepts these when they conform to the overall general 
picture that she is trying to paint, as when Felix interrupts her to point out that 
Felicity ‘was distinctly chaste,’ or when Picus throws in small addendums, like the 
notion that ‘[Felicity’s death] took murder off her mother’s hands,’ which only 
causes Scylla to look ‘at him with troubled and adoring love.’490 She discourages 
them when the interpolations constitute an encroachment on her authorised account 
of Felicity, for instance when Felix opines that ‘[s]he was a fool … or how could this 
have happened to her?’491 Scylla says nothing, but those watching her can see ‘the 
nails drawing blood from the palms of her hands.’492 Her silence in reproving her 
brother, and the violence of the act with which she shows him that he has done 
something wrong, emphasises her power over the narrative, as well as its intention to 
be not a discussion or argument about what Felicity was, but the ultimate truth. 
Scylla’s is the first and definitive account, and while others may fill in gaps and 	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suggest amendments, she edits their submissions. Thereby the story is formed 
communally, but according to her approval. It is firmly stated that this should be so 
in the very first pages of the novel, together with the reason why the story is needed: 
 
[S]he [Felicity] must have her requiem: give occasion for a good story, and 
so to her survivors some peace, since ballads were no longer within man’s 
capacity. In their house-saga, her story well-told would keep her [Felicity’s] 
memory brighter than earth’s freshest grass. The first recital should have her 
[Scylla] for rhapsodist. Felix later should write it, the family’s professional 
chronicler.493 
 
If the story is to bring peace to the community, it needs to be a coherent narrative; it 
will not allow for any deviations or untoward complexities. Death of Felicity 
Taverner is as multivocal a narrative as Armed with Madness, but the former has 
something which the latter lacks: clarity of intention. Despite intermittent confusion, 
there remains a measure of control that brings the narrative back to its point of focus 
when it threatens to veer off course. This control is personified through Scylla’s 
character. 
Felicity’s character is moulded to suit the needs of the narrative, rather than 
the other way around. Also telling in this quotation is the use of the concept ‘house-
saga,’ which returns again in Scylla’s framework narrative, the metanarrative that 
lets the audience get a glimpse of the construction behind her story: ‘( … No. I can’t 
stop and tell it [a ghost-story mentioned by Felix]. No. Yours are always about 
vampires, a pleasing thought but limited. We don’t have them here.) I must finish 
Felicity’s house, it’s important.’494 The parentheses used suggest an aside or possibly 
a thought, but as Scylla is addressing both Boris and Felix within them, it could also 
be read as simply a demarcation of an off-topic statement, that is something that is 	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irrelevant to Felicity’s story. In any case, the basis for the saga of Felicity is the 
house, or rather houses, that the Taverner group designate as theirs. 
 Both Jane Garrity and Andrew Radford refer to Scylla’s storytelling in terms 
of mundane archival work on the one hand – she is described as an ‘archivist,’ and as 
keeping the ‘parish archive’ – and spiritual visions on the other.495 Garrity also 
acknowledges Scylla’s power to create and change things through her control of the 
Taverner narrative: 
 
By revising the conventions of historical narrative, Scylla tacitly questions 
the veracity of historical chronicles that record only public events represented 
by the lives of heroic men; … she creates a space for women, the obscure, 
domestic life, mystical experience, and memory, however much this 
seemingly inclusive agenda is mitigated by other forms of parochialism.496 
 
Radford likewise points to the ‘parochialism’ of Scylla’s narrative, as he 
distinguishes between regional history versus heritage, claiming that, in Butts’ 
narratives, ‘regional history is a rigidly conceived and exclusive discipline that 
safeguards family secrets … while heritage and folk knowledge are more expansive 
and democratic.’497 It is for this reason, Radford posits, that Kralin is not privy to the 
master narrative of the Taverners, and thereby remains an outsider. I build on this 
assumption, but further claim that the need for the scapegoating and destruction of 
Kralin is ultimately due to his threat to the Taverner narrative about Felicity and 
thereby to the very existence of the group itself. 
If the novel can be thought of as an account of the creation of a Taverner 
religion, Scylla acts as a priestess of that religion. It is her mission to ‘reduce a 	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hideous chaos to a tragic cosmos.’498 The choice of words here point to the 
structuring principle of setting up the narrative around Felicity; initially there are 
only bits of loose information consisting of a variety of memories from the 
perspectives of different people, but after the work of re-telling those memories, 
there is a coherent, structured narrative. Scylla thus builds a community by narrating 
events, and thereby taking them from a place of chaos to being part of a structure. 
The construction of narrative is directly related to sacrifice through this principle of 
creating order and community. 
Scylla’s persona is in a way parallel to that of Felicity, in that she too is 
connected to the earth, bodily and spiritually. Andrew Radford has pointed this out 
and relates it to Scylla’s position in Armed with Madness, in which ‘Butts 
hypostatises the link between patrician lineage sanctioned by myth and sacred 
terrain… anticipating her cousin Felicity Taverner, Scylla becomes intertwined with 
her surroundings.’499 According to Radford, Scylla is not only a priestess, but a sort 
of demi-goddess herself. The aforementioned crucifixion certainly points to this. 
Scylla is not, however, a dead object of myth but a living, acting subject; Felicity’s 
life story has ended and can therefore be moulded by what others can remember of it 
to suit their purposes, while Scylla claims the part of creator and orator of the myth 
of Felicity and as such becomes the leader of the Taverners. 
When it comes to the circumstances of her cousin’s life that she knows less 
of, for instance Felicity’s life in Paris, Scylla hungrily listens to details of what 
others have to tell, still keeping her stature as the one who knows the entity of 
Felicity best. Her speciality does not lie in her knowledge of all the details, but in her 
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arrangement of the available information: ‘She began [telling the story] slowly, 
knowing that they had none of them yet arranged such facts as they knew into a 
version of the truth.’500 She thinks of her story as both a catalyst and a mould for an 
outpouring of emotional discharge that will eventually set and ‘leave them with a 
death in [the mould’s] proportions.’501 Ruth Hoberman has argued that Kralin 
actualises the role of a parallel mythmaker, using the same tools as Scylla, but to a 
different end.502 It is possible to link this theory to my earlier suggestion that Kralin, 
far from devoid of mana or power, simply uses it to different ends than Scylla. 
However, while Kralin clearly attempts to threaten Scylla’s authority by publishing 
Felicity’s private papers, prefaced by Kralin himself, his myth is never intended as a 
device for creating and maintaining a community, as Scylla’s is. 
Scylla is, in effect, creating and editing her family history; she is the 
omniscient narrator of the embedded narrative, who ‘arrange[s the] facts’ so as to tell 
her version of the truth, or rather, to make her version into the one and only truth. 
The omniscient narrator of the frame narrative lets Scylla illustrate the workings, and 
among them the possible dangers, of allowing one individual to decide what goes in 
and what stays out of a specific narrative. The illustration makes clear the amount of 
power that can be wielded over a group of people by controlling their collective 
narrative. Furthermore, the different levels of omniscience in the novel implicitly 
poses a question of what omniscient narration really is, and if it can even exist. The 
technique exposes the dubiousness of truth claims, unveiling the ultimately 
subjective, fabricated, and controlled nature of any coherent narrative. 	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Interestingly, a third narrative of Felicity’s life, which seems to scare all involved 
parties, pops up in the novel: her own papers. The textual evidence of her own 
writing threatens to overtake and overturn the narrative that has been carefully built 
up by the Taverners, and further sparks Mrs Taverner’s fear of indecency. As Kralin 
threatens to publish Felicity’s diaries and correspondence, the fear of chaos threatens 
the community to its core, and a decision is quickly made to stop him.503 Elizabeth 
Anderson points out that Felicity’s ‘death has fixed her character; she is no longer 
present to challenge others’ construction of her identity,’ but in fact her papers do 
pose such a threat – if they were not seen as dangerous to the Taverner narrative, 
they would hardly be worth suppressing.504 The appearance and suppression of 
Felicity’s paper further problematises the view of Scylla as archivist, since someone 
who ‘garners ethnographic data systematically’ should be interested to see Felicity’s 
papers published.505  
Butts’ empowering of two young women to the point where they are allowed 
to control the family narrative, fashioning themselves as the figurehead of their 
household and spiritual leader of their family, challenges traditional gender roles. In 
the nineteenth century, a number of scholars, among them Jane Harrison, believed 
that matriarchy had, in what was then referred to as primitive societies, been the 
universal norm. These scholars assumed that the widespread worship of female 
fertility goddesses throughout ancient civilisations in Mesopotamia, Egypt and China 
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confirmed that women as a group had had more power than men in prehistory.506 J. 
J. Bachofen proposes that matriarchy has its fundament in the spiritual superiority of 
women. His argument is based on a view of cultural evolution as parallel to 
biological evolution, where matriarchy is considered a primitive stage of human 
culture that precedes patriarchy. Part of the evidential basis for the theory is the 
Greek mythical tradition that predates the Hellenic age.507 Bachofen’s work is the 
first and most well-known theory of matriarchy, and has been continuously referred 
to since its publication. The matriarchy hypothesis was largely abandoned by 
researchers in the second half of the twentieth century, and was never particularly 
popular with scholars in general. There are few archaeologists and anthropologists 
today who argue that certain evidence points to a possible matriarchal past, but a 
handful of cultures are sometimes labelled as matriarchal, although the definition of 
the term continues to be debated.508 Matrilineal or matrifocal is usually preferred to 
the more politically charged term matriarchal. 
Harrison, influenced by Bachofen, outlines traces of matriarchy in local 
Greek cults in Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion (1903):  
 
[I]f these mirror the civilization of the worshippers, this civilization is quite 
other than patriarchal. Hera… reigns alone at Argos; Athene at Athens is no 
god’s wife… At Eleusis two goddesses reign supreme… At Delphi… 
Apollo… was preceded by a succession of women goddesses… These 
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primitive goddesses reflect… a state of society known by the awkward term 
matriarchal…509 
 
The influence of this theory on Butts’ work has been dealt with on numerous 
occasions. Andrew Radford argues that Butts’ idea of matriarchal society as an ideal 
came from ‘Harrison’s repeated stress on “the worship of the Mother,” which 
“emphasizes the group, the race and its continuance.”’510 Jane Garrity writes of the 
profound impact Harrison’s Themis (1912) had on the way in which Butts 
intertwined femininity, nature and the power of regeneration in her thinking.511 It is 
interesting to note that Butts not only takes inspiration from matriarchal theories, but 
utilises them with a twist. She does not leave the reader with an unambiguous 
celebration of female power, but questions the right with which Scylla exercises that 
power, as well as problematises its outcomes through the suppression of Felicity’s 
papers and the questionable value of Kralin’s murder. 
The Taverners choose to make the story of Felicity’s death into one of the 
battle between good and evil, which in this case also implies opposing tradition to 
modernity, as well as the English to the foreign. It is suggested that the death of 
Kralin, an outsider by way of ethnicity and beliefs, acts as a ritual sacrifice that will 
rid the community of sin. His betrayal of Felicity, his promotion of nihilism, his 
professed intention of modernising the countryside, in addition to the fact that he is 
Russian and Jewish, make him into the perfect scapegoat. The ritual murder of 
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Kralin not only protects Starn from the resort he envisions on the estate, but also 
guards the community from the supposed evil that he represents.512 
Kralin is never successful in taking narrative control, then, and this is why he 
becomes the scapegoat. This conclusion appears to go against what Cousineau and 
Burke argue: that the scapegoat is the protagonist, as Kralin is usually read as the 
antagonist to Scylla’s protagonista. The narrative model that Cousineau and Burke 
propose does not fit easily onto the second of the Taverner novels, which is 
markedly different from Ashe of Rings and Armed with Madness in that it conveys a 
more defined storyline and specific outcome of the sacrificial act. It is only because 
the sacrifice of Kralin is facilitated and approved by the Taverner narrative that it has 
a reciprocal structuring effect on the community. However, it is still possible to read 
the same function of the scapegoat – to strengthen a community – into the work as 
that which Cousineau and Burke suggest. Although the reader is not necessarily 
invited to feel empathetic towards Kralin, his character is not as one-dimensionally 
evil as many of Butts’ critics would have it. As I have shown, Kralin is only vilified 
on a superficial level; on the meta-level, he is responsible for the rebuilding of a 
community that had started to disintegrate with the death of Felicity. Since the 
events building up to it are told as a communal story, the act of killing becomes part 
of the Taverner myth, and thereby gains the function of implementing order in the 
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This chapter has looked at the appearance and function of instances of sacrifice in 
the novels of Mary Butts. While appearing to be warranted by the need to shield a 
given community from outside forces threatening to infect that community with 
impurities, the justification for sacrificial acts in Butts is actually created by the 
embedded narrative surrounding them. It is the story of the sacrificial act that creates 
the structure upon which a cohesive community can be built, rather than the 
sacrificial act in itself. 
Having outlined instances of sacrifice in Ashe of Rings, Armed with Madness, 
and Death of Felicity Taverner, I conclude that Butts depicts mainly unsuccessful 
sacrificial acts, but does occasionally portray a successful one, such as Van’s self-
sacrifice on the Rings. Furthermore, the texts make it clear why the sacrifices are so 
often unsuccessful. If the act is in line with the narrative of the society in which it is 
performed, it is a successful sacrifice; if not, it is unsuccessful. This requirement is 
not easily fulfilled, which is why the value of the outcome of most of the sacrifices 
in the three novels is debatable. 
Butts seems to be rewriting the story of the passion of Christ in both Ashe of 
Rings and the Taverner novels, letting her female characters be portrayed as restorers 
of the community through their respective sacrifices. Van’s self-sacrifice enables her 
to reach a state of transcendence, and she is thereby not only connected to Christ by 
her ancestor’s crucifixion, but also through making a sacrifice that would seem to 
annihilate her, but in reality gives her a greater sense of being, and ultimately more 
power within her community than she had at the outset, as the estate is restored to 
her. Scylla’s crucifixion, being incomplete, does not in actual fact restore the faith or 
the community; it is a failed sacrifice. The crucifixion is re-imagined through 
Felicity’s story after her death; despite her not being actually crucified, she is 
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described as having fallen victim to an outside force that killed her because she was 
trying to espouse a philosophy of universal love.  
The novels of Mary Butts portray a continual negotiation of the values of 
communal responsibility versus individual freedom by way of a variety of images of 
transcendence through sacrifice. The issue of the amount of structure needed in 
human society in order to avoid chaos and disorder is raised in the novels through a 
dissection of motives behind sacrificial acts and the outcomes in which they result. 
Only rarely do Butts’ sacrifices actually bring about structure; seemingly, only those 
that can be classified as self-sacrifice, as in Ashe of Rings, do. In other cases, it is the 
embedded narrative about the sacrifice that facilitates structure, not the sacrifice in 
itself. As I have suggested, the characters in Armed with Madness do not succeed in 
crafting such a narrative, because they lack a common goal. Without a shared 
purpose of the collective narrative, as in Death of Felicity Taverner, the result is not 
only that the intended sacrifices are unsuccessful, but that the purpose and direction 
of the narrative as a whole is unclear.
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Chapter 4 
‘Are you giving yourself to me to make a self?’ Sacrifice 
and the Ceaseless Creation of the Self in H. D.’s Madrigal 
Cycle513 
 
The conception of selfhood in H. D.’s prose is unmistakably tied to sacrifice, both as 
a part of ritual and as self-abnegation. I will argue in this chapter that the 
experimental narrative pronoun shifts in H. D.’s Madrigal cycle allow for a 
negotiation between searching for and giving up the self. H. D. opens up a space for 
multiple subjectivities within the narratives, producing a continuous widening, 
questioning, and loosening of boundaries between selves and others, which is 
repeatedly interrupted by the recreation of a defined, demarcated self. In contrast to 
the works of Sinclair and Butts, this process never seems to end in H. D.’s work, 
neither within the individual works nor in her oeuvre as a whole. 
The creation of the self in H. D.’s prose is accomplished through sacrifice. 
Self-effacing deeds combined with images of ritual sacrifice suggest ritual and self-
sacrifice are, for H. D., inextricably bound together. The focus of this chapter is how 
the sacrifice of the self is the necessary starting point for the journey of self-
exploration undertaken by the protagonists in the four novels of the Madrigal cycle: 
Paint It Today (written 1921, published 1992), Asphodel (written 1921-2, published 
1992), HERmione (written 1926, published 1981), and Bid Me to Live (A Madrigal) 
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(written 1939, published 1960).514 The pronoun shifts in the narration of these stories 
are the linguistic expression of the continuous fluctuation between sacrifice and (re-
)creation of the self. Before moving to the works themselves, I outline the 
conception of self that can be read through the works of H. D., and I specifically 
consider the role of the persona of the author and of creative writing for H. D.’s 
notion of self. 
 
‘If I let go (I, this one drop, this one ego under the microscope-telescope of 
Sigmund Freud) I fear to be dissolved utterly’: Psychoanalysis, Gender-Based 
Sacrifice, and H. D.’s Notion of Self515 
 
H. D.’s prose fiction suggests a state of constant re-imagination, re-evaluation, and 
re-invention of the self. Subjectivity, or rather multiple subjectivities, is the starting 
point and the core of H. D.’s creative legacy. While Matte Robinson argues that in 
her ‘late writing, the focus is on self-knowledge,’ I suggest that the exploration of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 For those of H. D.’s works where the years of the first composition and the first 
publication differ widely, both are given in order to show in what context each work 
may be understood. The years given are suggested by Susan Stanford Friedman in 
Penelope’s Web and are generally agreed upon by H. D. scholars. Susan Stanford 
Friedman, Penelope’s Web: Gender, Modernity, H. D.’s Fiction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 362; 364. For the sake of simplicity, I do not 
mention here all the known and supposed revisions made after the first composition. 
Bid Me to Live has a particularly thorny history, and is further said to have been first 
drafted in 1927 in Helen McNeil’s foreword to the 1984 Virago edition. Helen 
McNeil, introduction to Bid Me to Live (London: Virago, 1984), vii. I have used 
Stanford Friedman’s estimate here as it was made slightly later than McNeil’s (1989) 
and with access to H. D.’s papers. Stanford Friedman, Penelope’s Web, 360. This 
work is described in ‘Dating H. D.’s Writing,’ in Signets: Reading H. D., ed. Susan 
Stanford Friedman and Rachel Blau DuPlessis (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1990), 46-51. The troubled publication history of H. D.’s prose is 
further discussed by Stanford Friedman in Penelope’s Web, 20-3. 
515 H. D., Tribute to Freud (New York: New Directions, 2012), 116. 
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the self is paramount to H. D. throughout her career as a writer.516 In a corpus of the 
kind where all characters and plots seem to have their real world counterparts, it is 
tempting to draw conclusions based on what is known of the events on which the 
narratives are based; even more so perhaps, when, as in the Madrigal cycle, the same 
events are presented in a number of different books and approached in slightly 
different ways from one novel to the next. Her later work also clearly shows the lack 
of distinction between reality and fiction in her prose; in an early version of the 
manuscript of Majic Ring, H. D. used the names of real people and then replaced 
them with fictional ones in a later draft.517 
The attempt to understand and map these narratives paradoxically draws the 
context in which they were written into the world of fiction, while simultaneously 
lending the fiction an air of the documentary. Many existing studies of H. D.’s work 
in general and the Madrigal cycle in particular are focused on reading her life story 
through the fiction. For instance, Georgia Johnston refers to HERmione, Asphodel 
and Paint It Today as ‘fictional autobiographies.’518 In Penelope’s Web, Stanford 
Friedman includes a facsimile of the first page of the typescript of HERmione on 
which H. D. has scribbled a key to several of the novel’s characters, for instance that 
George Lowndes corresponds to Ezra Pound – it is difficult to withstand the 
temptation of reading biography into the fiction with such a hint from the author. 
Johnston’s phrase ‘fictional autobiographies’ points to the issues surrounding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
516 Matte Robinson, ‘H.D. and Robert Ambelain: Doubles in H. D.’s Late Work.’ 
Anglophonia/Caliban, 35 (2014), n. 2. Published online 16 December 2014, 
retrieved on 27 April 2016. http://caliban.revues.org/238. 
517 Robinson, ‘H. D. and Robert Ambelain.’ 
518 Georgia Johnston, ‘H. D. and Gender: Queering the Reading,’ in The Cambridge 
Companion to H. D., ed. Nephie J. Christodoulides and Polina Mackay (Cambridge: 
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interpretations of these works as factual, fictional, or somewhere in between the two. 
Susan Stanford Friedman similarly argues that H. D.’s authorship needs to be 
identified as situated somewhere between fact and fiction in her suggestion that 
‘[t]he writer, in H. D.’s view, not only creates the self-in-the-text, but more 
fundamentally constructs the author in the process of writing. The “authors” … are 
personae, who originate in and refer back to the historical writer, but are never her 
equivalent.’519 The persona of the author as is known to critics and the public has 
been molded by the autobiographical tint of her work; the stories of Hilda Doolittle 
and that of her many fictional alter egos have been shaped and maintained 
simultaneously to the point where the real person and the characters are nearly 
indistinguishable from one another. Rather than reading the fictional narratives of 
the Madrigal cycle as based on fact, it is more suitable to read H. D.’s life story as 
partially fictionalised. 
H. D.’s non-fictional works are sometimes nearly indistinguishable from her 
prose fiction because they deal with the same events, experiences that H. D. re-wrote 
continually from the 1920s through to the 1950s: travelling to Europe from her 
hometown in Pennsylvania, deciding to stay and make a life for herself in England, 
living through the First World War, various love affairs, the births of one still-born 
child and one child conceived outside of marriage, meeting Bryher, and experiencing 
paranormal phenomena – the writing on the wall and the man on the boat are two 
such incidents that recur often. The perceived affinity between the author and her 
protagonists continues to have a mutual influence on critical works on H. D. even 
today. Perdita Schaffner’s introduction to HERmione concludes with the words ‘I’ll 
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never escape the past’ and labels the novel as ‘autobiographical’.520 Cassandra Laity 
echoes this in her introduction to Paint It Today, which is described as a ‘roman à 
clef… one of three autobiographical novels (including Asphodel and HER) exploring 
H. D.’s love for women.’521 Robert Spoo, the editor of the 1992 publication of 
Asphodel, writes in his introduction that ‘[a]long with Paint It To-Day (written in 
1921), Asphodel represents one of the earliest surviving examples of [H. D.’s] 
sustained experiments in autobiographical fiction’.522 This is not only true for the 
Madrigal cycle, but for later prose work as well. Matte Robinson argues that ‘the 
conversion of events from the personal, in-time dimension to the “astral” realm… 
allows H. D. the emotional distance necessary to take stock of the various figures 
and symbols found throughout her late prose.’523 Robinson suggests that the 
supernatural elements in H. D.’s writing – shifting real life events to the ‘astral’ 
plane – was a way for her to convert autobiography into fiction. This does not 
explain the Madrigal cycle, however, as supernatural events are few and far between 
in these novels compared to her later prose fiction. 
Since the Madrigal cycle is so preoccupied with the life story of H. D., it is 
particularly interesting that the novels deal extensively with the topic of sacrifice, 
because it affirms the connection between (re-)writing the self and letting go of the 
self through sacrifice. In H. D.’s work, even the authorial self is re-imagined, 
according to both H. D. herself and to most critics that have done work on her prose 	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fiction. As Susan Stanford Friedman has previously indicated, H. D. comments on 
the autobiographical nature of her prose on several occasions, for example in Tribute 
to Freud (1956) – a memoir of her therapy sessions with Freud in the 1930s – where 
she writes that she wished to ‘free myself of repetitive thoughts and experiences – 
my own and those of many of my contemporaries’ by putting pen to paper, but that 
she ‘could not get rid of the experience by writing about it.’524 She has consciously 
tried to write her way through the traumatic events of her life in order to rid herself 
of her obsession with them and cure herself of the trauma incurred, but that thus far 
she has been unsuccessful: ‘There was no use telling the story, into the air, as it 
were, repeatedly, like the Ancient Mariner who plucked at the garments of the 
wedding guest with that skinny hand.’525 Yet it seems that telling the stories to Freud 
did not help H. D. either. She kept on writing them and they still bothered her in later 
life, which is evidenced in Magic Mirror (written 1955-6, published 2012), a late 
roman à clef about the relationship between H. D. and Erich Heydt where the 1915 
stillbirth is again recollected and reformulated, and in the non-fictional Hirslanden 
Notebooks (written 1957-9, published 2015), where she writes: ‘It was Erich [Heydt, 
H. D.’s psychoanalyst at the time] who dredged or dragged the actual emotional 
content [of the 1915 stillbirth] from the Depth, about the time of the Birth of my 
third grandchild, June 1956, before I went to America.’526 
Thus, despite the fact that psychoanalysis was one of the theoretical tools that 
H. D. used in order to make sense of the nature of the self, she was not undivided in 
her attitude to its principles. In Tribute to Freud, H. D. displays her great respect for 	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Freudian typology, but also her concern about the pathologisation of sexuality and 
implicit misogyny in Freudian theory. She is clearly influenced by Freud regarding 
the belief in an intersubjective consciousness: 
 
He had dared to say that it was the same ocean of universal consciousness, 
and even if not stated in so many words, he had dared to imply that this 
consciousness proclaimed all men one; all nations and races met in the 
universal world of the dream; and he had dared to say that the dream-symbol 
could be interpreted; its language, its imagery were common to the whole 
race, not only of the living but of those ten thousand years dead.527 
 
‘Universal consciousness’ is for H. D. connected to what she terms the astral 
dimension in so far as both concepts relate to a non-physical plane of knowledge that 
is shared across boundaries of time and space. The concept is similar to Sinclair’s 
understanding of the ‘Absolute’ and Butts’ tacit agreement between opposites that 
she calls ‘magic in the world.’ All three concepts indicate an intersubjective 
experience that joins people together across boundaries of time and space. 
Although she apparently wanted to free herself from the events of her past, 
H. D. also seems to have subscribed to the view that suffering is an inevitable fact of 
life. In Notes on Thought and Vision (written 1919, published 1982) – an early 
formulation of her ideas on the nature of the mind, body, and spirit – she explains 
why: 
 
There are two ways of escaping the pain and despair of life, and of the rarest, 
most subtle dangerous and ensnaring gift that life can bring us, relationship 
with another person – love. One way is to kill that love in one’s heart. To kill 
love – to kill life. The other way is to accept that love, to accept the snare, to 
accept the pricks, the thistle. To accept life – but that is dangerous.528 
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In other words, love and life are the same thing, suffering is an inevitable aspect of 
both, and the only way to escape it is to turn one’s back on life altogether. The 
second way mentioned in the quotation is not so much an escape from suffering as it 
is a reconciliation with the fact that suffering cannot be escaped, a philosophy that is 
reminiscent of Buddhism.  
On the following page, H. D. uses the term ‘martyrdom’ to refer to the 
previously mentioned ‘thistle’ of life and love. She states that 
 
…these notes are concerned chiefly with the mental process that is in some 
form or other the complement of the life process. That is to say this thistle – 
life, love, martyrdom – leads in the end – must lead in the logical course of 
events to death, paradise, peace. That world of death – that is, death to the 
stings of life, which is the highest life – may be symbolised by the serpent. 
The world of vision has been symbolised in all ages by various priestly cults 
in all countries by the serpent. In my personal language or vision, I call this 
serpent a jelly-fish. The serpent – the jelly-fish – the over-conscious mind. 
The realisation of this over-conscious world is the concern of the artist. But 
this world is there for everyone. The minds of men differ but the over-minds 
are alike.529 
 
Here, H. D. has set up three pairs of cause and effect: peace is a consequence of 
martyrdom, paradise is created by love, and death is the inevitable end result of life. 
She goes on to equate death with over-consciousness, creativity, or ‘the highest life,’ 
through the symbol of the serpent, and further concludes that the realisation of the 
‘world of death’ and the ‘world of vision’ – which is equated with what she calls the 
‘over-conscious world’ – ‘is the concern of the artist.’530 For H. D. this is of great 
importance to the construction of the self, in particular as it relates to the self as a 
creative artist; the universal consciousness or the world of the ‘over-mind’ is a 
universally shared state of consciousness that relates to artistic creation and spiritual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
529 H. D., Notes, 40. 
530 H. D., Notes, 40. 
Sanna Melin Schyllert 
 219 
refinement. As suggested above, this is H. D.’s conception of a plane of reality 
where an experience of intersubjectivity with not only current but past and future 
selves is made possible. 
However, as opposed to the Freudian sublimated consciousness – to which 
the over-mind seems to correspond – H. D.’s concept retains sexual instinct and 
sensual awareness. This brings together martyrdom and creativity, both seen as 
sacrifices of the self, without the need for a separation of sexuality from the self. 
Similarly to Mary Butts, and opposed to May Sinclair, H. D. found that artistic 
creation may co-exist with having a sex life, in women as well as men, and that a 
willingness to sacrifice the self is essential for both. 
The self, then, is for H. D. a multifaceted entity, one that cannot really be 
simplified and turned into a diagnostic model. Being influenced by Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory, H. D. was both intrigued and made uncomfortable by the 
formulaic descriptions of the self that ‘the Professor’ offered. She suggests that 
Freud was less deterministic in person, however, despite his tendency to categorise 
and look for recurring patterns: ‘There are all these shapes, lines, graphs, the 
hieroglyph of the unconscious, and the Professor had first opened the field to the 
study of this vast, unexplored region. He himself – at least to me personally – 
deplored the tendency to fix ideas too firmly to set symbols, or to weld them 
inexorably.’531 At the same time, she is palpably frustrated when she feels 
misunderstood by Freud, which is expressed matter-of-factly as ‘the Professor was 
not always right.’532 It also seems to bother her that Freud does not want her to be 
systematic or to write about her therapy: ‘Again, the Professor asked me if I 
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“prepared” for my sessions … The Professor repeated that he wanted the work to be 
spontaneous. He does not encourage me to take notes, in fact, would rather I did not. 
… I discontinued the notes, at the Professor’s suggestion.’533 As Meegan Kennedy 
states, Freud ‘generates and authorizes his narrative of the self’ and considers 
patients’ own narrative to be skewed due to their illness; ‘the hysteric cannot herself 
transcend the knots of her narrative.’534 H. D. was evidently considered by Freud to 
be unsuited to construct her own narrative due to her tendency to make it legendary 
and add supernatural elements to it. She comments on their differing views of 
elements of the supernatural: ‘The miracle of the fairy tale is incontrovertible; 
Sigmund Freud would apply, rationalize it.’535 Wishing to be in charge of her own 
narrative and thereby her own construction of self, H. D. was not comfortable with 
being classified as a type according to a logical path of reason, with no consideration 
for anomalies or divergences from Freud’s schema. 
In Psyche Reborn, Susan Stanford Friedman discusses at length H. D.’s 
disagreements with Freud in two chapters, one on their divergent views on ‘greater 
transcendental issues’ – a quotation from Tribute to Freud regarding a recurring 
discussion between them about materialism versus transcendentalism – and the other 
on the topic of gender identity and creativity.536 Friedman writes here that H. D.’s 
‘purpose in working with Freud inevitably incorporated a desire to understand 
herself as woman’, a perception that all too often pervades feminist readings and that 	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unintentionally reinforces a binary conception of gender.537 Locked in the binary 
trap, not even an acceptance of ‘androgyny’ can overcome the inherent devaluation 
of one in favour of the other: ‘Freud’s insistence on the bisexual nature of all 
psyches proved liberating to people like H. D. who could not limit themselves to the 
half life of either masculinity or femininity. But Freud’s value-laden perspective did 
not legitimate such transcendence of traditional gender identities and sex roles.’538 In 
this critique of the Freudian valuation of male above female, there is an implicit 
agreement with what is being criticised in the conviction of there being two sexes, 
that it would be ‘limiting’ to conform to one of them wholly – it suggests that the 
reason for H. D.’s prominence as a writer is because she transcends the limitations 
that are perceived to be inherent in femininity. 
Deirdre Anne Pettipiece falls into a similar trap when she notices that H. D. 
does not fit easily into any of the categories that Pettipeace sets up as binary pairs – 
male/female, hetero-/homosexual, American/European – an issue she tries to solve 
by suggesting that ‘at different points in her life, H. D. is one or the other, never 
successfully “both.” Like her sexuality, H. D.’s nationality shifts but does not 
stick’.539 This problem is created by the misconception that all things should be 
forced into categories, even avant-garde authors whose very purpose it is to not fit 
into any order. Claiming that H. D. is not ‘successfully’ both American and 
European or hetero- and homosexual is indicative of a low valuation  of being 
between categories. 
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The same problem resurfaces in Friedman’s reasoning in Penelope’s Web about H. 
D.’s prose in relation to her poetry. The work that H. D. produced before the First 
World War and rose to fame for was primarily poetry, and this fact – in conjunction 
with the checkered publication history of her prose – has rendered a common 
conception of the prose works as inferior in quality. The feminisation of prose and 
the adjacent historical view of the novel as a lesser form of literature than poetry is 
brought up by Stanford Friedman in her discussion of a letter from H. D. to John 
Cournos, a valued friend and confidant during the war: ‘Echoing the cultural division 
of labor into (male) production and (female) reproduction, H. D.’s poet is the 
primary producer of art, while the prose writer is the secondary reproducer of the 
poet, merely a means to a poetic teleology. The novelist fills the position of wife, 
handmaiden and helpmeet to the authentic artist, the poet.’ 540 Stanford Friedman 
writes that it is the idea that the perceived femininity inherent in prose – 
reproduction, telling a tale, not to mention the history of the novel form – is what 
makes it seem artistically weaker to H. D. than her poetry. However, it is far more 
likely that it is simply a matter of H. D. being discouraged from writing prose by 
those around her; Richard Aldington emphatically instructed H. D. not to write prose 
in a 1918 letter – ‘Prose? No!’ he wrote to her in 1918 – and Cournos evidently gave 
her negative feedback on the prose draft she sent him.541 His letter to H. D. has not 
survived, but it can be inferred from her reply that he did not advise her to keep 
working on the draft: ‘You are quite right about the novel and I shall certainly chuck 
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it.’542 She did not consider her poetry to be as self-exploratory as her prose, and she 
makes apologies for her writing, claiming to be unable to keep her ‘personal self’ out 
of her prose: ‘I do not put my personal self into my poems. But my personal self has 
got between me and my real self, my real artist personality. And in order to clear the 
ground, I have tried to write things down – in order to think straight, I have 
endeavoured to write straight.’543 This echoes her later declaration in Tribute to 
Freud that she tried to used writing as a way to ‘free’ herself of ‘experiences – my 
own and those of many of my contemporaries’ – clearly referring to the traumatic 
events of the war years.544 
Stanford Friedman notes the apologetic tone of the letter to Cournos and 
suggests that H. D. ‘adapts a rhetoric of duplicitous self-effacement that reflects their 
different positions within the gender system.’545 While I agree that H. D. is being 
self-effacing, there is nothing in the letter to suggest that she is being rhetorical or 
dishonest. On the contrary, the problematic history of the creation and publication of 
her prose, in addition to the letter in its entirety, strongly suggests that the criticism is 
internalised and that she did indeed ‘chuck’ several novels that were not considered 
fit for publication in her lifetime. 
I would argue that it is possible to think of H. D.’s prose as a subversion of 
the dichotomy of the whore/Madonna complex, given the strong feminist potential of 
her work. Containing such latent possibilities, the prose venture must have produced 
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ambivalence within H. D.; she repeatedly abandoned her prose, only to be drawn 
back to it again, in a never-ending game of trying ‘to clear the ground’.546 H. D. 
writes to Cournos that ‘the novel is not intended as a work of art’, and intertwines 
compliments to him with further self-criticism: ‘You are and have been for a long 
time, a symbol of strength to me. … Your knowledge of my strength helps me as 
well as your knowledge of my weakness. … Don’t take my novel seriously, dear 
John, though the fact that you have done so is another proof of your good faith.’547 
Not only is H. D. apologetic – she seems almost ashamed of the ‘personal self’ that 
has crept into the narrative, which she feels ought not to be taken ‘seriously’. The 
letter epitomises her difficulties as a woman writer, but her continued work and its 
subsequent publication shows the gradual acceptance of such subversive works of 
fiction, be they regarded as art or not. 
 Writing through the trauma could have been an empowering way of being in 
control of the story for H. D. In the authorial position, she wielded a power over past 
events, as she could tell the story from whichever perspective she wanted and omit 
or change details that she found unimportant or detrimental. However, the struggle to 
gain control over her own narrative was affected by the problematics of male–female 
power relations, and impeded by feedback given by various male contemporaries – a 
factor that is likely to have played a part in H. D.’s many edits of the manuscript of 
Bid Me to Live and her decision not to publish Asphodel. H. D. thought of Asphodel 
as an ‘early edition’ of Bid Me to Live and left instructions, both in a letter to 
Norman Holmes Pearson and on the manuscript itself, to destroy it. Bid Me to Live 
was first drafted in February – March 1939 and subsequently went through edits later 
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that year, and then again in various periods during the late 1940s and early 1950s.548 
It should be noted that Marianne Moore gave H. D. favourable feedback on Paint It 
Today in a 1921 letter: ‘The expressing of the inexpressible is carried to a high pitch 
of perfection; the whole thing is poignant – literally filtered through a rainbow. It is 
surely the spectrum of a consciousness.’549 As shall be noted further on, the 
problematic type of feedback that H. D. received from male contemporaries and 
friends was fictionalised in several of the Madrigal novels and is particularly 
noticeable in Bid Me to Live. 
The demands for women’s sacrifice due to male–female power relations also 
factor into H. D.’s fictional works. For instance, in The Sword Went Out to Sea 
(written 1946-7, published 2007) Delia’s lack of self-definition increases as she gets 
more involved and obsessed with Lord Howell and he, in turn, becomes dismissive 
of her. She is asked by him to give up her involvement with spiritualism; he thinks 
that he has a prerogative to be involved in that world and tries to use his status as a 
decorated war hero to oust Delia as his rival. He increasingly treats her with 
contempt, prompting her to suppose that he thinks of her as a ‘being of a lower 
order’ – although he explicitly says that she is not – because he suggests that her 
relayed messages from the beyond are false.550 He is, in effect, trying to devalue her 
work so that she will give it up. 
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Already in her early career, H. D. took an interest in the sacrifice of women for the 
benefit of the community; in 1919, The Egoist published what is in its title called a 
translation of Euripides’ Iphigenia in Aulis by H. D., which should really be termed 
an interpretation, since ‘[a] literal, word-for-word version of so well-known an 
author as Euripides would be useless and supererogatory’ as the writer herself put 
it.551 It is significant that H. D. took a specific interest in ancient Greece because of 
what the remains of that culture (as she knew it) meant to her; Elizabeth Willis 
argues that ‘[m]ore than anything, H. D.’s war experience solidified the importance 
of the transhistorical aspects of her work, with an emphasis on poetry’s capacity for 
“spiritual realism” in the context of political history.’552 While it is certainly true that 
H. D. used her interest in Hellenism to deal with war trauma and similarly used her 
war experience to conjure up historical events in her imagination, it was not only the 
war that served as a connection between H. D. and Hellenism. It may have come to 
strengthen a fascination that was already there before the start of the war, the 
existence of which is clear from her early Imagist poetry: one example being the four 
poems ‘Hermes of the Ways’, ‘Incantation’, ‘Oread’, and ‘Priapus,’ all published in 
The Egoist in February 1914. As previously argued by Claire Buck, the mingling of 
aesthetics and spirituality that H. D. recognised in Hellenism is outlined in Notes On 
Thought and Vision and later in Paint It Today, where Midget tells Althea of a statue 
of Artemis that is a work of art as well as a representation of a revered and powerful 
goddess: ‘H. D. takes this view [as found in Jane Harrison, Ancient Art and Ritual 	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(Bradford: Moonraker Press, 1978), 10-1] that Greek drama and myth had their 
origins in religious ritual as the basis for her own ideas about the role of 
contemporary art.’553 It is arguable that this aesthetic not only derives from 
Hellenism, but from the age of Decadence during which H. D. was in her formative 
years. Cassandra Laity posits that ‘H. D. constructed a female Romantic myth of 
origins from Decadent monologue or lyric songs of deviant desire’ in HERmione.554 
H. D.’s Iphigenia in Aulis asks the question of who will need to be sacrificed 
in the war in order for the gods of victory to be placated. At first, Iphigenia does not 
go to her sacrifice willingly, since she is not initially given the sense of being 
sacralised either before or after the killing. Rather, she thinks of herself as being left 
in disgrace and cast aside after the rite: 
 
And like a little beast 
… 
They will leave you 
With stained throat … 
And we ask this – where truth is, 
Of what use is valour and is worth? 
For evil has conquered the race,  
There is no power but in base men, 
Nor any man whom the gods do not hate.555 
 
This transformation of ritual sacrifice into a murder that does not so much cleanse 
the community as vilify it, and ultimately place a curse upon it, is a signal that the 
ordering principle of sacrifice has gone awry. The ritual ceremony that was intended 
to bring peace and stability has become an oppressive power structure that attempts 	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to force order back into place through the performance of a violent and destructive 
sacrificial rite, of which, it appears, the victim does not approve: ‘O I am miserable: / 
You cherished me, my mother, / But even you desert me. / I am sent to an empty 
place.’556 The resemblance to Christ’s sense of being forsaken on the cross is 
evident. It appears that it is necessary for the victim to approve to make the act into a 
sacrifice here, or at least that the sacrifice is worth more where the victim is ready 
and willing to go to her death, as the narrative is rejecting the sacrifice in this 
instance. 
However, as Achilles steps in to defend Iphigenia, an act of heroism that she 
understands may rob him of his life, she decides to go with dignity and even 
readiness to her slaughter. This affords her the respect and affection of the 
community, who realise what she is prepared to give up for them, something that she 
almost appears to assume: ‘Hail me now. … For I come to do sacrifice, / To break 
the might of the curse, / To honour the queen, if she permit, / The great one, with my 
death.’557 She also states her forgiveness of the community that has brought its 
calamity on her: 
 
Hail, land of my birth. 
Hail Mykenae, where I once dwelt – [calling upon the city of Perseus] – you 
brought me to the Greek light 
And I will not hold you guilty 
For my death.  
Ch. Your name will never be forgotten, 
Your honour will always last.  
Iph. Alas, day, you brought light, 
You trailed splendour 
You showed us god: 
I salute you, most precious one, 
But I go to a new place, 
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The community, in the voice of the Chorus, promises that her sacrifice is not in vain 
and that she will not be forgotten. The ‘new life’ promised to Iphigenia is 
reminiscent of Christian martyrdom in the sense that her death for a higher cause 
will be rewarded with a good afterlife. It also evokes war sacrifice, if giving your life 
for your country can be considered the most honourable death imaginable. 
In the long poem Helen in Egypt (written 1952-4, published 1961), H. D. re-
writes the sacrifice of Iphigenia. Janice S. Robinson’s reads scapegoating into 
Iphigenia’s fate and comments: ‘A difference between Girard and H. D. is that 
Girard does not regard woman as the sacrificial victim, while H. D. sees her as the 
perpetual object of man’s violence.’559 While it is interesting that Robinson sees the 
parallel between H. D. and Girard, she loses sight of H. D.’s complexity when 
writing sacrifice as a concept, not just as an archaic act of violence; a woman is not 
just an object of violence, but becomes a subject in her own right if that violence is 
sacrifice, in which case the act is not only the destruction of Iphigenia as an object 
but also the creation of her as a subject. Sarah Graham’s article ‘Falling Walls: 
Trauma and Testimony in H. D.’s Trilogy,’ which also deals with H. D.’s later 
poetry, similarly reads sacrifice as an act of pure violence, using Trilogy as an 
example of the expression of H. D.’s ‘traumatised poetic.’ Based on a reading of 
Iphigenia in Aulis and the biographical information on H. D.’s experiences of trauma 
in both world wars, Graham posits that H. D. considers sacrifice a ‘threat’, which is a 
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one-sided approach to sacrifice that does not acknowledge its potential for self-
realisation.560 
Robinson further posits that ‘[i]n her translation H. D. presents herself as 
both Iphigenia and Helen…she, Iphigenia, is being sacrificed so that the Greek (the 
poets) may instead have Helen, the ideal impersonal presentation of H. D., through 
her poetry.’561 Again, this points to a highly problematic distinction between H. D. 
the autobiographical, personal prose writer and H. D. the ‘impersonal’ poet – or 
perhaps between Hilda Doolittle the human being and H. D. the symbol of Imagism 
– that is mingled with the idea of H. D. as either lascivious or sexless. In Robinson’s 
reading, Iphigenia is a passionate, almost hysterical woman and Helen a cold, 
senseless marble statue to be worshipped, which simply boils down to an 
understanding of H. D. from a Freudian and male perspective, as these figures neatly 
fit into the two sides of the whore/madonna complex. 
In Bid Me to Live, working with a Greek classic is fictionalised – Julia 
Ashton is making a translation in much the same manner that H. D. went about 
interpreting Iphigenia – and here the very translation process is described in terms of 
sacrifice:  
 
She was self-effacing in her attack on those Greek words, she was 
flamboyantly ambitious. … She was bargaining with each word. She brooded 	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over each word, as if to hatch it. Then she tried to forget each word, for 
“translations” enough existed and she was no scholar. She did not want to 
“know” Greek in that sense. … She was arrogant and she was intrinsically 
humble before this discovery. Her own. Anyone can translate the meaning of 
the word. She wanted the shape, the feel of it, the character of it, as if it had 
been freshly minted. … She wanted to coin new words.562 
 
As in Death of Felicity Taverner, where Scylla’s control of the narrative allows her 
to plan and condone a scapegoating in order to bring structure to her community, 
Julia connects sacrifice with being in charge of storytelling, but in a different way. 
Here, it is the immersion of the self into the story that in the end allows her to 
assume power over it. Julia tries to immerse herself completely in the Greek 
language in order to be able to make it her own. To effect this, she must be ‘self-
effacing;’ it is as though the words will not let her master them unless she is 
prepared to offer herself as a victim of the words. The paradoxical nature of being 
both arrogant and humble at the same time reflects the ambivalent quality of her 
sacrifice, since she is giving up her self only to gain ownership of the Greek words 
and thereby, paradoxically, retrieve a sense of pride in herself. 
The most significant point for my thesis is that these accounts – fictional as 
well as real – of struggling for power in a gender hierarchy, and having to make 
adjoining sacrifices, are centred on the process of constructing a narrative; even the 
‘spiritual work’ done by Delia Alton may be considered creative in the sense that it 
enables her to conjure up hitherto unknown worlds and, as the supposed author of 
The Sword Went Out to Sea, put these images into writing. For H. D., creating a 
narrative entails the creation of a subject, a narrator, a self. This entity may be 
destabilised and elusive, as H. D.’s narrators often are, but its existence is still 
palpable and – more importantly – in charge of the narrative. 	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‘The state she had been in was a deadly crucifixion’: Sacrifice and Narrative 
Negotiations of the Self in the Madrigal Cycle563 
The protagonists and intermittent narrators of the Madrigal cycle all seek out various 
ways in which to shape their respective identities throughout their narratives. In fact, 
the perennial dynamic of discovery and loss of the self is the driving force behind the 
movement in the novels, for when H. D.’s characters lose themselves, they 
paradoxically also find their true inner selves. In the course of the growth of these 
characters, they frequently stumble in the attempt to find themselves. While they 
search for identities in the mythscape of ancient Greece, they are simultaneously told 
by others who they are or what they should be. This invariably triggers a downward 
spiral into self-doubt and depression, which sometimes culminates in a complete 
nervous breakdown. Similarly to May Sinclair, H. D. portrays the difficulty of both 
carving out a true identity for oneself as a woman while maintaining a normative 
role in early twentieth-century society. It is only in solitude, in nature, through 
writing, and – for H. D. – in lesbian love affairs that the characters find peace of 
mind and a space where they are allowed, unapologetically, to be themselves. 
It is through writing that H. D. explores the creation of the self as a subject, 
and sacrifice enables her to express the tensions between the establishment and the 
inevitable destruction of that subject. Matte Robinson states that, in Vale Ave 
(written 1957, published 1982), ‘“we” burn on the altar that is “love,” suggesting 
that love consumes something as a sacrifice. Most literally, what is sacrificed is the 
first person plural, and, it follows, also the singular.’564 In this section, I will pick 
this discussion up where Robinson leaves it, and look at how the pronoun shifts in 	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the narrative voice that occur in the four novels of the Madrigal cycle create the 
space for a negotiation of definitions of the self. 
 
‘[S]he is HER and I am HER’: The Circular Formation of the Self in HERmione565 
H. D.’s preoccupation with the self is perhaps never so obvious as in HERmione, in 
which the eponymous character constantly appears to question her individuality, 
notably in the declaration on the very first page that ‘“I am Her,” she said to 
herself… “Her, Her, Her.”’566 The statement is repeated throughout the text, as 
though Hermione has a need to constantly remind herself of her identity: ‘I am Her. I 
am Hermione.’567 Hermione is searching for selfhood through a community of 
creativity or spirituality; to create her self as a subject, she must also be validated as 
such by others. Before she gets to the point of meeting people with whom she feels 
an artistic or spiritual connection, she is dependent on her fiancé George because he 
appears to be the only one who understands her until she meets Fayne Rabb, the first 
ever female object of her passion. HERmione portrays several instances of 
frustration with being unable to express to others the affinity she feels with some 
people; one example is where Hermione is talking with a girl called Nellie – with 
whom she feels no particular connection – who asks her about Fayne Rabb: ‘How to 
get it across to Nellie for she is HER and I am HER.’568 Here, Hermione thinks of 
herself and Fayne as so intimately related that they are one and the same person, a 
phenomenon that is expressed even more clearly in Paint It Today, as I will show 
below. 	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HERmione is mainly told in the third person – as are the other three Madrigal novels 
– but first person narration breaks through intermittently, beginning just after the 
first expressions of disassociation with the self: ‘…she was not Hermione, she was 
not any more Her Gart, what was she? ... I am Her Gart, my name is Her Gart. I am 
Hermione Gart.’569 There is no doubt a clear identification of narrator with character 
here, and in this novel the relationship is not further obscured by shifts between first 
and third person narration. 
Hermione’s sense of identity and sense of self, however, are repeatedly 
questioned, and, with them, the identity and self of the narrator. This does not mean 
that there is any confusion as to the centre of narrative gravity, since the memories, 
thoughts, and feelings remain recognisable to the narrator/character, both as ‘her’ 
and ‘I’ even if neither perspective succeeds in identifying her self as ‘Her’ or 
Hermione: 
 
Her negated Her and all the poems I slaved over, copied out and out were no 
use. Were all the poems no use? Some poems are useful one way, some 
poems another (she ran to catch the trolley) and I used one poem. “Thou has 
forgotten,” she chanted in an undertone as she slid into a side seat, “O 
summer swallow” and I’m glad it’s empty this time. “Do not spit on the 
floor” she read and “Wear Washable Whalebone” and “Extra, Extra, Extra” a 
boy shouted and “All about the big fire” above the rumbling wheels. I’ll be 
late. Eugenia will be furious.570 
 
Hermione feels that her self as an object, the third person pronoun and the short 
version of her given name, will suffocate or negate her as a subject. The poetry she 
produces, or re-produces by copying, is threatened by the object self. It is significant 
that the text also points to her name as restrictive: ‘“Hermione is a gull name…you 
read beautifully” cut up and across the heavy thing that she now saw was destined to 	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entrap Her. I will be caught finally, I will be broken. Not broken, walled in, 
incarcerated. Her will be incarcerated in Her.’571 Her, short for Hermione, is only 
distinguishable from the word ‘her’ through context or when it is placed mid-
sentence, creating a muddling effect for the reader, who has to stop and consider the 
sense of sentences that include both the name and the pronoun: ‘Her ankles, 
concentrated terror (that scythe shadow) impelled Her Gart… Her negated Her…’572  
The continuous wordplay on the short version of Hermione’s name and the 
third person singular feminine pronoun increases the sense that an identity based on 
words is not a real, stable form of self, but that the self must constantly transform 
and change, as sacrifice too suggests. It is suggested by Matte Robinson and 
Demetrios P. Tryphonopoulos that the constant reiteration of Hermione’s name is a 
way for her to merge her subject and object selves.573 I propose that, rather than 
being a strategy for overcoming the opposition between experiencing the self as a 
subject versus object, the textual repetition of ‘HER’, ‘Her’, and ‘her’ – the 
continuous play on the word as given name and pronoun – expresses the sensation of 
fear as well as that of freedom involved in sacrifice, because it entails both the risk 
of losing the self and the simultaneous chance of strengthening the self. It 
acknowledges the never-ending dialectic or negotiation between subjectivity and 
objectivity, and enables the realisation of the impossibility of ever merging the two 
for a lengthy period of time. Moments of convergence do occur, but these are brief, 
flighty, dream-like flashes of transcendence: ‘For the moment, holding to the 
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moment, I know this. I was a wire, connecting me with such things in my 
incandescence…wire flared out. Hermione will say all that was some dream.’574 
Hermione tries to re-establish a connection with her old self and identity 
through words and works of fiction. Considering the fact that her parents have taken 
her name from Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale, she identifies with the work itself: 
‘I am out of the Temple Shakespeare. I am out of The Winter’s Tale. …I am out of 
this book.’575 The Winter’s Tale is mentioned only briefly, but it has a number of 
intertextual parallels on various planes. In the play, Queen Hermione is suspected of 
being pregnant with a child that is not her husband’s, although she – as opposed to 
H. D.’s Hermione in Asphodel – turns out to be innocent of adultery. It may be 
inferred that the use of The Winter’s Tale indicates that Hermione is not to be 
considered as being guilty of any crime, since her husband starts having an affair 
long before she becomes pregnant with Vane; the rules applied in society do not 
apply to Hermione in this case, as she does not appear to consider herself to be in the 
wrong by having a relationship with Vane. Shakespeare’s character ends up calling 
the child Perdita, which is what H. D. named her own daughter, who was the result 
of an extramarital affair with Cecil Gray. 
When losing hold of her self, Hermione describes herself as spinning in 
‘[c]oncentric circles’ and thereby being ‘smudged out.’576 The twirling is reminiscent 
of the whirling dervishes of sufism, who meditate by performing a spinning 
movement that allows them to let go of themselves in order to experience absolute 
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reality. This portrays a conflict that consists of the longing for an individual self and 
simultaneously realising that it does not exist away from community – the self can 
only be found as part of a larger whole. It is also reminiscent of the idea of circular 
or ritual time; the suspension of reality through gyration is reimagined through the 
circularity of narratives that take place on several different planes yet belong within 
the same storyline, such as The Sword Went Out to Sea. Historical circularity is also 
effected in the Magna Graeca novels Hedylus and Palimpsest, as well as in the long 
poem Helen in Egypt, where by rewriting historical events with a feminist spirit, H. 
D. recuperates a wounded female history. Circularity is thereby both indicative of 
losing control and regaining it.577 
Another such twirling incident can be found in the short story ‘Kora and Ka’ 
(1930). In this story, as in much of H. D.’s prose, the first person narrator shares its 
identity with the protagonist John Helforth, yet the character is sometimes described 
in the third person, as separate from the narrator. In the first pages of the story, the 
narrator presents itself as the conscious self or the spiritual self within Helforth: ‘I 
am that sort of shadow they used to call a Ka, in Egypt. A Ka lives after the body is 
dead. I shall live after Helforth is dead.’578 The mind of Helforth, who is deeply 
traumatised by the war and has grave doubts about his own identity and existence, is 
described as ‘[treading] a ferris-wheel’: ‘His mind rotated … ground round and 
round, till Helforth forgot man, men, women. Helforth forced Helforth to go on in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577 For an analysis of circling and spiralling in Trilogy (written and first published as 
three separate volumes in the 1940s, first published as one volume 1973), see Susan 
Gubar, ‘The Echoing Spell of H. D.’s Trilogy,’ in Signets: Reading H. D., ed. Susan 
Stanford Friedman and Rachel Blau DuPlessis (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1990), 297-317. 
578 H. D., Kora and Ka with Mira-Mare (New York: New Directions, 1996), 9. 
Sanna Melin Schyllert 
 238 
ferris-wheel of iron circle’.579 Here, the spinning movement is again indicative of 
losing grip of oneself and splitting the self into object and subject: ‘If he lets go the 
hold that I have over Helforth, Helforth will begin the old tread wheel … [that] will 
crush me beneath it’.580 The narrating persona is in danger of being destroyed by 
Helforth’s gyration; it is caught in the bind of being a part of him, yet perceiving 
itself as separate entity due to Helforth’s mental instability: ‘There are two things 
that mitigate against me, one is my mind, one is the lack of it.’581 Just as in 
HERmione, the ability to eradicate or distort the self in a sort of spiritual centrifuge 
is considered with both anxiety and anticipation, even though both texts seem to 
settle on regarding it as a perilous exercise. 
The danger of having an unstable conception of self is also expressed as an 
anxiety with regard to names for H. D. and her narratives. Just as her fictional alter 
ego is named Hermione Gart, Julia Ashton, Midget Defreddie, and so on, so did 
Hilda Doolittle – or Hilda Aldington under which she sometimes published during 
her marriage – wish to fragment her own name and authorship with a plethora of 
pseudonyms: John Helforth is the intended pseudonym for Nights (written 1935, 
published 1986), Helga Dart is the name used for the author on the typescript of 
Paint It Today, Delia Alton for The Sword Went Out to Sea, and Helga Doorn, which 
was used on the title page of the HERmione manuscript as well as her screen name in 
for example Borderline, the 1930 film made with Bryher and Kenneth 
Macpherson.582 Stanford Friedman further elucidates on the topic of alter egos as 	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indicative of both intradiegetic and extradiegetic differential selves in H. D.’s 
writing: 
 
The writer, in H. D.’s view, not only creates the self-in-the-text, but more 
fundamentally constructs the author in the process of writing. The ‘authors’ 
of her poetry and prose are different – the one visionary, the other personal. 
They are personae, who originate in and refer back to the historical writer, 
but are never her equivalent. Fabricated, but not false, each ‘author’ has her 
own voice and serves a special function within the evolution of the living 
woman writer. H. D.’s self-reflexive construction of these ‘authors’ is 
characteristically modernist, analogous to Yeats’s self-conscious theorizing 
about masks and to Pound’s statement on poetic identity in 
‘Vorticism’[1914]: ‘In the “search for oneself,” …one gropes, one finds some 
seeming verity. One says, “I am” this, that, or the other, and with the words 
scarcely uttered one ceases to be that thing.’583 
 
Both Helforth and Alton also appear as fictional characters in Kora and Ka and 
Sword respectively. It may be more useful to think of these as heteronyms – such as 
those used by Fernando Pessoa – rather than pseudonyms, since Helforth and Alton 
are ‘characters’ in their own right who have characteristics that are separate from 
those of H. D. 
Hermione’s attention is directed to the word ‘AUM’ when she looks at a 
book that stands beside The Winter’s Tale on the shelf and thinks that it could be The 
Mahabharata, an ancient Indian epic, or ‘one of those translations,’ presumably 
meaning a translation of an Eastern classical text into English.584 When Hermione 
realises the sacredness invested in the word, she is instinctively scared of its 
implications: ‘I am the word AUM. Hermione dropped the volume. This frightened 
her. God is in a word. God is in a word. God is in HER. She said, “HER, HER, HER. 
I am Her, I am Hermione… I am the word AUM.” This frightened her.’585 The 	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syllable  , commonly transcribed as Aum or Om, is considered by Hindus to be the 
holiest of all syllables. It is a representation of God or Brahman, the absolute reality 
or world soul. It is as though Hermione unconsciously knows about the sacred nature 
of this syllable that links words, narration and the sacred. It is not like any other 
name, word, or syllable, and it has to be treated with more respect than other, more 
mundane words. The deep sense of significance that comes over her is too much to 
bear at this stage; she tries instead to repeat her given name so as to keep herself 
grounded and present in corporeality. Finding her true identity in Aum is a 
suggestion that her real, inner self is not made up of the physical person whose name 
is Hermione, but rather of the intangible soul, which is part of a greater whole: an 
entity with a sacred name that may be designated as the world soul, absolute reality, 
or supreme existence. This notion is present in Hinduism and various versions of 
philosophical idealism, but also in Daoism, a belief system H. D. apparently was 
familiar with: it is mentioned briefly in Notes on Thought and Vision (1919) as the 
‘philosophy of the Tao.’ 586 It is hardly surprising that H. D. knew about Daoism 
since she was acquainted with Arthur Waley, a translator and scholar of Chinese 
poetry and religious texts. 
Clearly, names are meaningful but also interchangeable for H. D., as can be 
seen by the many different names the protagonist is called in any one novel of the 
Madrigal cycle, and in Asphodel, where Fayne Rabb is referred to as Josepha on at 
least two occasions.587 The character of Fayne Rabb is presumed to be modelled on 
Frances Gregg, the first woman with whom H. D. fell in love. Josepha was Frances 
Gregg’s middle name and the Gregg character in Paint It Today is called Josepha. It 
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is possible, then, that this is only a slip of the pen in so far as H. D. had Gregg in 
mind when writing the passage. She had not prepared the manuscript for publication; 
if she had, these two name changes may have been taken out. Robert Spoo, the 
editor, does not comment on this slip in his 1992 introduction. 
Hermione’s whole self cannot be found in only her given name, then, 
because it is more complex; different aspects of her are associated with different 
names. Her search for an identity in words thereby concludes with the discovery of 
something so momentous as to be both incomprehensible and even frightening; 
although Aum is a word, it is a sacred word that contains the power to create change: 
a religious or magical incantation.588 
In comparison with the other Madrigal novels, HERmione displays a more 
subtle – or perhaps less anarchic – form of narrative experiment, which, although its 
events take place before those in Asphodel, makes it palpable that it was written 
several years later. In the initial pages of the novel, which have already been 
discussed, the premise of the pronoun shifts is laid down and there is no mistaking 
that the narrator throughout is to be read as the protagonist, as the first person 
pronoun is occasionally dropped into what is otherwise mostly a third person 
narrative, always referring to Hermione. The following example shows the brevity 
and relative insignificance of the shifts, making it easily overlooked and seemingly 
meaningless: ‘Minnie had married Bertrand Gart. My brother Bertrand Gart. 
Hermione hid her brother in her gesture…’589 These pronoun shifts have more in 
common with May Sinclair’s style than with the shifts found H. D.’s earlier work in 
so much as they do not generate any greater confusion as to the identity of the 	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narrator. However, they do still question the boundaries of the individual self. 
Towards the end of the novel, Hermione experiences an increased sense of 
chaos, which is noticeable both in the narration, as it shifts increasingly more often, 
and in the storyline, as the friendship between her and Fayne Rabb move towards a 
definitive break. Hermione feels as though she is being punished by the gods to run a 
marathon towards a determined, deadly end: 
 
You are doomed Hermione for the message you carry is in forgotten 
metres…run, stripped across snowbanks, fly downward with pulse beating 
and pummelling veins at either side of a burning forehead; beating, beating, 
run, run Hermione. Pheidippides run, run. You have a message but you are 
doomed Hermione. … No god asks too much…humanity is in a god’s touch. 
… the message-bearer next in line has turned against you…dead, dead or 
forgotten. Hecate at crossroads, a destruction…you have a double 
burden…run, run Hermione, run for yourself and Fayne Rabb.590 
 
Hermione feels left alone with the weight of a burden that belongs to both her and 
Fayne – condemnation to a life on the margins – because Fayne is about to acquire a 
husband, just as Hermione has forsaken all thought of ever marrying her fiancé. The 
‘message’ in the passage is the narrative of Hermione’s sexuality, which does not 
suit the time and place in which she has been condemned to tell – and live – her 
story. Her sacrifice, then, is to tell it anyway, despite the burden it entails. 
 
‘[Y]ou can’t kill your self’: The Chasm and the Self in Asphodel 
While HERmione is a tale of adolescence written decades after the time when its 
events are supposed to have taken place, Asphodel is an account that roughly covers 
the period 1912-1919; it was composed only two years later. The novel charts the 
continuation of Hermione Gart’s life as she travels to Europe, settles in England, 
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marries Jerrold Darrington, and lives through the First World War, which ultimately 
causes her marriage to fall apart. As in HERmione, the pronoun shifts occur 
throughout and are intermittent, sometimes occurring abruptly and sometimes within 
long paragraphs, interspersed with imperative clauses and sentences: ‘…my 
husband’s an officer… she counted on her fingers… Lie with your head propped 
up… for you need all this Morgan le Fay. Don’t sing, eat. Gather twigs and burn 
them. Pray to your near gods for God lacks in inventiveness and this has happened – 
this has happened.’591 The rambling, winding nature of these paragraphs, written in a 
stream of consciousness style, are different compared with those looked at in 
HERmione, which are much shorter and more staccato in rhythm. 
The second person is also used more in Asphodel, particularly in the second 
half of the novel. Here, the reader can never be quite sure whether the narrator is 
addressing herself, her unborn child, her partner Beryl – all three of whom are or 
might be referred to as Morgan le Fay – the reader, or some otherwise unknown 
entity. In the novel’s first half, it is more clear when the second person is used to 
whom it refers, for instance in inner monologues of the joint narrator and protagonist 
– that is, not within inverted commas – addressed to fellow characters: ‘She had felt 
the peace of nothingness and she supposed she must now pay. The woman pays. She 
had paid. She was paying. O Darrington, where are you? I sent you away. You were 
the one person who could understand this. … Someone, something wanted her to 
write. For writing and life were not diametric opposites.’592 This passage clearly 
mixes third person stream of consciousness with the first person, not unlike the more 
conservative pronoun shifts seen in May Sinclair; it is as though the narration zooms 
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in on the character who, for a brief moment, acts as a subjective first person narrator. 
Another instance is during a music performance by Walter Dowel, one of 
Hermione’s Paris friends and a great pianist, during which a long internal monologue 
of Hermione’s is recounted and where more than one other character is addressed in 
the second person: 
  
It’s almost as if you, Clara, understood what I was, am going through. … But 
you are stronger than I and O Walter poor little Walter they started you when 
you were three. … If I weren’t so sorry, didn’t feel you so much Walter, I 
couldn’t myself sit so still here… But you Walter, they put you to school 
when you were three and don’t you see, all my life it’s killed me, this that 
they didn’t teach me something when I was three. But it doesn’t matter. 
Things don’t just happen and if I can’t play it makes it better for you, for just 
this moment. I am crucified for you and you for the thing beyond me that is 
getting through to you. Is this your own music Walter?593 
 
Interestingly, the mention of crucifixion – referring to Hermione’s lack of practical 
or artistic skill, which is perceived to be relative to Walter’s in the sense that if she is 
unable to play, his ability can be allowed to shine – shows that a religiously coded 
symbol of sacrifice is used to describe a rather ordinary, everyday occurrence of 
sacrifice. The selfless attitude taken up by Hermione is mingled with a tone of irony, 
as though she begrudges Walter his role as focal point for the admiration of others 
here. 
There are several other instances in Asphodel where religious sacrifice is 
conflated with secular sacrifice. Walter Dowel is described as ‘a great white 
sacrificial ox’ by Jerrold Darrington because his wife Vérène had gone mad around 
the time of the end of the war and been put away in an asylum.594 That Darrington 
thinks of Dowel as the victim in these circumstances, under which it would perhaps 
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have been more natural to consider the unfortunate situation of his institutionalised 
wife, points to his attention to the plight of men in wartime, whether they be soldiers 
or civilians. It begs the question of whether Darrington is thinking of himself; his 
own wife, Hermione, has suffered nervous breakdowns during the war, one of which 
caused her to miscarry Darrington’s child. At the point in time when the 
conversation about Dowel takes place, Hermione is pregnant again, but by another 
man, Cyril Vane, with whom she has struck up a relationship while Darrington was 
fighting in the trenches. Darrington’s expression of empathy towards Walter Dowel 
suggests that he feels himself to be an unwilling victim of the situation in which he 
has ended up: a soldier who has risked his life for his country, only to first be robbed 
of what he thought was going to be his first-born child, and subsequently of his 
wife’s affection. 
A white bull – which is, just like the white ox, a symbol of the threat of 
involuntary sacrifice brought on by war – also appears in the narrative. Jane Harrison 
writes of the ancient Greek sacrificial bull in her work Ancient Art and Ritual (1912), 
where it is postulated that the offering is crucial for not only the survival of the 
community and state, but for the individuals within it, as they all get their portion of 
meat, symbolic of luck and strength. However, in Asphodel, the bull is not going to 
be sacrificed; rather, the intimation is that it will make Hermione its victim: ‘Make 
sacrifice. The white bull that lowers after me seeks to slay me.’595 This is part of a 
piece of stream-of-consciousness-like first person narration that immediately 
precedes the part where Hermione has to tell Darrington that she is pregnant. 
Hermione feels, like Darrington, that she is the victim of the circumstances of war. 
After her initial miscarriage, her husband takes a mistress while home on leave, who 	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later moves into their lodgings. This is what drives Hermione to move temporarily to 
Cornwall where she then becomes pregnant by Vane. Here, Hermione is victimised 
but without fulfilling the restoration originally intended by ritual sacrifice. 
The white bull image is foreshadowed a little earlier in the narrative in a play 
on words, as Shirley, a friend of Hermione’s who is in love with Walter Dowel, 
shoots herself with a ‘white bullet.’596 Shirley has several similarities with 
Hermione: she is clever, but unsure of herself, and her love for Walter cannot be 
fulfilled as he is already married. Hermione is palpably shaken by the news of 
Shirley’s suicide, to the point where she feels that it disrupts her carefully 
constructed self-image as a sensitive soul: ‘Herself, the immaculate image, the saint, 
the spirit, had been shattered for her. Forever. A white bullet had so shattered it. 
Intuition and fine feeling had not been fine enough to sense this.’597 Hermione feels 
that she has let her friend down by not realising how depressed she was, by not 
helping her. At the same time, she condemns Shirley – or predicts that Shirley will 
be condemned by the gods – for ‘dropping out:’ ‘Plato says we are servants of the 
gods. No servant can neglect his work. To kill oneself is to drop out, lacking in 
service.’598 While Hermione feels that Shirley has neglected her service to the gods, 
the suicide is described as having been executed in a manner of an organised and 
premeditated ritual, with an emphasis on purity of both mind and body:  
 
Little May day communicants going to church in long veils and long frocks 
and white slippers and hands crossed over prayer-books. Brides of God. 
Little wise virgins. Virgins. Shirley was a virgin. … It was so clean. They 
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said she had planned it all so carefully. … So clean. Not anything horrible. 
So clean under her breast. All gone. That is true love.599  
 
The clean nature of the shot that kills Shirley and the ordered setup of the suicide 
invokes a sense of ritual, which is further strengthened by the association made to 
the ritual of First Communion, in which one hands oneself over to God in a state of 
purity, symbolised by wearing white garments, and is allowed to receive the 
eucharist for the first time. 
Interestingly, in Asphodel, Christianity is defined as the ritual of 
remembrance for its own primary sacrifice, the Holy Communion. When asked what 
a Christian is, Fayne Rabb responds: ‘A Christian is a person who goes to 
communion.’600 She does not justify her definition further, only explains that if she 
had not gone every Sunday her mother would not be happy with her. The implication 
is that communion almost trivialises sacrifice due to its regularity and the relative 
ease with which you can become a good Christian: simply partake in the ritual of 
remembrance of Christ’s sacrifice, and you will be saved. 
 However, in a sequence of Asphodel portraying Cornwall, Hermione seems 
to be saved by the natural surroundings as a form of holy communion: ‘Was there 
ever such green? Flowers that are (it must be) rose-campion, little flowers along the 
edge of a field; the fields are small, small, simply imagination come true. This is 
reality. Heady gorse, thick with its yellow makes ridges and lumps of pure gold and I 
must be somewhere else. I haven’t died for I am substantiated,’ says Hermione; she 
is not physically dead.601 The quotation suggests, like the ritual of communion, that 
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dying does not necessarily mean physical death if it is part of a process of 
transubstantiation. It is interesting to note that H. D. mentions rose campion, which – 
as has been mentioned above – is in English folklore a symbol of death, in particular 
of the mother. 
As early as 1915, May Sinclair made the connection between imagist poetry 
and transubstantiation in an effort to characterise the innovations being made by the 
group of young poets led by Ezra Pound: ‘The Victorian poets are Protestant. For 
them the bread and wine are symbols of Reality, the body and the blood. They are 
given “in remembrance.” The sacrament is incomplete. The Imagists are Catholic; 
they believe in Trans-substantiation. For them the bread and wine are the body and 
the blood. They are given. The thing is done.’602 For Sinclair, the imagist poetry of 
H. D. imparted a ‘frisson of immortality impending’ – a sense of sacrality and 
transcendence – but also a literal image that would have different effects upon 
different readers, depending on the preconceived notions of the reader.603  Bearing 
this in mind, the particularly poetic prose sequence quoted above may be read as 
Hermione being made immortal, not just through nature, but by journeying to 
‘somewhere else’ in both space and time – the Cornish natural landscape being a 
timeless milieu that stands in stark contrast to central London. It is also the place 
where she becomes pregnant a second time. 
Shirley sacrifices herself for the good of Walter Dowel’s marriage – a 
sacrifice that is proclaimed to be indicative of ‘true love.’ Here, then, is a negotiation 
of the distinction between service and sacrifice that seems to involve a question of 
motive. If Shirley really wanted death, she was neglecting her service to the gods, 
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but if she was prepared to make a sacrifice and die for the sake of somebody else, the 
Dowels, she is made holy, like a martyr or a soldier would be. 
As has been exemplified above, Asphodel is not solely preoccupied with its 
protagonist’s self-destruction and -realisation, but that of her surrounding set of 
characters, as there are multitudinous references to crucifixion and sacrifice of 
various people. The latter part of the novel is also to some extent concerned with the 
self of the Bryher figure Beryl, who – like Shirley – is suicidal. According to 
Hermione, Beryl is obsessed with her self, its creation and its destruction, which 
seem to go hand in hand: 
 
She [referring to Beryl] was too young to talk about self, self, self – what was 
self? Self was a white carnation in a tall, green tumbler, (you can’t kill your 
self) self was a lotus-lily folded in the mud, self was the scent of pot-pourri 
across the fumes of beech bark burning in an elegant room and the polish on 
the floor and the net of gilt that was the sun, that was the curtain before the 
window that caught the sun, self was the sun caught in a drawing room 
curtain, caught now in a curtain that was too heavy.604 
 
Hermione uses the second person within brackets to pose a statement simultaneously 
to herself, to Beryl, and to the reader, which negates the possibility of self-sacrifice 
in the sense that it is impossible to wipe your self out by way of committing suicide. 
Hermione seems to say that the self, once found, is indestructible, or at least that it is 
not possible for oneself to eradicate one’s self. It would require the lack of 
recognition from others, just as the creation of the self requires the acknowledgement 
of a community or an other. It is impossible to be a self in isolation; although 
Hermione tries to construct a self independently, she finds that there are parts of her 
self that are created by others, the influence of which she is unable to combat or even 
fully understand: ‘Hermione had determined to sink into her own self-made aura. 	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Herself [sic] had woven herself an aura, a net, a soft and luminous cocoon but 
somehow daemon eyes drew out of her all those things, all these other things.’605 
Struggling to hold onto her self-made self, Hermione realises that there is no 
escaping the definitions of others; they create her as much as she does herself, and 
she cannot protect herself from becoming what others make of her. Even though she 
tries to define her own self and preserve it in the face of others, ‘…holding herself in 
so many layers, so carefully housed,’ she becomes ‘confused and blurred by the 
cocoon state she was in. Self. What is self?’606 The difficulty of answering the 
question of what self is stems from the difficulty of negotiation between the 
subjective and objective selves that are created simultaneously, one from within, 
through the self-reflective gaze, and the other from without, through a multitude of 
external gazes, which can be in conflict between themselves as well as with the self-
reflective gaze. 
When H. D. writes that the ‘[s]elf is a lotus bud slimed over in mud,’ it is 
tempting to think that the value implicit in the statement that Hermone’s self-
reflective gaze needs protection from the ‘daemon eyes’ of others means that the 
lotus bud is the self-made self and the mud is the self created by others, and that the 
self-made self would be better off without being covered in slimy mud. However, 
mud is generally necessary for flowers to grow; while it is not meant to cover the 
bud, it is not going to kill the plant or stop the bud from developing into a flower. 
The use of the word ‘slimed’ further suggests that the mud sticks to the bud, that the 
two are not to be separated without some measure of force that could potentially 
harm the bud, and that the slimy mud makes the bud less visually appealing. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
605 H. D., Asphodel, 185. 
606 H. D., Asphodel, 179. 
Sanna Melin Schyllert 
 251 
The slimy bud also offers another reading: a slightly unpleasant, albeit fairly 
realistic, image of a newborn child. The Madrigal cycle displays a curious and 
problematic relationship between creative writing and childbearing – both are 
present, but indirectly, as neither is ever described as it takes place, nor is there any 
rendering of what went on in the mind of the protagonist at the time of either event. 
Donna Krolik Hollenberg claims that the Madrigal cycle ‘revealed the tension 
between creativity and procreation [H. D.] was experiencing’ and that it was not 
until the Second World War that ‘she began to use the symbol of the child both to 
suggest the human potential to re-create the self and to critique the institution of 
motherhood’, thereby turning on its head the traditional idea of artistry as 
incompatible with motherhood.607 I suggest that H. D. does this already in Asphodel, 
where the child Hermione is pregnant with – that she calls ‘small le Fay’ in reference 
to her own doubling of Morgan le Fay earlier in the volume – is overtly said to usurp 
Hermione’s self, whilst containing the possibility to regenerate it: ‘Small le Fay, you 
are more a self than I am, but I am giving myself to you to make a self. Are you 
giving yourself to me to make a self?’608 This quote implies not only an 
acknowledgement of the physical sacrifice that pregnancy entails, but a reciprocity 
in the sense that motherhood will possibly afford Hermione a new identity. 
It is not motherhood, however, that is the focus of H. D.’s fictional 
renderings of procreation – it is pregnancy and childbirth. The first pregnancies in 	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Asphodel and Bid Me to Live result in stillbirths; the second pregnancies that 
culminate in the birth of healthy babies terminate the narratives. Neither Hermione 
nor Julia are ever narrated as mothers, only as mothers-to-be, or – rather – as 
pregnant and labouring women. The significance of this is that it is not the long-
term, durational story of a life devoted to motherhood that H. D. wishes to tell, but 
the physical battle of women’s childbearing, one that can be compared and related to 
men’s soldiering. Stanford Friedman suggests that ‘H. D. paralleled war and 
pregnancy as public and private versions of an underlying patriarchal structure [and] 
proposed women’s procreative power as a counterweight to men’s violence, as a 
regenerative force in the (re)birth of both individual and society’ in Asphodel.609 H. 
D. did not, then, focus on the sacrifice of the mother – a more traditional trope in war 
literature, as I discuss in chapter 1 – but rather on the sacrifice of the pregnant, 
childbearing woman, who renounces herself bodily to bring life to another person. 
Another example of sacrifice and pregnancy/childbirth being overtly 
compared in Asphodel is when Hermione considers whether or not it is her fate to 
become a mother, a thought that appears to terrify her. In a long paragraph of stream 
of consciousness, she initially thinks of the Virgin Mary as analogous to herself, but 
she also ponders Christ’s refusal of the drink he was offered before his death – a 
passage that is normally interpreted as Christ’s unwillingness to dull his experience 
of the sacrifice he was about to make – and connects this willingness to suffer with 
childbirth: 
 
George said there needn’t be any children. Must I ever, should I ever have 
one? George Lowndes said I would look like Maria della something or 
other… Incense to numb out your pain but Christ wouldn’t take the sponge 
(O why, why didn’t he?) they offered him. Chloroform I read in the Materia 	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Medica doesn’t always help though sometimes – don’t let me scream. Don’t 
let me die. Perhaps it’s my Hell and must we all pass through it to get to 
meadows thick with water lilies?610 
 
The implication is that the bodily trauma of childbirth should be gone through 
gracefully, without screaming or otherwise displaying the abhorrence Hermione 
expects to feel at the mortification of the flesh, just as a soldier is expected to run 
bravely into the firing line. Hermione prays that she will not express the depth of the 
suffering that she expects to experience through childbirth, but the underlying 
sentiment is that she would rather not experience such a thing at all, as the initial 
thought is about avoiding pregnancy and the question of whether she ‘must’ at some 
point in her life have a child. She concludes by asking if we all have to experience 
suffering to get enjoyment, employing an explanation of sacrificial economy to 
answer the question of why suffering appears to be a fact of life. 
After her miscarriage, Hermione again describes pregnancy as a sacrifice 
comparable to crucifixion, or possibly even worse, considering the drawn out, 
tortuous experience of pregnancy: 
 
The state she had been in was a deadly crucifixion. Not one torture (though 
God that had been enough) but months and months when her flaming mind 
beat up and she found she was caught, her mind not taking her as usual like a 
wild bird but her mind-wings beating, beating and her feet caught, her feet 
caught, glued like a wild bird in bird-lime.611 
 
She mainly feels the restriction through the imposed rest-cure she appears to have 
been under, where she has not been allowed to read, write, or see her friends. 
Additionally, she is pained by her inability to talk about the unnecessarily cruel 
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process she has had to endure without being considered a woman who cannot accept 
her sacrifice gracefully. 
 
…there were no words to tell it in. How tell it? …men will say she was a 
coward, a woman who refused her womanhood. No, she hadn’t. But take a 
man with a flaming mind and ask him to do this. Ask him to sit in a dark 
cellar and no books… but you mustn’t. You can’t. Women can’t speak and 
clever women don’t have children. So if a clever woman does speak, she 
must be mad. She is mad. She wouldn’t have had a baby, if she hadn’t 
been.612 
 
Clever women, it seems, must endure more suffering through the sacrifice of 
motherhood than others. The unspeakability of the sacrifice is partly due to the 
unspeakability of women – in particular clever women, who will be seen as mad if 
they do speak – and partly to the unspeakability of the trauma of childbirth. 
The extent to which the Hermione in Asphodel considers herself to have 
suffered through marriage and childbirth is clarified by her comparison of her 
situation to that of Christ, and the almost embittered tone over not having died in 
childbirth: ‘Hermione had had her share of suffering and if she took more than her 
share of suffering the world would topple over for you can’t arrogate virtue to 
yourself, you can’t suffer more than Christ – and she had suffered. Dead, resurrected, 
but she had come to the wrong place. She belonged in heaven after Phoebe 
[Hermione’s newly born daughter] – and she wasn’t in heaven.’613 Hermione thinks 
that after all that suffering, she should have died and been rewarded for her suffering 
in the after-life. In this way, her view of her own suffering is similar to that 
commonly known to have been the feeling of many surviving soldiers of the First 
World War, who thought that they should have died on the battlefield – so called 
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survivor guilt. While shell shock was of course diagnosed and treated medically, 
there are not enough clinical studies of the illness from the time of the war to 
evidence the number of First World War soldiers affected by survivor guilt. 
However, it is clear from first-hand accounts and literary re-imaginations of the war 
that survivor guilt was an issue for many after the end of the war. 614 Everyday life 
after the trenches seemed empty and futile and survivors were thereby left with a 
sensation of hopelessness. 
The problem with the suffering of Hermione is that she does not have the 
right to feel wronged; ‘this suffering of Hermione’s was illegitimate. You don’t take 
more than your share of suffering any more than you take more than your share of 
happiness…’615 Hermione has, it seems, willingly chosen to take on more suffering 
than was her lot, which is true of soldiers of the First World War if we see their 
position as analogous to Hermione’s, and it is certainly true of Christ. 
Towards the end of Asphodel, it is becoming clear to Hermione that she went 
through a major change in the years of the First World War. The trauma of going 
through a stillbirth has such a profound impact on Hermione in Asphodel that she 
comes to view it as on a par with facing the guns in France: ‘Men were dying as she 
had almost died to the sound (as she had almost died) of gun-fire. Guns, guns, guns, 
guns. Thank God for that. The guns had made her one in her suffering with men – 
men – men’.616 The direct comparison of the suffering of soldiers with her own is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
614 Marc-Antoine Crocq and Louis Crocq, “From Shell Shock and War Neurosis to 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A History of Psychotraumatology,” Dialogues in 
Clinical Neuroscience 2, no. 1 (2000): 47–55. Brian Murdoch, German Literature 
and the First World War: The Anti-War Tradition. Collected Essays (Abingdon and 
New York: Routledge, 2016), 169. 
615 H. D., Asphodel, 199. 
616 H. D., Asphodel, 114. 
Sanna Melin Schyllert 
 256 
indicative of an urge to make male and female sacrifices valued equally. Stanford 
Friedman similarly points out that ‘[t]he parallels between birth and war pervade 
[Asphodel’s] structure and imagery.’617 Hermione further expresses a wish to 
sacrifice herself; she thanks god that her stillbirth took place under the noise of 
gunfire, and thereby being allowed to feel that she ‘had not suffered ignobly like a 
woman.’618 Having suffered to the background of the same noise as the men on the 
battlefield, she feels that her sacrifice is legitimated through its connection to the 
war. Hermione draws another parallel between battle scars and pregnancy towards 
the end of her second gestation, which coincides with the end of the war. 
Significantly, her statement that ‘honourable wounds, dishonourable wounds, it’s all 
one to God so long as you are wounded,’ could be interpreted as meaning that her 
own sacrifice is dishonourable, as the child is a product of an extramarital 
relationship with Vane.619 However, the comment could also be read as an ironic 
take on the inevitable condoning, not to say encouragement, of violence during 
wartime. Is the sacrifice of a soldier always as honourable as the propaganda 
machine would have it? It is not difficult to conceive of the sadness involved in 
labouring to bring a child into the world in the midst of millions of men fighting 
each other to death. 
When Darrington visits Hermione after the war and sparks the hope that they 
will resume their life together, she starts to refer to her ‘pre-chasm’ self, meaning the 
Hermione that existed before 1914. Her husband’s physical touch is that of the old 
world that is no more, which she finds comforting, but also stifling: ‘She was 
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smothered and kisses recalled her to worlds away, pre-chasm.’620 She tries to bring 
her pre-war self back in order to bring Darrington closer, but soon realises that this is 
an impossibility for her, however much she may want it: ‘Hermione pulled threads to 
get something of that pre-chasm into her speech … Things that had existed in one 
dimension, that couldn’t any more so exist. … Get across the chasm to the other side 
for there are dreams still the other side, ivory, bronze.’621 The pre-chasm dreams are 
those of marital bliss, family values, and romantic love with Darrington. However, 
these are now relics clad in ivory and bronze; they are no longer alive and can 
therefore not be got at in real life. Instead, Hermione has to move on, ‘sensing … 
that she would land, finally, safely, be thrown … up on dry land, onto a new post-
chasm world.’622 She has opened up a new part of her self, the post-chasm 
Hermione, that cannot be denied or held back. 
The characters who are not able to move on, who prefer to stay in the pre-
chasm era, are made into examples of what happens if one is unwilling to move with 
the times: they perish. Ironically, despite Hermione’s predilection for the ancient 
past, the post-war message delivered by her appears to be change or die. Her friends 
Vérène and Shirley both fall victim to the cultural chasm caused by the war. When 
she realises this, she understands that the same fate will befall her unless she 
continues to progress: ‘Vérène went mad since she couldn’t (it was evident) march 
with events. Shirley shot herself since she couldn’t march forward. … One must roll 
in, on with the tide, with the times, or be crushed under the wave ground to death in 
the trough and the great drag back that would be the inevitable aftermath of the war 
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and all it stood for.’623 The narrative goes on to denote Vérène and Shirley as 
‘victims’ of this historical movement, implying that they have fallen into and been 
swallowed up by the chasm, being unable to bridge it. The only way for Hermione to 
survive, then, is to sacrifice her pre-chasm self and go forward in the hope of finding 
a new self. The following subsection will look at a narrative self-development that is 
portrayed as taking place during and just after the chasm in Bid Me to Live. 
 
‘I myself, I myself, I myself’: Fighting for the Self as a Subject in Bid Me to Live 
Bid Me to Live, edited over the course of at least two decades, bears a strong 
resemblance to the other Madrigal narratives, but is far more readable as it is slightly 
less challenging in its experiments with form. The intermittent pronoun shifts come 
throughout the novel, but there is an additional overarching shift between a first and 
second part of the book. The first is primarily narrated in the third person and 
outlines a story of war and marriage – in which the two seem more alike than anyone 
would care to think – and the difficulties with which Julia Ashton is forced to 
relinquish and recreate her self, as a writer, wife, and mother. The third person 
narrative that dominates initially is indicative of Julia’s struggle to find her own 
voice and to establish herself as a subject in her own right. In the second part, Julia 
takes over more and more as the first person narrator, even though there are still 
shifts back to the third person. The second person is interspersed throughout the 
whole book. 
The very first pronoun shift looks – as many others – like reported speech, 
but it is not within inverted commas and does not occur in a scene; it is more like an 
echo of a remembered dialogue: 	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So-and-so knows someone who has a cottage; won’t you take it, Frederick? 
As if she, Julia or he, Rafe or someone who had met Bella’s mother before 
they gave up their studio in Paris had this right, this power – they were rich, 
in their way. Take so-and-so’s cottage, they have a cottage, a sort of lodge I 
believe, and it’s empty and they asked me and Rafe to go there before he 
went to France…624 
 
It seems here as though the communal narration is at the core of this story, as the 
pronoun shifts are suggestive of a cacophony of voices that could belong to anyone. 
However, only a short while later, the protagonist’s self-preoccupation seen in 
HERmione and Asphodel re-surfaces: ‘…why should she give in now, go, as they 
urged her, back to America, go, as they suggested, into the country? J’y suis. I 
myself, I myself, I myself. This is my room.’625 The importance of place in this 
occurrence of the first person narrative voice is indicative of the re-shaping of Julia’s 
American self as British, an identity that has been assigned to her through her 
marriage. Her husband not only usurps her nationality, but her name as well: ‘Mrs 
Rafe Ashton. That is my name.’626 Throughout the novel, it is painfully clear that 
Julia has built her self-image on the foundation of the husband. Being forced to 
sacrifice her marriage, Julia first loses her self and then regains it, all the while 
negotiating her subjective space in the text through pronoun shifts. The second part 
of the narrative, which takes place after she has physically become estranged from 
her husband and is living in Cornwall with another man, sees her re-establish a new 
sense of self as well as be in control of the narrative by mainly using her subjective, 
first person voice to tell the story. 
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In a clear reference to the subject being made a sacrifice by the circumstances, the 
narrative voice equates the physical death of Julia’s child in utero in 1915 with the 
demise of Julia herself: ‘Then 1915 and her death, or rather the death of her child. 
Three weeks in that ghastly nursing-home and then coming back to the same Rafe. 
Herself different.’627 Julia’s self falls victim to the circumstances, both of war and 
marriage. Victimhood is ever-present in the novel; already in the very first pages, 
victim and victimiser are set up as an oppositional pair: ‘Victims, victimised and 
victimising. Perhaps the victims came out, by a long shot, ahead of the steady self-
determined victimisers. They escaped; the rowdy actual lost generation was not 
actually their generation.’628 This implies that the terminology of victimhood is 
sometimes used to denote something rather different than what one might assume – 
it is indicated here that there is a discrepancy between those that call themselves 
victims and those who perform sacrifices passively and involuntarily. 
There seems to be a connection between lack of self-definition, self-sacrifice, 
and the proximity of male authority that pervades all of the three novels hitherto 
looked at in the Madrigal cycle. Hermione is clearly rattled by identity crises at the 
points in her life when she is the most intimate with Lowndes or Darrington, and 
Julia is extremely dependent on the approval of both Rafe and Rico – also called 
Frederick or Frederico, a writer friend of the couple, based on D. H. Lawrence – as a 
wife and as a writer. Rico’s critique of her writing is paternalistic and domineering, 
yet a slight tinge of jealousy is discernable between the lines as he acknowledges 
Julia’s ability to know something she should not – how a man feels: ‘Stick to the 
woman speaking. How can you know what Orpheus feels? It’s your part to be 
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woman, the woman vibration, Eurydice should be enough. You can’t deal with 
both.’629 According to Rico, man and woman are completely separate creatures, so it 
is natural for him to assume that a woman cannot portray a man’s psyche. The 
reverse, however, does not apply, as he tries to write about women himself. Julia 
questions this quietly to herself in her own mind, wondering why, ‘if he could enter, 
so diabolically, into the feelings of women, why should she not enter into the 
feelings of men?’630 The thought directs attention to the inherent misogyny that Julia 
encounters as a woman writer.  
The problem of being a woman writer is further illustrated by Rafe chiming 
in to give his wife feedback without having been asked for it, which he is eager to do 
in a moment of jealousy over Julia’s friendship with Rico. Julia does not want him to 
read the draft and responds evasively as to its whereabouts: ‘He was shuffling books, 
papers, on the table. “Where is it?” “What?” … “Is this it?” “I don’t know. Those are 
all discarded pages.”’631 When Rafe finally does read it, his comments are ‘[n]ot so 
good,’ ‘[a] bit dramatic,’ and, the worst of all insults, ‘[i]t’s Victorian.’632 Julia 
apologetically replies that she ‘saved [the draft] only for the other-side of the page, 
the paper. I kept it for the other-side of the page, for the paper’.633 Self-effacement is, 
despite moments of internal rebellion against the hierarchy in which she lives, deeply 
ingrained in Julia. 
In Bid Me to Live, the struggle of Julia to stay connected with her husband 
Rafe through the sacrifice of her own needs is evident. The breakdown of the marital 	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relationship is in this narrative primarily caused by Rafe’s love affair, which is the 
result of Julia’s unwillingness to have sex with her husband following a miscarriage. 
Julia feels that she has not made as great a sacrifice as her husband in the war and 
she is constantly torn by feelings of jealousy on the one hand and guilt on the other. 
Here, it is not the case that the protagonist wishes to draw a parallel between 
her own suffering and that of her husband, but it is not necessarily true that the 
author ‘is not arguing that female civilians suffered more than male soldiers, nor is 
she agitating for direct comparisons’ between the two, as Julie Goodspeed-Chadwick 
argues.634 The comparison of the sacrifice of the mother with that of the soldier is 
plainly illustrated by the narrator by way of Julia and Rafe’s respective likenesses to 
saints: ‘Yes, he was Saint Anthony; what kind of saint was she, or who? Claire? 
Mated, unmated, two saints living in separate walled-in seclusion, would find the 
same answer in the up-rising incense, in a cold lady-chapel at dawn, as they found in 
a cold studio living-room in Bloomsbury…’635 H. D.’s reference to Saint Claire 
implies a biographical significance; the story of Saint Claire seeing pictures of 
church mass on the walls of her room is similar to a visionary episode in H. D.’s life 
that recurs in her writing: seeing pictures and writing on a wall in a hotel room in 
Corfu. The quote also implies the desexualisation of Julia, who is ‘mated’ – married 
– yet chaste, or ‘unmated’, just like a nun who is considered to be mated with God. 
The narrative shows Julia moving back and forth between self-annihilation 
and self-assertion in relation to the love triangle. After having initially made it easier 
for Bella and Rafe to see each other privately by helping to cover up the affair, she 	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begins to feel that she can no longer handle the emotional strain: ‘Bella and Rafe 
made it outrageously obvious that they only wanted to sneak off and be together, 
leaving her with the lovely wifely part of camouflaging love-affair for husband-on-
leave. No. This was the last time.’636 But since Rafe is an officer on leave, Julia has 
to allow for the special circumstance of war. Each time he goes out to France, the 
question of whether or not he will return again looms large. He feels that his 
sacrifice – risking life and limb at the front – earns him the right to be unfaithful to 
his wife when he is on leave: ‘I won’t come back, you might allow me a little fun’, 
he says to Julia, but she feels as though it ‘was someone else speaking. It was not 
Rafe speaking’ when she recalls the words.637 It seems as though Rafe the officer has 
taken the place of Rafe the poet, to whom she got married. Confronted with ‘not so 
much a losing as a lost-battle,’ she ultimately suggests that the husband and mistress 
use the couple’s flat for their rendez-vous rather than Bella’s, a proposition that leads 
to her walking in on them one day: ‘Something went still in her and she knew they 
were there on the other side of the room, actually in bed together. … “I didn’t expect 
to get back so soon … I’m sorry – ” sorry?’638 Julia’s apology, and the narratorial 
questioning of it, is a snapshot of the bind she is in; she feels the need to apologise 
for having created an awkward situation, but clearly she is the wronged party and 
should not have to apologise for returning home to find her husband with his 
mistress. 
Julia and Rafe are both unfaithful, but Julia’s affair with Vane, resulting in 
motherhood, is a continuation of her initial renunciation of her marriage. Rafe 
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acknowledges that Julia’s acts have been for his benefit; he comments on their final 
separation with a note of gratefulness towards her for letting him be with his mistress 
without making things difficult by creating tension: ‘I want to thank you for all this. 
I realise what you have done for me.’639 Even so, he does not seem to fully 
understand the reasons why Julia has had to accept his infidelity, since she needs to 
spell out for him that she had to abstain from sexual intercourse following her 
miscarriage because she was told by the doctor that it would be life-threatening for 
her to become pregnant again before the end of the war. Just as Hermione in 
Asphodel, Julia sees her own part in the situation and does not wish to blame anyone 
for the disintegration of her marriage. In her explanation of why she refused him her 
bed, Julia tells Rafe: ‘I thought you understood. I didn’t want to worry you about it. 
It was not your fault.’640 Not having explained the reason for why she refused her 
husband’s intimacy at the time, Julia does not feel the need to blame Rafe for what 
has happened – their marriage is simply another casualty of the war. 
While Julia accepts responsibility for her actions, which could be read as her 
being made a scapegoat for the demise of her marriage, the narrative also indicates 
that this experience is part and parcel of her role as a woman, one that she shares 
with Bella, her husband’s mistress: ‘She and Bella were simply abstractions, were 
women of the period, were WOMAN of the period, the same one. … Bella was shot 
to pieces, with nothing to show for it…’641 The two women have fallen victim to the 
circumstances of the war, but are not scapegoats in the structural sense of the word, 
because there is no blame placed on anyone in the narrative. The events of the novel 
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are an outcome of chaos – the lack of any defined scapegoat lets the breakdown of 
order continue on until Julia becomes pregnant by her lover in Cornwall, when she 
can be blamed for the ultimate demise of the relationship with Rafe; the marriage 
will never recover from her having a child with another man. The role of the two 
women may have more in common with ‘the abstract painted horror of a flayed 
saint’ that Julia sees in the Louvre because of the numb emptiness of their shared 
suffering: ‘they were past feeling anything; she was.’642 
Away in Cornwall, Julia comes to terms with the demise of her marriage. She 
feels whole, healed, and made holy by her new, natural surroundings: 
 
If she thought of Rafe, it was with a sort of gratitude. … Now she was glad 
the whole bright rock-landscape was clouded, with this cold, healing mist, as 
if someone had breathed a cold, healing breath; the very Holy Spirit had 
breathed on this. She was enclosed in crystal. She was perfectly at one with 
this land. Everything that had happened back in London had been bound to 
happen. It had been necessary. Those who had precipitated its happening 
were each separately blessed by her. She wanted to lay flowers on an altar.643 
 
Julia wants to perform a ritual sacrifice – laying flowers at an altar – to 
commemorate what triggered these events: the physical sacrifice of her stillborn 
child, Rafe’s mistress Bella, and Rico, who aided in driving a wedge between 
husband and wife in various ways. The nature of the peace she feels within – being 
‘filled literally now with that divine Spirit…beatified as a Yogi in a mountain 
temple’ – is such that it extends not only to her and the events that have recently 
taken place, but to the physical objects that surround her: ‘Beads of moisture settled 
on the sleeve of her old coat. Her coat was sanctified by it, this was another story of 
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a fleece.’644 Drawing a parallel to the Golden Fleece the narrator again emphasises 
the connection between past and present sacrifice, making it clear that there are 
literal, physical implications of a spiritual development, and vice versa. 
Ritual sacrifice recurs in the narratives as a basic component of the human 
condition through the ages. For many of H. D.’s characters, not least for Julia 
Ashton, it is a prerequisite for understanding their present that they familiarise 
themselves with the past. Travelling to the past via the mind creates a space where 
dream and reality – past and present – meet and mix to the point where it is uncertain 
which is which: 
 
Did the past and the future blend (or would they) in one eternal circle of the 
absolute, of final beauty? That prayer they quoted (from Plato, was it?), And 
may the inner and the outer be at peace. Here, certainly there was no peace, 
or peace so hardly won in these rare moments of fulfilment that they became 
worlds ahead; as he said, as Rico said, “You are entangled in your own 
dream.” Was, or wasn’t it the dream that mattered?645 
 
In dreaming of ancient Greece, the H. D. avatars re-write or re-discover a secret 
history, a forgotten genealogy, a female lineage and spiritual tradition. The 
preoccupation with the place of women in history sometimes causes scholars to 
discuss H. D.’s work as a feminist revisionary project. 646  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
644 H. D., Bid Me to Live, 147. 
645 H. D., Bid Me to Live, 72-3. Emphasis in original. 
646 See for instance Susan Stanford Friedman (as Susan Friedman), ‘Psyche Reborn: 
Tradition, re-vision, and the goddess as mother-symbol in H. D.’s epic poetry,’ 
Women’s Studies 6 (1979): 147-160; Rachel Blau DuPlessis, H. D.: the career of 
that struggle (Brighton: The Harvester Press Limited, 1986); Susan Edmunds, ‘“I 
read the writing when he seized my throat”: Hysteria and Revolution in H. D.’s 
Helen in Egypt,’ Contemporary Literature XXXII, no. 4 (1991): 471-495; Susan 
Stanford Friedman, ‘Creating a Women’s Mythology: H. D.’s Helen in Egypt,’ in 
Signets: Reading H. D., ed. Susan Stanford Friedman and Rachel Blau DuPlessis 
(Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 373-405; Lara Vetter, ‘Review 
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Importantly, ancient Greece is also where H. D.’s characters find a space for a 
negotiation of individuality versus community via sacrifice. The very first lines of 
Bid Me to Live make it clear that sacrifice is a fundamental concept not just for the 
characters in this novel or for the English during the First World War, but for people 
throughout history: ‘Oh, the times, oh the customs! Oh, indeed, the times! The 
customs! Their own, but part and parcel of the cosmic, comic, crucifying times of 
history.’647 Sacrifice is portrayed here as an inevitable, almost natural part of life. In 
another instance, the time frame of the war is pointed out: ‘Beauty is truth, truth 
beauty. But could this truth be beautiful? Maybe it was. They had shouted of honour 
and sacrifice for two years, three years now. This was winter or early spring but 
seasons revolved around horrors until one was numb…they were past feeling 
anything…’648 Even though the temporal reference to two or three years is quite 
specific, the sentences that frame it are suggestive of timelessness – the timeless 
nature of concepts like truth and beauty – or circular time, with the recurring four 
seasons. It is as though time has lost its meaning in the sense that it is no longer 
reliable as a tool with which to measure the duration of something; since time 
‘revolved around horrors’, it appears that it is impossible to conceive of a time when 
the horrors end. Interestingly, it is in the timelessness of the Cornish milieu that the 
tattered Julia finally begins to mend: ‘It would take her a long time to get over these 
past years, and here was space and time to do it.’649 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
article of Majic Ring, The Mystery, and The White Rose and the Red,’ English 
Studies 94, no. 1 (2013): 57-63. 
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As Julia finally takes control of the narrative voice, she addresses Rico and releases 
herself from his criticism of her writing: ‘My work is nothing. But, Rico, I will go on 
and do it. I will carve my pattern on an altar because I’ve got to do it. You jeered at 
my making abstractions of people – graven images, you called them. You are right. 
Rafe is not the Marble Faun…you are not Orpheus. You are human people, 
Englishmen, madmen.’650 Despite her newfound confidence in herself, she still 
ultimately credits Rico with bringing her to life and addresses him with respect and 
servility, despite (or perhaps because of) his disrespectful treatment of her work: 
‘You said I was a living spirit, but I wasn’t living until you wrote to me, “We will go 
away together.” We have gone away together, I realise your genius, in this place. I 
would like to serve your genius, not only because it is personally, your genius, but 
because it is part of this place.’651 Julia may now be the subjective narrator, but she 
is still caught in a world of entrenched gender hierarchy. 
  
‘Do I become somewhat mystical in contemplation of this Midget…?’ De-Narrating 
the Self in Paint It Today652 
Bid Me to Live, HERmione, and Asphodel all share the more or less certain 
identification of the narrator with the protagonist. In Paint It Today, that supposition 
can be called into question, as the pronoun shifts keep the reader in suspense by 
continually signifying different things. The shifts keep negotiating the space and 
identity of narrator and protagonist throughout the narrative, while sacrificial motifs 
provide a suggestive backdrop for the play on pronouns. The narrative voice changes 
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between the use of ‘I,’ ‘she,’ ‘you,’ ‘we,’ and ‘they,’ and the referents of the 
pronouns switch as well, as I will exemplify below. Furthermore, the narrative voice 
self-consciously comments on both the distance and the nearness of itself to the 
protagonist. The novel is most often read as an unfinished, almost unripe, work – a 
youthful ‘homoerotic novel of passage’ or ‘search of a “twin sister”’ – and it is often 
overlooked in terms of its experimentality in narrative technique.653 
Like the previously examined novels by H. D., and indeed the two Sinclair 
novels in chapter 2, Paint It Today is concerned with the development of the self of a 
young woman in relation to the expectations of the surrounding world that become to 
some extent internalised in her psyche. The novel might be considered a very 
abridged version of HERmione and Asphodel, but one that focusses on other aspects 
of the story, most prominently the lesbian theme. The protagonist – here named 
Midget Defreddie – is a young girl who breaks free from her family, moves to 
England, and pursues romantic relationships with women. As a result of trying to 
become her own person, Midget’s mother is the target of an attack of hostility that 
has obvious undertones of Greek mythology, psychoanalytic theory, and, of course, 
sacrifice, as Midget imagines herself as Orestes: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
653 Cassandra Laity, introduction to Paint It Today, xviii; Christina Walter, ‘From 
image to screen: H. D. and the visual origins of modernist impersonality,’ Textual 
Practice 22, no. 2 (2008): 301. Apart from two texts by Susan Stanford Friedman – 
her introduction to the publication of the first four chapters of Paint It Today in 
Contemporary Literature 27, no. 4 (1986) and a piece in Signets co-written with 
Rachel Blau DuPlessis: ‘“I had two loves separate”: The Sexualities of H. D.’s HER’ 
– I have only been able to find one article where Paint It Today is mentioned as an 
example of an early experiment with narrative persona, and then very briefly in a 
subclause: Brian Richardson, ‘Linearity and Its Discontents: Rethinking Narrative 
Form and Ideological Valence,’ College English 62, no. 6 (2000): 688. Gary Burnett 
mentions that it ‘begins with and is largely concerned with questions of aesthetics; 
the very aspiration of “Paint It To-day” is immersed, for H. D., in the problems of 
both artistic utterance and self-definition.’ Gary Burnett, H. D. between Image and 
Epic: The Mysteries of Her Poetics (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1990), 22. 
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How did Orestes feel when he held the knife to slay his mother? … ‘Your 
mother has betrayed your father,’ spoke the present to Orestes. ‘Your mother, 
your mother, your mother,’ the present said to Midget, ‘has betrayed, or 
would betray, through the clutch and the tyranny of the emotion, your father, 
the mind in you, the jewel the king, your father gave you as your birthright. 
Look,’ said the present, ‘and choose. Here is a knife, slay your mother. She 
has betrayed or would betray that gift.’654 
 
The imagined ritual sacrifice of the mother is brought on by her injunction for 
Midget to go back to America when Midget is just finding her place in the literary 
world in London. The symbolism contained within the image is not only telling of an 
early familiarity with psychoanalytic theory, but of the idea that the tropes of ancient 
myth have relevance for contemporary human culture and society, which is evident 
from much of H. D.’s work, both in poetry and prose. It is also pertinent that the 
sacrifice of the mother appears to be required for Midget to be a person in her own 
right. 
 Initially, as in the excerpt above, it seems as though the narrator is external to 
the protagonist Midget, but retains very intimate information about her and her inner 
life; one might even think of this voice as akin to a Victorian omniscient third person 
narrator in parts: ‘I do not wish to belittle the Josepha incident. It colored Midget’s 
life; it colors it still.’655 However, the preceding sentence makes the narratorial 
identity more ambiguous: ‘Josepha had shown her or she had shown Josepha what 
love was or could be or become if the earth, by some incautious legerdemain, should 
be swept from beneath our feet; and we were left ungravitated between the stars.’656 
The ‘we’ here may of course be read as referring to humankind, but it is also 
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possible that the ‘we’ points to the ‘I’ of the narrator and Midget together as one, 
leading to the inference that they share an identity and are only separated by time. In 
another instance, ‘we’ is again used ambiguously: ‘…we have not yet reached the 
fervor of dark eyes and our setting is blue. Here we have power to choose, we 
magicians, we failures, we ourselves, our very selves, poets and lovers. Although in 
a sense, we have not chosen this blue scene, it has rather chosen us.’657 This ‘we’ 
might be the narrator and Midget, the narrator and narratee, all humankind, or the 
whole set of characters in the novel including the narrator. 
The ‘we’ interpreted as narrator and narratee is evidenced a little further into 
the novel, when Brindel is first mentioned: ‘Brindel, whom we are going to hear of 
later, said to Midget…’658 This ‘we’ must certainly refer to a self and other who are 
on the extradiagetic level, and is addressed to those receiving the narrative in a 
manner that conveys a sense of conviviality with the narrator. Further ahead, 
however, there is a ‘we’ that seems to undo the certainty of that identification: 
 
…we are defrauded of the best. We have our lovers, but we do not have them 
in the proper setting. We are all exiles, we and they. The more joy to us, true, 
the greater share of glory when we meet unexpectedly in some blind alley, a 
little sordid…we would all shout at the incongruity of us all, you and I and 
my lover and the ragged children and white Aphrodite and bronze Hermes 
and a Pan or two to divert the children… We measure, or should measure, 
our capacity for life, (the depth in us for living) not by our power of attracting 
but by our power or possibility of being attracted.659 
 
Here, the possibilities are again opened up to multiple interpretations, as the passage 
first implies a ‘we’ that could incorporate all humankind, then one that is 
intradiagetic and suggests that the narratee could be a character in the story, and then 	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back again to a more inclusive ‘we.’ What is particularly pertinent here is that is the 
stress on love and attraction; it emphasises the feeling of being as one. Even in 
separation there is togetherness – everyone is exiled, it is hinted, from Paradise – and 
the ‘incongruity’ is considered to be a joint characteristic; we are joined together by 
our differences. 
 The pronoun ‘we’ is indicative of intersubjectivity when the narrator is its 
referent, since it refers to more than one subject. In using this pronoun, the narrator 
more than suggests the shared narration of a collective; it is explicitly expressed in 
the use of the first person plural. If ‘we’ are the centre of narrative gravity, then the 
communal subjective voice will develop and be as one through the formation of the 
narrative in a unified (as unified as any self can be) way. 
 To be part of a collective ‘we’ also means, of course, that a stable, individual 
identity – or the self – has to be sacrificed. Paint It Today is possibly the best 
example of how H. D. tries to negotiate this realisation – that the self has to be 
flexible and may even be negated in order to be part of an experience of 
intersubjectivity – through shifts in narrative voice. A few pages into the novel, the 
narrator admits to sharing an identity with Midget as it is explicitly stated that 
Midget is ‘more or less, myself.’660 Jean Gallagher among others has pointed out 
‘that H. D. often associates classical statuary with lesbian sexuality, particularly 
lesbian sexuality understood as both homoerotic and autoerotic.’661 It is no wonder 
that Paint It Today may be understood as such, since the narrator and the protagonist 
may be read as one and the same, or as two separate entities. The narrator remains 
identified with Midget as she retains the first person singular while describing a 	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scene in an Italian forest, just as a traditional first person narrator would describe an 
event that has taken place in the past: ‘I was very glad at that time for my 
companion… He was not a bit annoyed when I sat on the paving stones.’662 Here, 
there is no questioning the fact that Midget and the narrator are one and the same. 
However, just like the initial omniscient third person narration is turned on its head, 
so is the conventional first person account only a few pages later: ‘…I will not let I 
creep into this story. I will not let I go on banging the tinkling cymbal of its own 
emotion. You and I are out of this story, are observing and (if you will let I still 
intrude by way of speaking out opinions) I think, myself, that Midget really was a 
lucky girl.’663 The return to the third person is explained by the necessity to keep 
subjective emotions out of the narrative. The narrative voice therefore expresses the 
need to open up the gap between itself and Midget again, and in doing so implicates 
a ‘you’ in addition. As the ‘you’ is ‘out of the story’ here, it cannot be identified as 
Midget, but might signify the narratee, or even be a self-reflexive ‘you’ and refer to 
the narrative voice itself. 
Ritual sacrifice is invoked again towards the end of the novel, where the 
distance between Midget and narrator is emphasised again as the former is 
considering a statue of Jason in the Musée du Louvre: ‘White lily of the valley. That 
is what I should, were I Midget with her magic gift of seeing through the present into 
the past or the future, whichever she may call it, place at the feet of these two 
heroes…’664 The narrator proposes that she would lay lilies-of-the-valley on the 
ground before the Greek statues, like an offering. If it has been suggested before that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
662 H. D., Paint It Today, 24-5. 
663 H. D., Paint It Today, 26. Emphasis in original. 
664 H. D., Paint It Today, 64. 
Sanna Melin Schyllert 
 274 
the narrator and Midget are one and the same, and that they are only separated by a 
distance in time, this passage appears to contradict that assumption, since the 
narrator claims she (or he?) does not have Midget’s psychic vision. As with the 
initial suppositions regarding the ‘we,’ the previous statements made about the ‘I’ 
are challenged here, in a paragraph that states what sacrifice the narrator would make 
were she and Midget one and the same. 
The constant negotiation of space between narrator and protagonist naturally 
blurs the boundary between the two, and the demarcation is further clouded by the 
narrator’s self-reflection: ‘Myself [sic] who was an unformed sort of nebulous 
personality shall have no name. You might have called me Midget if you were very 
stupid, but I was not Midget.’665 The nebula of the narrative self is indefinable, or 
was; the past tense indicates that the narrator’s present state may be more distinct, 
although the previously stated confusion in the text as regards its identity suggests 
otherwise. 
First, it is stated that Midget is ‘myself’ and then that ‘I was not Midget’ – 
yet there has been no other perceived change in the narrative voice. This is a case of 
what Brian Richardson calls ‘denarration,’ that is, when the narrative voice factually 
contradicts itself and thereby ‘draw[s] attention to what could be called, after J. L. 
Austin, the performative nature of the articulation of a fictional world.’666 One of the 
foundations of fiction is the suspension of disbelief – in order to understand a 
fictional narrative, one needs to accept the premises given by the narrator as true – 
and if the narrator turns back on itself and negates a premise previously given, the 
reader is not only made confused and possibly suspicious as to the reliability of the 	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narrator, but aware of the ‘performance’ on the page. In a sense, it is akin to breaking 
the fourth wall, as it is intended to make the audience self-aware as audience. 
The denarrated text also has affinities with religious or mystical texts, which 
are often paradoxical in nature. One example with which H. D. may have been 
familiar is the famous first lines of the Daodejing: ‘The Way that can be told of is 
not an Unvarying Way / The names that can be named are not unvarying names.’ 667 
The narrator of Paint It Today is well aware of this and self-consciously discusses 
the mysticism involved in her own narration: ‘Do I become somewhat mystical in 
contemplation of this Midget contemplating Jason and Jason’s friend, hurling his 
disc? That may be. But I belong to a curious race. I lived before the black cloud fell. 
I am living still. And while the cloud was on us, I looked and wondered and looked 
and did nothing to help one way or the other.’668 The self-criticism that concludes 
this quotation is again a reminder of the war and its implications for the self-image 
of one of H. D.’s narrators, as well as a peculiar offhand admission of survivor guilt. 
The ‘you’ here might refer to a universal ‘you’ (as in ‘one’), the narratee, or 
be a self-reflection. A fourth possible conclusion is that the ‘you’ means all of the 
above; since the narrator’s personality is nebulous, shifting, and apparently without 
any borders or rules, it is conceivable that the narrator can be identified as several 
personalities or identities in one narrative consciousness. The narrator is also 	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any. Translations and interpretations of the Daodejing are notoriously varied due to 
the mystical nature of the original text, not to mention the complexity involved in 
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narratee, protagonist, and possibly every other imaginable identity; it is an 
intersubjective narrative consciousness. Amusingly, it is not a universal 
consciousness without internal struggle – since it has previously stated that Midget is 
‘myself,’ it is calling itself stupid and undoubtedly contradicting itself in the 
quotation above. It is vital to point out that this struggle is never resolved in H. D.’s 
work. Despite Paul Smith’s claim of Helen in Egypt – that ‘idealist and mystical 
consciousness gives way to the recognition and acceptance of the subject’s split 
condition’ – it is clear from most of H. D.’s writing that there is an ongoing 
negotiation between material and transcendent experience, not least in the late works 
Majic Ring and The Sword Went Out to Sea, and that the transcendent experience is 
still highly relevant for H. D. in her later years.669 
Another instance of the ‘you’ in the very same paragraph suggests, however, 
that there is a differentiation between the narrator and the narratee, pointing instead 
towards the identification of the narratee as Josepha, the first woman with whom 
Midget falls in love: ‘Josepha had called her a white sword flower. But if you had 
looked carefully, you would have seen there was no sword in my face. Possibly if 
you had looked again, you would have realized it was in my heart.’670 Implicitly 
addressing Josepha, the narrator again identifies with Midget, as it is presumably her 
that Josepha ‘had called a white sword flower.’ Clearly, it is not for anyone to say 
who the narrator and character are, at least not without the narrator putting up a fight, 
if not even the beloved Josepha may define her without contradiction. 
Not only is the distinction between the narrator and protagonist uncertain, but 
there is also evidence that other characters within the story can affect or alter 
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Midget’s consciousness. Raymond, her former fiancé, is one of these: ‘She seemed 
to be arguing with herself quite clearly about something the Raymond person had 
jabbed into her consciousness.’671 The permeability of Midget extends to Raymond, 
if not in as great an extent as to the narrator, and lets him ‘jab’ things into her 
consciousness. It is difficult not to draw a parallel to H. D.’s relationship with Ezra 
Pound – on whom Raymond is modelled – who is portrayed as an insistent and 
violent manipulator of the author’s fate in the memoir End to Torment; he ‘drags’ H. 
D. where he wants her, ‘pushed,’ ‘banged,’ ‘pounding’ with a stick to get his way, 
and is ‘injected’ and ‘re-injected’ into her life continually.672 
The lack of secure and stable borders of consciousness in all of H. D.’s 
Madrigal protagonists – and indeed in the author herself – is what enables that which 
is the theme at the heart of much of H. D.’s prose: creativity and madness. These two 
facets are bound up with the theme of sacrifice and self-development for H. D., as 
her protagonists are motivated by one and held back by the other in their constant re-
negotiation of the boundaries of self. The exhilaration of losing oneself in a 
meditative, creative flow teeters on the edge of an unstoppable descent into mental 
illness, the fear of which is ultimately the fear of losing the self forever. Running the 
risk of losing the self permanently seems to be a sacrifice required for creativity. The 
protagonists’ time travels, concern with spiritual energy, and deep connection with 
other human beings, feed into the creative process in some way, yet also cause 
intermittent collapses, as the boundary between dream and reality is dissolved in the 
process. All of these things are made possible through the sacrifice of the self – the 
individual consciousness, partitioned off from others by clear boundaries of the 
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beginning and end of the self – for the benefit of being able to open oneself up to an 
intersubjective conscious. 
If the conclusion of a narratological analysis of HERmione is that the 
narrator/protagonist is in a state of turmoil as regards identity, but that the centre of 
narrative gravity remains intact as it is possible to identify the protagonist with the 
narrator throughout the novel, then the outcome of a similar look at Paint It Today 
should indicate that the centre of narrative gravity is lost here because there is 
incoherence as to who the narrator identifies as or with. But does the continuous 
creation of personae necessarily result in a loss of the centre of narrative gravity? In 
Paint It Today, the contradictions suggest so, but then the question must be asked 
whether it would be at all possible to write or read such a narrative. There may exist 
a sense of discontinuity, memory loss, reconstruction or destruction of the physical 
body, reinvention of the self, and even rebirth of the self, and still the centre of 
narrative gravity within a consciousness could remain intact, according to the 
definition of the term as outlined in chapter 1 of this thesis. But, then, how do we 
know that it is one and the same narrator throughout the narrative? It is felt through a 
coherence in tone, style, and address; even if there are indices that suggest a 
multifarious narrative voice, that voice is nonetheless the same throughout the novel. 
Since the narrative consciousness in Paint It Today is coherent and easily understood 
as one and the same for the reader, despite its many explicit identity crises, the 
conclusion must be drawn that the centre of narrative gravity is intact. 
The relevance of sacrifice for the many pronoun shifts in Paint It Today, 
then, is that the initial wish to dispose of the mother in the manner of Orestes is seen 
to be symbolically fulfilled, as Midget negotiates her self through the defining 
moments of life. She gives up the self, rediscovers the self, and puts her self at risk 
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in every moment of intersubjectivity. Rather than half-heartedly mimicking a 
sacrifice made by someone else without making the narrative surrounding it into her 
own, like Sinclair’s Harriett Frean, or using her personal narrative by making it into 
a communal one for the purpose of justifying an actual blood sacrifice, like Butts’ 
Scylla Taverner, Midget accomplishes what Sinclair’s Mary Olivier aspires to: 
freedom of the self through sacrifice. 
* 
This chapter concludes that sacrifice in H. D.’s Madrigal cycle is necessary for 
creative production, because sacrifice produces intersubjectivity, and artistic creation 
requires an intersubjective space. Psychoanalytic theory combined with an esoteric 
religiosity make up the basis for H. D.’s syncretic idea of intersubjective space. 
Using pronoun shifts in her fiction to trouble and toy with the binary pair of subject 
and object, she forms an intersubjective space, a community of selves, within the 
narrative that is similar both to Mary Butts’s polyvocal, intersubjective narrative 
consciousness and to epiphanic moments of intersubjectivity in May Sinclair. 
 The four prose works analysed here evidence on the one hand a 
preoccupation with both ritual and everyday sacrifice, and on the other a constant re-
imagination, re-evaluation, and re-invention of the self. This sustains the hypothesis 
that sacrifice enables both destruction and construction of the narrative self. 
Similarly to Mary Butts and May Sinclair, H. D. negotiates the realisation of the self 
through sacrifice by way of experimental shifts in narrative voice. H. D. also reflects 
on the power of creativity in the formation of the self, as do the two authors 
previously discussed. In the Madrigal cycle, although creative production is seen as 
necessary for the development of the self, it is also portrayed as dangerous, because 
it contains a possible detrimental effect in cases where the centre of narrative gravity 
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is lost and the self no longer has any power or control. Narrative positions shift 
continually as the self is constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed in the novels. 





Sacrifice, although conventionally thought of as a pre-modern phenomenon, is a 
highly relevant concept in modernity. The narratives looked at in this thesis evidence 
the correlation between early twentieth-century experimental writing and the theme 
of sacrifice through formal experiments that effect the dissolution of the self as a 
centre of narrative gravity and create an intersubjective, communal narrative 
conscious that contains both self and other, just as sacrifice generates a possibility 
for the self to be simultaneously obliterated and affirmed by the community. 
Sacrifice through religiously coded ritual, scapegoating, war, motherhood, 
and feminism creates a possibility for the individual to succumb and be merged with 
the collective, whilst paradoxically being reinforced as an individual. 
Unconventional shifts in the personal pronoun used by the narrative voice bring the 
negotiation between individual and community to a syntactical level. 
Having established the importance of investigating sacrifice in the context of 
modernist culture, I have looked at the works of three authors, specifically chosen 
for their prominence in the interwar period and relative obscurity in literary 
scholarship today: May Sinclair, Mary Butts, and H. D. These three women share the 
tool of pronoun shifts in producing experimental narrative. I have argued that this is 
part and parcel of their interest in sacrifice, as it demonstrates on the page the 
assimilation of the subject self – the ‘I’ – into something that is other – a ‘you’, ‘she’, 
or ‘we’. Sacrifice as a narrative strategy thus has two expressions: thematic and 
stylistic, the co-agency of which is conducive to the reading of sacrifice as a central 
concept in the works. 
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The formal experiments that relate to sacrifice on the grammatical level are, as I 
have shown, pronoun shifts that mark various plateaux of the narrator-protagonist’s 
renunciation and realisation of the self. Further research into the formal aspects of 
using sacrifice as a narrative strategy might include looking at the intertextual level, 
where the stories told within each individual authorship are strikingly similar to one 
another, in some instances to the point where the same lines occur in several 
different works and the main difference is the naming of the characters. These 
repeated occurrences of events connected with sacrifice emphasise the similarities 
between ritual and the narratives, even when the context is suggestive of non-
transcendental, everyday sacrifice.  
Sacrifice is so important in these early twentieth-century works because it 
responds to the issue of the relationship between self and community, a problem 
which became increasingly acute in the First World War and its aftermath. The 
narrative pronoun shifts show a suspicion towards a hegemonic narrator and a 
linearly ordered narrative – a typically modernist challenge and normally understood 
as promoting individual freedom over the strictures of society – but they also herald 
the dissolution of the self and its immersion into a community. Most importantly, the 
centre of narrative gravity – the subjective narrative consciousness – is destabilised 
through fragmentation and does not allow for being put together again without the 
now known threat that dissolution can (and probably will) happen again at any time. 
A typology of person shifts in narrative voice would need to be established in order 
to further research in this area, building on a joint understanding of linguistics and 
narrative theory. This cross-disciplinary work lays the ground for further work in 
both abovementioned disciplines, but also has potential for branches of the medical 
humanities that strive to understand how self-reflective narratives are constructed. 
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The point that these – formally modernist – texts are making in their use of sacrifice, 
appears to be an oddly postmodern one, if by postmodernism we mean the self-
conscious deconstruction of objective truths and metanarratives, as they pronounce 
the death of the subject and simultaneously assures its reconfiguration in ever-
changing constitutions. Even Butts’ novels, where the social group is seen to be 
dependent upon its metanarrative, are indicative of a suspicion towards and 
consciousness of the fabricated nature of such metanarratives. The pronoun shifts not 
only suggest misgivings towards a structured hegemony – they show that there is no 
way out of such a hegemony that is not equal to chaos, illustrated in these works as a 
breakdown of meaning and understanding, most effectively shown through the 
denarration in Paint It Today. Paradoxically, the sacrifice of the self entails a 
reconstruction of the self enabled by the collective that – through its absorption of 
the individual self – reconstitutes the self, which is still identified as belonging to an 
individual, but is now enriched and augmented by its bond with others. 
The implications for the larger modernist project, then, is the postmodern 
aspect of modernist works that show an interest in sacrifice without proclaiming its 
position in a value system, that is, without saying that sacrifice is inherently a good 
or a bad thing. The works studied here, though they project a preoccupation with the 
individual self, are not indicative of an interest in saving the self from having to 
make sacrifices. Rather, they suggest that without sacrifice, there is no self. 
Many other modernist writers show an interest and concern with sacrifice, as 
has been suggested in chapter 1, so a selection had to be made not just on the basis of 
the texts themselves and their context, but on the state of the field of research today. 
In order for this thesis to be significant and make an original contribution to 
knowledge within the field of literary studies, it was imperative to look beyond high 
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modernism to find out new things about modernist fiction that will challenge 
readings of individual works as well as perceptions of the movement as a whole. In 
order to do so, we need to look to the works that are on the edges of modernism and 
see what they might tell us. 
My conclusion is not only significant for further research into literary 
modernism in terms of a revaluation of its relation to concepts that are traditionally 
thought of as having pre-modern connotations, but also for the wider implications of 
the role that sacrifice plays in contemporary society. It is imperative to deepen the 
understanding of the concept and its consequences for human behaviour, particularly 
with regard to contemporary world politics and international relations. In order to 
make sense of the existence of human sacrifice today we must widen or re-define the 
traditional, western view of modernity, so that the reality of such phenomena as 
suicide bombers is not dismissed as being simply anachronistic, horrifying, and 
inexplicable. Naturally, there are multiple reasons why sacrifice is still a significant 
part of society, but if those reasons are to be understood, we cannot remain 
entrenched in the view that sacrifice is inherently archaic. 
 On the back of the evidence laid out in this thesis, I propose that despite these 
works’ historical status as modernist, they in fact illustrate the death of the subject, 
which is more closely associated with postmodernism. However, they also effect the 
recreation of the subject through sacrifices made for the benefit of a physical or 
spiritual community. In doing so, they transverse the binary opposition of self and 
other, which calls for either a re-evaluation of these works as modernist or of the 
distinction between modernism and postmodernism. There are many fertile areas of 
further research into the concept of sacrifice in other modernist works, but it would 
also be of relevance to consider sacrifice in the postmodern era in future research. 
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Writers like Kurt Vonnegut, Don Delillo, and Salman Rushdie spring to mind as 
potentially suitable for such a project, which would further develop the idea that the 
concept of sacrifice is germane to an understanding of contemporary society. All 
three writers’ concern with the apocalypse and the fragmentary nature of the 
subjective self, in combination with Vonnegut’s treatment of sacrifice in war, 
Delillo’s work on terrorism, and Rushdie’s re-formulation of traditional religious 
narratives, would make for an interesting future project. 
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